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ABSTRACT 
 
Whilst studies on capital punishment in Japan have been conducted by various 
scholars from various perspectives, empirical research on the de facto 
moratorium period is largely unavailable.1 This thesis aims to investigate how 
consistently the Japanese government justified capital punishment during the 
execution-free period from 1989 to 1993. Its primary goal is to throw light on the 
elite-driven nature of the capital punishment system where important decisions 
are made within the closed institutional dynamic, often irrespective of domestic 
or international factors. It will also highlight that capital punishment policy has 
been dealt with by the Japanese government as an issue of law and order, 
which does not necessarily invite criticism from human rights perspectives. The 
thesis then proceeds to empirically examine the governmental discourse on 
capital punishment from 1980 to 2002. It will contend that investigations from an 
appropriate approach can make clear the elite-driven nature of capital 
punishment policy in Japan. Finally, it will suggest implications for the 
international and domestic anti-death-penalty advocates regarding their 
campaigns over Japan, and reflect on how this thesis can help tackle future 
research.  
 
KEY WORDS: JAPAN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, DE FACTO 
MORATORIUM PERIOD, GOVERNMENTAL JUSTIFICATION, MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE 
                                                  
1 The few works that briefly touch upon this era include: (1) Capital Punishment in Japan by 
Petra Schmidt (2002); and (2) ‘Japan’s Secretive Death Penalty Policy: Contours, Origins, 
Justifications, and Meanings’ by David T. Johnson (2006). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a worldwide declining trend in the number of states retaining capital 
punishment today, and more than two thirds of the states in the world have 
abolished this system in law or practice (Amnesty International 2010:1). 
International society has also created a series of benchmarks for modern 
democracies regarding the abolition of capital punishment. They are 
represented by relevant covenants2 of the United Nations (UN) and the acquis 
communautaire that states must conform to before they can be admitted into the 
European Union (EU). Given that states tend to adhere to international norms in 
order to be recognised as legitimate members of international society (Axelrod 
1986:1105; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:895), it may appear that it is in states’ 
interests to comply with the anti-death penalty norm. Nonetheless, since capital 
punishment deprives people of their right to life, it cannot be simply justified as a 
domestic cultural manifestation or by reference to national sovereignty.  
 
Currently, the US and Japan are the two remaining industrialised democracies 
that retain capital punishment against the international trend. However, Japan 
recently experienced a de facto moratorium on executions from 28 July 2010 to 
29 March 2012, for one year and eight months; and there was also a longer 
execution-free period which lasted for three years and four months from 1989 to 
1993 (see Appendix I).  
                                                  
2 For example, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that 
‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’; Article 5 stresses that ‘No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. 
Moreover, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) clearly aims at the abolition of capital punishment. 
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This thesis addresses how the Ministry of Justice in Japan justified capital 
punishment policy during the de facto moratorium period from 1989 to 1993. 
Although studies on capital punishment in Japan have been conducted by 
various scholars from various perspectives (Johnson 2002; 2006; Schmidt 
2001; Sato 2008; Johnson and Zimring 2009; Fuse 2009), very few works have 
primarily focused on this period. Indeed, the existing literature (Schmidt 2001; 
Johnson 2006) is often conceptually flawed and is not backed up by detailed 
empirical evidence. There has been no serious attempt to conceptualise this 
period, or to investigate the implications of this phenomenon to understand 
Japan’s capital punishment policy. The existing research tends to overestimate 
the influence of one of the then Ministers of Justice, who did not authorise 
executions because of his personal belief, and it does not provide detailed 
analysis of how the capital punishment system had been discussed by a wider 
sphere of actors such as bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice and the general 
public. Hence this thesis aims to fill the gap in the existing literature and 
empirically explain the de facto moratorium from 1989 to 1993. 
 
With regard to a writing style, I employed a Japanese way. All Japanese names 
are presented in Japanese order, with the family name first; and Japanese terms 
are written in italicised romaji (English transliteration of Japanese) throughout 
this thesis.  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the 
elite-driven nature of the capital punishment system in Japan. It is concerned 
with three research questions: (1) Who are the real actors who get involved in 
capital punishment policy? (2) To what extent are domestic and cultural factors 
reflected in this process?; and (3) How was this policy justified by the Ministry of 
Justice during that execution-free period?   
 
The Ministry of Justice often cites five intertwined domestic factors in its official 
statements on justification of the capital punishment system: (1) maintenance of 
legal order; (2) deterrent effect; (3) Japanese culture; (4) public opinion; and (5) 
victim satisfaction.3  However, in-depth investigation of each claim provides 
alternative views. Firstly, the government claims that capital punishment should 
take place as laid down in legal provisions in order to keep Japan hochi kokka 
(law-abiding country); capital punishment and the execution method used have 
been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court since 12 March 1948, and 
hanging is stipulated by Article 11 of the Penal Code. However, the 
constitutionality and legality of this system are still controversial today. Whilst 
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates that ‘No person shall be 
deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except 
according to procedure established by law’, Article 36 of the Constitution 
provides that ‘[t]he infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel 
                                                  
3 Ministers of Justice who proclaim these factors include Okuno Seisuke (1980b:8); Sakata 
Michita (1982b:20); Sumi Eisaku (1984:8); Gotoda Masaharu (1993b:3); Moriyama Mayumi 
(quoted in Japan Times, 4 October 2002).  
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punishments are absolutely forbidden’. Moreover, whilst the responsibility of 
Ministers of Justice regarding authorising execution orders is stipulated by 
Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legality and propriety of this 
provision have been debated amongst legal scholars.  
 
Secondly, although governmental opinion polls indicate wide public support for 
retention of capital punishment, based on belief in its deterrent effect, the 
methodological defects of the survey questions have been pointed out by 
various scholars (Sato 2008; 2009). Finally, the government tends to proclaim 
that the capital punishment system has been retained in order to respect the 
feelings of the victims’ bereaved families and a social norm, which treats death 
as a price worth paying for serious crimes (Moriyama quoted in Japan Times, 4 
October 2002). However, opposing opinions by the anti-death penalty victim 
lobby have been ignored. Rather, it appears that it is (1) the governmental 
officials’ recurring use of language, which makes reference to Japanese culture, 
and (2) the media’s excessive focus on the pro-death-penalty victim lobby that 
have been making the public believe that the capital punishment system is 
deeply embedded in the Japanese culture and can deter crimes. By unpacking 
the real key actors who are involved in this policy, and by examining how they try 
to construct a dominant discourse on capital punishment referring to domestic 
and cultural factors, this thesis will clarify the real motive of the Ministry of 
Justice in justifying retention of the capital punishment system even during 
execution-free periods.  
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The claim to originality of this thesis lies in this: (1) it offers a better 
understanding of the institutional and cultural dynamics where capital 
punishment is justified by policy elites; and (2) it provides rich empirical data on 
the government’s arguments to justify the existence of the death penalty during 
the de facto moratorium period from 1989 to 1993 in Japan. Firstly, none of the 
existing research has combined institutional and cultural frameworks in order to 
investigate the capital punishment system in Japan. The decision making 
procedure regarding capital punishment policy has been researched by scholars 
of criminal justice (Johnson 2002, 2006; Kikuta 2002a); the social norm which 
treats death as a price paying for crimes by scholars of the Japanese view on life 
and death (Lifton 1977); and other Japanese cultural features, such as 
consciousness of human rights and the law, by legal scholars (Johnson 2002, 
2006; Kawashima 1967). However, these study areas have not been combined 
in order to investigate capital punishment policy in Japan comprehensively. By 
doing so, my thesis will clarify that the capital punishment system is primarily 
elite-driven, and decisions regarding this policy are made independently from a 
social norm or other cultural factors.  
 
Secondly, no one has systematically investigated the de facto moratorium period 
from 1989 to 1993. The scant literature which briefly touches upon this era 
includes Capital Punishment in Japan by Petra Schmidt (2002) and ‘Japan’s 
Secretive Death Penalty Policy: Contours, Origins, Justifications, and Meanings’ 
by David T. Johnson (2006). However, Schmidt (2001:63–73) merely cites 
parliamentary proceedings during this period in the sub-section ‘The Justice 
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Minister’, and the specific reference to the de facto moratorium period is only the 
following sentence: ‘The reasons for this, amongst others, included the refusal of 
former Justice Minister and a Buddhist priest, Sato Megumu, to sign execution 
orders’ (Schmidt 2001:64). Her book is more of a very informative book grasping 
the big picture of the capital punishment system in Japan chronologically, and 
does not investigate the de facto moratorium period in depth or provide 
discussion of the wider public. Similarly, Johnson only refers to the way the de 
facto moratorium came about:  
 
for the 40 months from November 1989 to March 1993, the Japanese 
state executed no one because four successive Ministers of Justice 
refused to sign (or had no opportunity to sign) the requisite death 
warrants. The third of those Ministers, Megumu Sato, was a Buddhist 
priest who believed that the death penalty violates the sanctity of life 
(Johnson 2006:88–9). 
 
As for the reason why there is little existing literature on the de facto moratorium, 
two factors can be mentioned. Firstly, capital punishment policy is characterised 
by confidentiality and secrecy (Johnson 2005; 2006), which has been making it 
challenging for activist groups or researchers to conduct empirical studies 
through access to the pro-death-penalty norm entrepreneurs, such as 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice, or death row inmates. According to Kaga 
Otohiko, a former technical official at the Tokyo Detention Centre, ‘postwar 
democracy was valid in the 1950s’ (Kaga and Yasuda 2008:127): researchers 
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could even interview death row inmates in person and publish their works freely. 
Indeed, the issue of capital punishment was actively discussed within the 
Ministry of Justice. For example, the Keibatsu to Shakai Kairyo no Kai (Criminal 
Punishment and Social Reform Association) was founded in 1955 by staff of the 
Ministry of Justice such as Masaki Ryo and Yoshikawa Eiji; and prison guards 
and detention centre custody officers also debated capital punishment 
passionately (Kaga and Yasuda 2008:129). They wrote to the newspaper 
stressing the importance of abolishing the system, and presented such ideas in 
the Diet as well (Kaga and Yasuda 2008:129).  
 
However, after a tsutatsu (circular) imposing restrictions on death row inmates’ 
communication was issued on 15 March 1963, 4  a secretive policy was 
employed regarding capital punishment policy, and interviews with death row 
inmates also became impossible with a few exceptions5. When Kaga published 
the book Shikeishu no Kioku (Memory of Death Row Inmates) in 1980, the 
Ministry of Justice accused him of disclosing some significant information that he 
would not have known if he did not work in such a post; and public prosecutors 
also denounced his action as against the Public Service Act (Kaga and Yasuda 
2008:127). Therefore, when the International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH) carried out its first investigation in 2001, delegates could only meet senior 
civil servants from the Ministry of Justice, and their requests for interviews with 
death row inmates were denied (FIDH 2008:3–4). Similarly, David T. Johnson’s 
                                                  
4 See Chapter 2 for the details of detention conditions. 
5 For example, a writer, Saito Michinori, has been corresponding with a death row inmate, 
Odajima Tetsuo, both in person and by post, periodically since July 2006. See Chapter 1 for 
details.  
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works on capital punishment in Japan are primarily based on in-depth interviews 
with public prosecutors, not with bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice (Johnson 
2002:9).  
 
Secondly, it is important to note that the Japanese government does not 
conceive the de facto moratorium period as a political event to be examined 
academically, and the Ministry of Justice refuses any research-related 
investigation into this era. In my interviews, two MOFA (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) ministers, one of whom was previously in the Ministry of Justice, were 
reluctant to discuss this period with a presumption that there was a de facto 
moratorium from 1989 to 1993.6  They stated that although there was an 
execution-free period, it was inappropriate to consider it as a kind of politically 
stable period when bureaucrats refrained from authorising executions. 7 
Questioning the existence of the de facto moratorium period can be crucial to 
understand capital punishment policy in Japan. The Japanese government 
justifies capital punishment on domestic, cultural and legal grounds consistently. 
Executions tend to take place annually; however, since executions are 
postponed for years at times, some scholars and anti-death-penalty lobbyists 
tend to describe this lapse of time a de facto moratorium period.  
 
The discussion in the existing literature revolves around the causal relationship 
between personal convictions of Ministers of Justice and absence of executions; 
and the anti-death-penalty lobby discusses the possible impact of contemporary 
                                                  
6 Interview with two MOFA ministers, Tokyo, 17 June 2011 
7 Ibid. 
10 
 
domestic and international events, although such an impact is not proved by any 
evidence. The important question to be dealt with in my thesis is whether or not 
there was a period equivalent to a moratorium during this period in Japan. In 
order to investigate this, it is significant to examine: (1) what the nature of the 
moratorium period is; (2) who tends to or tends not to call the execution-free 
period a de facto moratorium period; and (3) what factors tend to make an 
execution-free period look like a moratorium period.   
 
It has been challenging for scholars or anti-death-penalty NGOs to investigate 
this period with limited access to the primary sources, and they have not 
completed a systematic study on the de facto moratorium period for a better 
understanding of capital punishment policy in Japan. This thesis is based on 
empirical research which uses data from fieldwork in Japan from April to June in 
2011, and it aims to fill the gap in the existing explanation of Japan’s retention 
and justification of capital punishment. For these two reasons, I believe that my 
thesis represents a novel departure for the study of capital punishment in Japan.  
 
TIME PERIOD AND CASE STUDY SELECTED 
 
This thesis conducted an empirical research covering 1980-1989; 1989-1993; 
and 1993-2002. The main focus is on the de facto moratorium period from 1989 
to 1993, in order to analyse the governmental discourse from parliamentary 
proceedings. Examining the ten years before and after the de facto moratorium 
era, it seeks to examine the consistency of the Ministry of Justice in justifying 
capital punishment policy. With regard to the choice of the particular period from 
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1989 to 1993, it is worth explaining why: (1) my thesis did not select more recent 
de facto moratorium periods in Japan; and (2) it is important to examine what 
happened nearly 20 years ago even though secondary literature is largely 
unavailable.  
 
Executions were recently put on hold for one year from 28 July 2009 to 28 July 
2010, and for one year and eight months from 28 July 2010 to 29 March 2012. 
However, the prime reason that my thesis did not choose these periods is the 
limited access to the latest data. The central reason for executions being put on 
hold during these periods was that Ministers of Justice did not authorise 
execution orders. However, it is wrong to give too much prominence to the 
personal convictions of Ministers of Justice, given the elite-driven nature of the 
capital punishment system led by bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. Instead of investigating the contemporary periods, 
this thesis chose to study the de facto moratorium period from 1989 to 1993 by 
analysing the primary sources; challenging the existing claims and hypotheses 
on this period in secondary sources; and interviewing witnesses of this period. I 
believe that the case study in my thesis will provide initial findings that the future 
comparative work can add depth to.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that this thesis does not engage with issues such as 
the domestic or international impact of the de facto moratorium period. Neither 
does it deal in detail with the government’s resistance to the international 
anti-death-penalty campaigns. Given that the issue of capital punishment 
12 
 
revolves around closed decision making within the Ministry of Justice and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, investigating the international influence on the 
domestic decision making is not necessarily relevant to my thesis. Instead, this 
thesis primarily deals with the ‘language’ the Ministry of Justice has been using 
to justify the capital punishment system even when executions were put on hold.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This thesis employed a triangulation strategy (see Figure 1), and conducted 
textual and empirical research with the use of theoretical sampling and 
discourse analysis. This is based on Norman K. Denzin (1970:26)’s claim that 
‘because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple 
methods of observations must be employed’. This part will explain how exactly 
these individual methods were combined in a single sequential design.  
 
First of all, this thesis employed a theoretical sampling strategy. According to 
Jennifer Mason, theoretical sampling refers to ‘selecting groups or categories to 
study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical 
positions and analytical framework, your analytical practice, and most 
importantly the explanation or account which you are developing’ (Mason 
1996:94). Therefore, this thesis took a level-of-analysis approach focusing on 
two main levels: the government and civil society. This is to capture the rich 
diversity and fluidity of institutional and social relationships amongst the actors. 
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Figure1 Research Design 
 
TRIANGULATION STRATEGY 
 Early Stage 
(2008) 
Fieldwork 
(April to June 2011) 
Write-up Stage 
(2013) 
Textual  
Research 
   
   
Primary Sources  
- Parliamentary Proceedings 
- Governmental Opinion Polls 
- Periodic Reports by human rights NGOs 
Secondary 
Sources 
 
- Academic 
Books  
 
- Academic Books  
- Monthly/Annual Magazines  
(in Japanese)  
                  
Empirical 
Research 
   
In-depth Interviews                        Interviews to 25 people: 
                 -  Governmental Officials 
                 -  NGO workers 
                 -  Anti/pro-death-penalty advocates 
                 -  Scholars  
 
The main actors that this thesis will examine at each level are: (1) officials and 
ministers in the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and Diet 
members; and (2) public opinion, and anti- and pro-death-penalty 
NGOs/advocates. What merits some attention is that the capital punishment 
system has been the province of a narrow elite in the Ministry of Justice and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the role that actors at the civil society level can 
play in this tightly-knit institutional dynamics is limited. However, re-investigation 
Theoretical Sampling and Discourse Analysis  
Analysis of Data Collected in Fieldwork
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of public opinion, and the way in which the Japanese government strategically 
cites domestic factors for the justification of capital punishment, can help 
illuminate the elite-driven nature of this policy. Similarly, although 
anti-death-penalty NGOs do not possess official status to get involved in capital 
punishment policy making, it is beneficial to contrast their approach on capital 
punishment from human rights perspectives with the governmental approach 
based on the issue of law and order.   
 
Textual Research  
 
Focusing on these actors at two levels, most of the initial research was 
conducted through an analysis of official documents from the Japanese 
government such as parliamentary proceedings, public opinion surveys 
conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office, and periodical reports by both 
international and domestic human rights NGOs. Secondary sources range from 
academic books to monthly/annual magazines that contain articles by politicians, 
researchers, and journalists such as Sekai (World) and Nenpo Shikei Haishi 
(Annual Report: Abolishing Capital Punishment). The Nenpo Shikei Haishi series 
follows the domestic and international trends on capital punishment and local 
activities of human rights NGOs in particular, and it was helpful in collecting the 
vast volumes of documentation needed to evaluate death penalty-related 
movements during and after the de facto moratorium. Since this series was first 
published in 1996, it does not fully cover the ten years before the de facto 
moratorium period. However, an interview with the editor allowed me to get 
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first-hand information about the missing period. 
 
In handling these documents, discourse analysis was conducted in order to 
evaluate ‘how political concepts, ideas, language, behaviour and institutional 
arrangements are loaded with assumptions about the nature of the social and 
political world and our understanding of it’ (Burnham et al. 2004:242). This is 
primarily to assess what ‘language’ the Japanese governmental officials had 
been using during the de facto moratorium period in order to construct a 
dominant discourse on capital punishment as legitimate. As Peter Burnham et al. 
(2004:244) argue, politics can be understood as ‘a struggle to control the 
dominant political language’ since:  
 
language can be used to deceive and to manipulate those to whom it is 
addressed. Language and discourse are dominated by the powerful in 
society who can impose meanings and explanations of social reality 
which protect their interests and undermine those of the rest of society, by 
spreading confusion and deceit in discourses that allow oppression and 
exploitation of the weak to continue (Burnham et al. 2004:242–3).  
 
Furthermore, as Colin Robson (2011:372) argues, ‘[i]n discourse analysis, it is 
not only the substance of what is said (which forms the basis for conventional 
analysis) that is important but the styles and strategies of the language users – 
how they say things’. This holds true of capital punishment policy in Japan, and 
the Ministry of Justice appears to be using particular language to domestic and 
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external actors. In other words, it tends to claim the significance of domestic and 
cultural factors consistently in order to gain public support to back up this policy, 
and to avoid taking responsibility to comply with international norms. Therefore, 
it is important to analyse the governmental discourse on the issue of capital 
punishment, mainly using parliamentary proceedings. 
 
Empirical Research 
 
Besides such documental analysis, in-depth interviews8 were conducted with 25 
people, including government ministers, NGO staff, pro- and anti-death-penalty 
advocates, and scholars from April to June 2011 in Japan (see Appendix II). Its 
primary aim was to investigate the social and political background of the case 
study period in order to gain better understanding of how the Ministry of Justice 
had been justifying the capital punishment system, citing domestic factors. As 
Robson claims, conducting interview was beneficial since:  
 
‘[f]ace-to-face interviews offer the possibility of modifying one’s line of 
enquiry, following up interesting responses and investigating underling 
motives in a way that postal and other self-administered questionnaires 
cannot. Non-verbal cues may (end of 280) give messages which help in 
understanding the verbal response, possibly changing or even, in 
extreme cases, reversing its meaning’ (Robson 2011:280–1).  
                                                  
8 In to encourage cooperation to be interviewed on this sensitive subject, I agreed in my 
initial contacts with interviewees that they would remain anonymous in my thesis. For this 
reason, unless otherwise stated, interviewees’ real names are not mentioned. 
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The interviews were semi-structured,9 and although the script had previously 
been sent to the interviewees by post or e-mail, extra questions were also added 
as the conversation developed. Regarding the interview questions (see 
Appendix III), they were not standardised but customised, depending on the 
interviewees’ views on capital punishment, expertise, and professional standing. 
Whilst asking all the interviewees the same questions can make comparison 
easier, it is not necessarily helpful to put questions about the de facto 
moratorium period to people who were not witnesses or participants in events of 
that period. In addition, my interview sought to avoid simplistic ‘for or against’ 
questions on the issue of capital punishment. Whilst the issue of capital 
punishment tends to divide people into two extremes – retentionists and 
abolitionists – a great amount of agreement is often observed at a certain point 
or at a more fundamental level, and disagreement can be observed even within 
each lobby. By customising questions depending on interviewees, the interviews 
sought to capture various opinions on the capital punishment system. This 
helped highlight that there exist various views about capital punishment in civil 
society, whilst the Japanese government proclaims wide public support as 
justification for its continuation. 
 
With regard to the selection of interviewees, most of them were people who have 
                                                  
9 Semi-structured interview refers to that ‘The interviewer has an interview guide that serves 
as a checklist of topics to be covered and s default wording and order for the questions, but 
the wording and order are often substantially modified based on the flow of the interview, 
and additional unplanned questions are asked to follow up on what the interviewee says’ 
(Robson 2011:280). 
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either basic or sufficient knowledge concerning the key governmental actors in 
capital punishment policy. This is because:  
 
‘[t]he qualitative interviewer conducting a long, in-depth interview with a 
respondent whose background he has studied is less likely to 
mismeasure the subject’s real political ideology than […] interview[ing] 
with a randomly selected respondent about whom he knows nothing’ 
(King et al. 1994:31).  
 
Firstly, it was critical to access the pro-death penalty norm entrepreneurs, or 
governmental officials in the Ministry of Justice since my thesis aims to 
investigate the governmental justification for capital punishment. However, they 
were very reluctant to be interviewed since this policy area is characterised by 
confidentiality and secrecy. For example, most of the ministers were consistent 
in reproducing the governmental view and showed cautious attitudes towards 
questions that had not been provided in advance. Although they also questioned 
me about my own view or how it has been discussed in Europe, this does not 
necessarily indicate that they showed any interest in the European view on this 
issue for their reference. Rather, they appeared unwilling to engage with the 
issue since they considered me as an abolitionist.  
 
Regarding the MOFA, it appeared to have another reason for not being eager to 
discuss the issue with a third party. According to a MOFA minister, the MOFA is 
not in a position to express any independent opinion on capital punishment, and 
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it only reproduces the policy of a particular Ministry that is in charge – the 
Ministry of Justice in this case – as a dominant voice of the Japanese 
government.10 This supports the argument of Glenn D. Hook et al (2001:45) that 
although the MOFA is responsible for the day-to-day running of Japanese 
diplomatic policy and functions as Japan’s window upon the world, ‘its ability to 
direct and manipulate Japanese foreign policy is constrained by its own internal 
organizational limitations’.  
 
On the other hand, NGO workers, attorneys, academics and so on expressed 
their own views more freely, and emotionally at times. Their passion appeared to 
result from very personal experiences such as their religious views or the media 
coverage of capital punishment including false charge cases or serious murder 
cases. Most of their remarks were independent from ‘public opinion’ that can be 
observed in the media reports. Finding this out was very beneficial since it can 
support my hypothesis that it is the Japanese government that is the actual 
supporter of capital punishment, and ‘public opinion’ can greatly vary depending 
on how people are asked questions on this issue and their level of 
understanding of this system.  
 
In particular, despite the nature of my research into events of approximately 20 
years ago, witnesses to or participants in those events were very co-operative 
with my interviews: a former death row inmate, a former Minister of Justice, and 
senior members of human rights NGOs. With regard to a former death row 
                                                  
10 Interview with a MOFA minister, Tokyo, 9 May 2011 
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inmate, Menda Sakae,11 his first-hand information on life in detention, including 
his dialogues with prison guards helped illuminate the elite-driven nature of the 
capital punishment system. Secondly, postal correspondence with Sato Megumu, 
who had been a Minister of Justice during the de facto moratorium period, was a 
great opportunity to contrast his official statement on capital punishment, which 
can be found in the parliamentary proceedings, with what he can currently say 
freely with his own words. Thirdly, interviews with NGO workers were also 
essential to complete my research given that:  
 
DNGOs (domestic NGOs) have access to information on the ground 
through extensive contacts that INGOs (International NGOs) could not 
possibly get access to on their own, and have access to political and 
legal strategies within national jurisdictions that INGOs would normally 
not have the knowledge or contacts to employ (Calnan 2008:11).  
 
Senior members of anti-death-penalty NGOs, in particular, were very 
cooperative in providing me with first-hand information about the social and 
political background of the de facto moratorium, which I could not have known 
from the existing literature. Those who are not necessarily witnesses to or 
participants in the de facto moratorium, but have been engaging in the current 
anti-death-penalty activities, or those who are keenly involved on the issue of 
                                                  
11 Although it was difficult to approach Menda for interviews at the first stage, the contact 
was achieved through the help of senior NGO staff: Shimaya Naoko, a core member of 
Forum 90; Tagusari Maiko, the Secretary General at the Center for Prisoners’ Rights; and 
Yamazaki Hiroyuki, a representative of Tanpopo no Kai, a local anti-death-penalty NGO in 
Fukuoka Prefecture. In particular, Shimaya has currently been acting on behalf of Menda, 
and postal and e-mail correspondence with Menda was achieved through her help. 
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capital punishment in general, were also interviewed. For example, they include 
a representative of a victims’ group; senior writers at newspaper agencies; a 
senior staff member at the Delegation of the European Union to Japan; and 
academics in law, sociology, and EU-Japan studies. The aim of interviewing 
them was to examine how the wider public have been discussing the issue of 
capital punishment in their own personal or professional approaches, whilst it 
has been treated by the Ministry of Justice as one of the governmental policies 
to be implemented in a dutiful manner. I believe that my interviews in Japan 
helped me test the considerable amount of secondary source analysis I have 
completed, and added tremendous value to my thesis.   
 
THESIS OUTLINE 
 
Finally, this section summarises the content of my thesis and the main 
arguments discussed in each chapter. Chapter 1 will present an analytical 
framework to understand Japan’s capital punishment policy. The existing 
research poses various hypotheses on Japan’s retention of capital punishment 
considering historical, external, and internal factors. However, this chapter will 
examine the bureaucratic decision making mechanism in Japan, and clarify the 
elite-driven nature of capital punishment policy. It will also examine the 
divergence between the Japanese government and anti-death-penalty bodies in 
approaching the issue of capital punishment.  
 
The first part of Chapter 2 will critically examine the validity of the governmental 
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justification for capital punishment on cultural grounds. Through reconsidering 
what kind of cultural features have been claimed to be associated with the 
capital punishment system in Japan, it will clarify how policy elites’ recurring use 
of language that makes reference to culture has been influencing the public and 
scholars to believe that capital punishment policy is domestically and culturally 
determined. The second part will propose a better approach to investigate the de 
facto moratorium period in Japan’s capital punishment policy. Whilst some 
scholars and activists treat the execution-free period as a politically significant 
phenomenon, as if it was not in line with government policy, the thesis will clarify 
that executions were not put on hold because of any political initiatives. It will 
contend that appropriate investigation of this period can provide a better 
understanding of the elite-driven capital punishment policy in Japan.  
 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will empirically examine how the Ministry of Justice justified 
the capital punishment system from 1980 to 2002. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
period from 1980 to 1989, when the government was legitimising the system 
despite the emergence of criminal justice issues including the disclosure of 
successive miscarriages of justice. Chapter 4 examines the de facto moratorium 
period from 1989 to 1993. It will investigate how consistently the Japanese 
government justified the system even when executions were being put on hold 
for more than three years. Chapter 5 focuses on the period from 1993 to 2002. It 
will examine how the government tried to maintain the dominant discourse on 
crime and punishment for the justification of capital punishment after executions 
were resumed. Finally, the Conclusions will summarise the main findings of the 
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thesis, set out implications for the international and domestic anti-death-penalty 
advocates regarding their campaigns to Japan, and present a future research 
plan.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Capital Punishment Policy Decision Making: A Framework for Analysis 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The existing research poses various hypotheses on Japan’s retention and 
justification of the capital punishment system. In particular, David T. Johnson 
(2011) demonstrates nine hypotheses from three perspectives: historical, 
external, and internal. However, too many variables have currently been 
considered as factors potentially influencing the governmental decision making 
process, even though capital punishment policy is primarily elite-driven. The aim 
of this chapter is to fill the gap in this area of knowledge, and to provide an 
appropriate analytical framework to understand Japan’s capital punishment 
policy. In order to do this, it will examine the Japanese decision making 
mechanism, and critically investigate the extent to which it accounts for the 
power dynamics surrounding capital punishment policy.  
 
The first part of this chapter will review the current academic approach on 
Japanese government’s retention of capital punishment. It will use the same nine 
sub-headings as Johnson’s work. In order to test the validity of each claim, the 
second part will introduce the Japanese decision making model called the Iron 
Triangle, which is composed of: (1) bureaucrats of the economic ministries and 
agencies, (2) politicians of the ruling party, and (3) leaders of the business 
community (McCargo 2004:110).  
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The third part of this chapter will then apply this decision making mechanism to 
capital punishment policy, and re-define the power relationships between the 
actors. The first two actors can be: (1) bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice and 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office; and (2) Ministers of Justice and politicians of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (1955 to 2009; 2012 to today) and the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (2009 to 2012). However, since important 
decisions tend to be made by the former actors, often irrespective of the latter, 
this part will explain why bureaucrats exert tremendous power over capital 
punishment policy. Furthermore, this part will argue that the third actor, which 
replaces the business community, has not been systematically established in the 
existing literature. Although pressure groups which support the government’s 
pro-death-penalty policy may be suggested, capital punishment is a primarily 
bureaucrat-led policy, and it is dubious to locate the pressure groups in the triad 
as actors of equal influence or power with the other two. Unpacking the key 
actors in the institutional framework within which policy elites operate, this part 
will clarify the applicability of the Iron Triangle model to capital punishment 
policy. 
 
Having illuminated the elite-driven nature of capital punishment policy, the 
second part of this chapter will examine the governmental approach to capital 
punishment. The ineffectiveness of the anti-death-penalty lobby in getting 
involved in capital punishment policy can be partly explained by its limited role in 
the bureaucrat-led decision making process. However, it also appears to stem 
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from a divergence between the Japanese government and anti-death-penalty 
advocates on the approach to the issue of capital punishment. Through 
investigating detention conditions and the execution procedure in detail, this part 
will highlight the fact that the Japanese government has been treating capital 
punishment policy as an issue of law and order, not as an issue of human rights.  
 
1.2. EXISTING HYPOTHESES ON THE GOVERNMENT’S RETENTION OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT  
 
Historical Factors  
 
Johnson (2011:141–4) poses the following three factors as the historical 
explanation of Japan’s retention of capital punishment: (1) the US occupation; 
(2) the characteristics of Japanese political parties; and (3) Japan’s geographical 
position and its stability as a democratic country. Firstly, the US occupation 
intended to disarm the military, eradicate imperialist thinking, and root 
democracy in Japan. The aims included ‘the downsizing of the emperor from 
“god” to mere “symbol of the State and of the unity of the people”, the 
renunciation of war, the creation of due process rights, and the establishment of 
the principle of equality of the sexes, of the Diet as the highest organ of state 
power, of the power of judicial review, of land redistribution, and so on’ (Johnson 
and Zimring 2009: 60–1). However, since capital punishment remained in 
Japanese criminal justice, Johnson introduces a hypothesis that the US may 
have left the system intentionally in order to execute seven war criminals in the 
Tokyo War Crime Trial in 1948 (Johnson and Zimring 2009:60–1; Johnson 
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2011:142). In other words, his assumption is that Japan would have abolished 
capital punishment in the post-war period if that had been included in the then 
US policy (Johnson 2011:142).  
 
Secondly, Johnson mentions the characteristics of Japanese political parties and 
their resistance to political changes including the abolition of capital punishment. 
The Japanese government was ruled by a pro-death-penalty LDP for 
approximately 54 years from its foundation in 1955 to when the Democratic 
Party of Japan defeated it in 2009; and the LDP has regained power from 2012 
again. In his hypothesis, the government’s retention of capital punishment stems 
from the LDP’s policy on this issue and its perpetual dominance (Johnson 
2011:143). Thirdly, Johnson points out Japan’s geographical position and its 
stability as a democratic country. For example, since Japan is geographically 
distant from Europe, the EU’s anti-death penalty norm may not appear to appeal 
to the Japanese government (Johnson 2011:144). Another hypothesis he 
suggests is that since Japan is in a geographically important area and has 
already established its status as a democratic country, international society does 
not appear to want to punish Japan for not complying with international norms 
(Johnson 2011:144).  
 
External Factors 
 
Secondly, with regard to external factors, Johnson mentions Japan’s relationship 
with two states and one region: the US, South Korea, and Asia. Firstly, given that 
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the US and Japan are the two remaining industrialised democracies that retain 
capital punishment against the international trend today, it is often discussed 
amongst scholars that if all the 50 states in the US abolish capital punishment, 
Japan will follow suit (Johnson 2005:253; 2011). Secondly, South Korea is being 
raised as a possible key country that could influence Japan’s policy making. The 
last execution in South Korea took place on 30 December 1997, and its 
government has been implementing a de facto moratorium until today. Therefore, 
Johnson’s hypothesis is that Japan would mirror South Korea’s policy once that 
country abolished capital punishment in law, since he believes that Japan wants 
to protect its self-image as a leader in Asia, and does not want to allow Korea to 
stand out in any policy area (Johnson 2011:147; 2005:253, 266). Thirdly, 
Johnson suggests a linkage between Japan’s retention of capital punishment 
and a lack of regional organisations in Asia such as an East Asian Community. 
His claim is that there do not exist any Asian organisations that can make the 
abandonment of capital punishment a criterion to which Japan must conform 
before being admitted as a member, as the EU does (Bae 2008:79; Johnson 
2011:148)12.  
 
  
                                                  
12 Although there are already various organisations in this area such as: (1) the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); (2) ASEAN+3 that include China, Japan, Korea; (3) 
the East Asia Summit (EAS); and (4) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), their main 
focus is on the economy and security, not human rights (Bae 2008:79; Johnson 2011:148).  
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Internal Factors  
 
Finally, Johnson raises three internal factors: (1) strong public support for capital 
punishment; (2) a unique Japanese view on sin and human rights; and (3) a 
‘punitive’ way of thinking from the perspective of victims’ bereaved families. First 
of all, public opinion is one of the primary reasons for the Japanese government 
to retain capital punishment. Governmental opinion poll results have revealed 
that the vast majority of Japanese citizens, 85.6 per cent in 2009, support the 
system (Appendix IV). Secondly, it is often said amongst governmental officials 
that it is a unique Japanese mentality on life and death that has been 
contributing to Japan’s retention of capital punishment (Okuno 1980c:8; Goto 
1989:3; Moriyama quoted in Japan Times, 4 October 2002). In their argument, 
the Japanese public believes that execution through capital punishment is the 
only way for some offenders to atone for their crimes, and that it functions as 
social justice for the victims’ bereaved families. Thus, Johnson suggests that 
domestic factors have been playing a significant role in the government’s 
retention of capital punishment in Japan. 
 
Whilst these hypotheses cover a wide range of domestic and international 
factors comprehensively and may appear helpful to understand Japan’s 
retention of capital punishment, the actual decision making is conducted by 
selected bureaucrats in the closed institutional framework irrespective of cultural 
features or external pressures. In order to challenge each hypothesis, the 
following part will first clarify who get involved in the capital punishment policy 
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making.  
 
1.3. JAPANESE DECISION MAKING: THE IRON TRIANGLE MODEL 
 
First of all, it is important to clarify how the Constitution of Japan lays down 
where power rests in Japanese decision making. According to Article 1, 
sovereignty resides with the people; and Article 65 stipulates that the executive 
power is vested in the Cabinet. The Cabinet is composed of (1) the Prime 
Minister, who is elected by members of the Diet; and (2) other Ministers of the 
State (Article 66). Regarding the selection of the Ministers of State, the Prime 
Minister appoints them, and a majority of them must be chosen from amongst 
the members of the Diet (Article 68) in order ‘to insure a government 
accountable to the electorate’ (Thayer 1969:180). As Nathaniel B. Thayer 
(1969:183) states: 
 
After the prime minister has decided what sort of a cabinet he intends to 
choose, he will call for recommendations of lower house members from 
the faction leaders and of upper house members from party leaders in 
the House of Councillors. Factional balance and the selection of able 
men will be the two principles which guide the prime minister in the 
selection of his new cabinet. Particular attention will be paid to the 
economic posts. After the prime minister has selected his new officers, 
they will be attested to by the emperor, a proclamation of the new 
cabinet will be issued, and the cabinet will formally be set in motion.  
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During this process, ‘the staff rarely proposes candidates on its own initiatives, 
but restricts itself to commenting on the proposed cabinet lineup given it by the 
prime minister’ (Thayer 1969:185). In the meantime, cabinet changes stem from 
the following two factors. Firstly, Article 69 stipulates that ‘If the House of 
Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence 
resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse’. Secondly, ‘The Prime Minister 
may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses’ (Article 68) considering the 
fact ‘that the present cabinet is not working well, that the present government 
policies are not going smoothly, or that the public is tired of the same old faces 
and the same old voices’ (Thayer 1969:182). 
 
Thus, the constitutional provisions promise that Japan is a parliamentary 
democracy (Article 65, 66, 68); and the Prime Minister exerts a key role in 
making a cabinet. However, the existing research has shown that Japan is a 
‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ country (Van Wolferen 1989:272) in reality. In other 
words, it is a cluster of bureaucrats, or higher civil servants, who play significant 
roles in the Japanese government. In fact, cabinet reshuffles carried out 
approximately every year do not allow cabinet members to play executive power, 
and the Prime Minister has practically:  
  
‘no explicit legal authority enabling him to insist on policy innovation 
outside his Office, force a Cabinet colleague to take a particular course 
of action or even divulge a particular piece of information’ (Neary 2004: 
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675).  
 
A discrepancy between theory and practice can be observed in the actual power 
dynamics within the Japanese government. Instead, a model that has been 
widely used to account for the power dynamics in the Japanese decision making 
process is the Iron Triangle, which consists of bureaucrats, party politicians, and 
the business community, which is represented by the Keidanren13, the Japan 
Business Federation (McCargo 2004:110). Of the three, bureaucrats play a 
significant role in both policymaking and policy implementation in Japan. 
Approximately 80 per cent of all legislation passed is drafted by bureaucrats, and 
Diet members merely rubber-stamp the documents (Van Wolferen 1989:33, 
145).  
 
As Karel van Wolfren (1989:145) argues, ‘[t]he law-making process is usually 
over by the time a bill is submitted to the Diet’. This may appear at first sight a 
simple result of the bureaucrats’ long tenure of office in contrast to party 
politicians. Whilst bureaucrats are usually employed for life, ‘LDP cabinet 
ministers rotate their jobs on average about once a year, and are rarely in post 
long enough to stamp their ideas on a particular ministry, even if they were 
minded to do so’ (McCargo 2004:105). However, bureaucrat-led decision making 
system has also been strengthened by other intertwined factors: (1) the fluidity of 
                                                  
13 Keidanren is ‘a federation of leading industrial organisations such as the automobile 
manufacturers’ association, the shipbuilders’ association, the iron and steel federation, the 
petroleum association and the chemical industry association, together with trading 
companies, wholesale business, banks, insurance companies and securities companies’ 
(Van Wolferen 1989:34). 
33 
 
bureaucrats within the triad; (2) their power relations with the business 
community; (3) the standardised educational background of bureaucrats; (4) the 
Japanese decision making process, which prefers ‘group consensus’; and (5) 
the continuous domination of the LDP. Through examining these aspects, this 
section will clarify why bureaucrats tend to play a significant role within the Iron 
Triangle.  
 
Firstly, bureaucrats tend to occupy important posts in the business community 
and the ruling party through a system of amakudari, or descent from heaven. 
Amakudari is a custom of outplacement by which senior high-profile bureaucrats 
from governmental agencies such as the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry move to the private and public sectors such as the Bank of Japan, 
commercial banks, trade and industry associations, and the boardrooms of 
private enterprise (Boyd 1987:68). Also, about 25 per cent of the LDP Diet 
members are ex-bureaucrats under a similar system (Krauss 1989:53), and they 
try ‘to represent the interests of their former ministry […so that] their […] 
personal connections with their former colleagues would [not] fade’ (Van 
Wolferen 1989:143). 
 
Secondly, whilst the business community provides the government funding, 
bureaucrats tend to influence their activities through a practice of gyosei shido, 
or administrative guidance. According to Krauss (1989:51): 
 
Administrative guidance is a general term that encompasses formal and 
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informal methods of implementing policy, from the issuing of formal 
administrative ordinances that have the force of law, to informal 
communication that attempt to persuade social groups to go along 
voluntarily with a policy.  
 
Although this practice is not legally binding, the business community tends to 
abide by it. This is because:  
 
‘Governmental officials are responsible for approval of applications for 
almost every conceivable business activity. If they do not like an 
applicant, for whatever reason, they can hold of a decision on that 
person’s applications’ (Van Wolferen 1989:344).  
 
Therefore, although administrative guidance only requires ‘voluntary 
co-operation’ from the business community in theory, it is almost compulsory in 
practice (Van Wolferen 1989:344–5).  
 
Thirdly, what characterises bureaucratic decision making is that the bureaucrats 
tend to act on precedents (senrei shugi) (Mori 2008:18) and make conservative 
decisions without inviting new ideas from various people of various backgrounds 
or experiences. What makes it possible is that they are a standardised elite 
group. Bureaucrats tend to be recruited disproportionately from Japan’s most 
prestigious universities through competitive examination (Krauss 1989:51; 
Campbell 1989:115; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1998:60; Richardson 1998:109), 
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and the prime example is the Law Faculty of Tokyo University. As John C. 
Campbell (1989:116) contends, ‘attracting the best students from the best 
universities makes the Japanese bureaucracy more effective in terms of sheer 
talent, and public respect encourages self-confident leadership’. Furthermore, 
this not only helps them agree to follow precedents but also helps make the 
consensual decision making smooth when a new proposal is made. Since ‘new 
graduates can readily plug into the established alumni network’ (Van Wolferen 
1989:111), it is easy for them to build human connections, which becomes useful 
for this process.   
 
Indeed, what also symbolises the Japanese decision making process is that 
bureaucrats maximise the use of available measures in order to reach 
consensus in advance. What creates an ‘illusion of consensus’ (Van Wolferen 
1989:339) in particular is the ringi system with a use of nemawashi. Under the 
ringi system, a proposal is passed around the ministry to get approval from 
superior officials (Yamada 1985:102). Stamps indicate approval, and those who 
disapprove do not put a stamp on the proposal, while those who want to give 
conditional approval put it either sideways or upside down (De Mente 1975:87; 
Ruch 1984:71). However, what deserves some attention regarding this system is 
that: (1) it does not expect an open objection during this process; and (2) the top 
authority dealing with the issue usually approves the proposal considering the 
long process it must have taken. A practice of nemawashi, or ‘binding the roots 
of a plant before pulling it out’ (Vogel 1975:xxii), is often held in order to help 
reach a ‘group consensus’. As van Wolferen (1989:338) argues: 
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Nemawashi involves talking with the concerned parties so as to prepare 
them to ‘accept’ a plan, as one prepares the ground for planting 
something. Such spadework does not invite ‘democratic’ objection (with 
the option of rejection), as a similar process would in the West.  
 
Moreover, ‘[w]hether or not a ringi proposal is approved by the […head] is 
primarily determined by who has approved it by the time it gets to him’ (De 
Mente 1975:88). Considering the long process, which could take a month until it 
reaches the top authority, he usually approves the proposal (Ruch 1984:72). In 
addition, what characterises the bureaucrat-led decision making system is that 
the ringi system is not always used for the aforementioned purpose for less 
important matters but ‘serves to circulate information about decisions already 
made’ (Ruch 1984:72).   
 
Finally, what has made the triad highly interdependent is the perpetual 
domination of the LDP (Krauss 1989:39, 52) from 1955 to 2009 (with 1993 as 
exception) and from 2012 to today. As Duncan McCargo (2004:114), argues, ‘[t]o 
a large extent, studying the politics of Japan means studying the politics of one 
leading party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’; and post-war economic 
reconstruction could never have been achieved without this mechanism 
(McCargo 2004:106, 110).  
 
This section has introduced the Iron Triangle model – discussing bureaucrats’ 
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significant role in this triad, in which they make the most of their personal 
networks within the ruling party and the business community – and the Japanese 
decision making tradition and the stability of the ruling party. Having examined 
the elite-driven decision making mechanism in Japan, the subsequent section 
will move on to evaluate the extent to which the Iron Triangle model fits into the 
decision making mechanism regarding capital punishment policy in Japan.  
 
1.4. APPLICATION OF THE IRON TRIANGLE MODEL TO CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT POLICY 
 
In order to investigate the applicability of the Iron Triangle model to capital 
punishment policy, it is important to examine which people in which 
governmental agencies (1) underpin the legal legitimacy of the system, (2) get 
involved in the actual running of the system, and (3) represent and justify the 
policy on legal, domestic, and cultural grounds both internally and externally.   
 
Firstly, it will clarify the role that the Supreme Court plays in the governmental 
justification of capital punishment. Although the constitutionality and legality of 
the capital punishment system and the execution method used have been 
controversial in Japan, the Supreme Court consistently declares that they do not 
conflict with any legal provisions. Examining the people who serve as judges at 
the Supreme Court, this part will clarify why they tend to make decisions in 
favour of the government. Secondly, it will highlight the role that the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office plays in this system. Even though it is the Ministry of Justice 
that is responsible for capital punishment policy, the public prosecutors in 
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practice get involved in the crucial part of the policy. This section will explore how 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is a subordinate institution of the Ministry of 
Justice, runs the capital punishment system in reality.  
 
Relating to this fact, the third part will examine the limited power of Ministers of 
Justice, at the head of the Ministry of Justice, in capital punishment policy. Given 
that non-authorisation by Ministers of Justice can delay executions, their 
personal convictions may appear crucial factors in the policy at first sight. 
However, this section, mentioning the short tenure of Ministers of Justice as one 
reason, will clarify that it is employed-for-life bureaucrats in the Ministry of 
Justice who get involved in the actual decision making process. Finally, it will 
critically investigate whether or not pressure groups can fit into the triad 
regarding capital punishment policy. Although the pro-death-penalty lobby’s 
claims may appear to have been reflected in governmental decision making, that 
is not the case in practice. This section will argue that capital punishment policy 
is primarily elite-driven, and important decisions are made irrespective of the 
voice of pro-death-penalty NGOs or the victim lobby.  
 
1.4.1. The Supreme Court 
 
First of all, it is the Supreme Court that consistently proclaims the 
constitutionality and legality of the capital punishment system, and makes the 
final judicial decisions regarding death sentences. Given that Article 76 of the 
Constitution of Japan stipulates that judicial power is vested in the Supreme 
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Court,14 and Article 77 also provides that: ‘Public prosecutors shall be subject to 
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court’, the Supreme Court is theoretically 
independent from bureaucratic control. Having said that, it merits particular 
attention that all the 15 judges in the Supreme Court, who are appointed by the 
Prime Minister, have previously worked as public prosecutors (McCargo 
2004:103). This can lead the Supreme Court to make decisions favouring the 
positions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office on capital punishment, and in fact the 
Supreme Court has overturned decisions on capital cases or the constitutionality 
of the capital punishment system made in lower-level courts.15 Keeping the 
bureaucratic control by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in mind, this section will 
examine how the Supreme Court has been resisting domestic debate on the 
constitutional and legal issue of the capital punishment system; and why legal 
ambiguity is observed regarding the death sentences imposed by the Supreme 
Court.  
 
  
                                                  
14 According to Article 76: The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in 
such inferior courts as are established by law. No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, 
nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power. All judges shall 
be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this 
Constitution and the laws. 
15 This also holds true of other government policies. For example, whilst lower-level courts 
sentenced major companies guilty of causing hazardous pollution in the 1960s, the 
Supreme Court overturned their decisions and ‘helped precipitate new legislation and the 
setting up of an environmental agency’ (McCargo 2004:103).  
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Constitutionality of the Capital Punishment System 
 
Firstly, as briefly discussed in the Introduction, capital punishment has been 
declared constitutional by the Supreme Court since 12 March 1948, and so is 
the execution method, which is specified as hanging in Article 11 of the Penal 
Code.16 However, domestic debate on the constitutionality and legality of this 
system is still open-ended in Japan. For example, whilst Article 31 of the 
Constitution of Japan stipulates that ‘No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, 
nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure 
established by law’; Article 36 of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]he infliction of 
torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden’. 
The key point regarding this debate appears to be that the Japanese 
government has not solved or does not intend to solve a ‘legitimacy problem’ 
regarding the cruelty of hanging. As Austin Sarat (2002:19) argues: 
 
To be legitimate at all, state killing must appear to be different from the 
violence to which it is opposed and to which it is seen as a response. A 
crucial part of this difference is in the way law deals with those accused 
of capital crimes and those who are sentenced to death.   
 
In order to justify state killing, or to distinguish it from homicide which states 
criminalise, most states of the US, the other remaining industrialised democracy 
                                                  
16 Although the execution method in Japan varied from strangulation or decapitation, to 
seppuku or ritual disembowelment, after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 Japan made hanging 
the official execution method, importing the Western criminal system. 
41 
 
which retains capital punishment, have been employing lethal injection, since it 
is meant to kill death row inmates ‘more softly and humanly’ without unnecessary 
pain (Sarat 2002:60; Johnson 2005:259). On the other hand, the Japanese 
government has been sticking to the claim that ‘state killing is state business’ 
(Johnson 2005:260) on the basis of Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan and 
Article 11 of the Penal Code. This is because the Japanese government treats 
capital punishment policy as an issue of a criminal justice, and believes that it 
has the right to choose its own criminal justice system without interference from 
international society (Moriyama 2001b:8).  
 
However, the constitutionality and legality of the capital punishment system are 
not only a concern amongst the legal experts but also for death row inmates, and 
the latter have fought against the Supreme Court. For example, Matsushita 
Kesatoshi, then a death row inmate in the Tokyo Detention Centre, took a legal 
step in 1958 claiming that hanging is in conflict with Article 36 of the Constitution 
of Japan. However, the Supreme Court rejected this case in 1960, referring to its 
previous decision in 1955. In more recent case, a claim by attorneys for Takami 
Sunao 17  was also turned down on 31 October 2011; and Wada Makoto, 
presiding judge at the Osaka District Court, declared that hanging is 
constitutional (Nikkei, 31 October 2011). The Supreme Court, which is filled with 
former public prosecutors, appears to simply represent government positions on 
this issue and proclaim the constitutionality and legality of the capital punishment 
system. 
                                                  
17 Takami, 41 at the time of the crime, set fire to a pachinko parlour in Osaka on 5 July 2009, 
and killed five people and injured 10. He was sentenced to death on 31 October 2011. 
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Criteria for Capital Punishment 
 
With regard to death sentences, it is also the Supreme Court that makes the final 
decisions based on the Penal Code. However, there does not appear to exist a 
clear borderline between capital punishment and life imprisonment in reality 
(Schmidt 2002:45, 55), and public prosecutors tend to influence the judicial 
decision making. First of all, capital punishment is applied to the following crimes 
in Japan, all specified in the Penal Code:  
 
(1) insurrection (Article 77(1));  
(2) instigation of foreign aggression (Article 81);  
(3) assistance to the enemy (Article 82);  
(4) arson of inhabited buildings (Article 108);  
(5) detonating explosives (Article 117);  
(6) damage to inhabited buildings by flood (Article 119);  
(7) overturning of trains (Article 126(3)); 
(8) endangering traffic by overturning of a train (Article 127);  
(9) pollution of water supplies with poisonous materials and causing death 
(Article 146);  
(10) homicide (Article 199);  
(11) robbery causing death or injury (Article 240);  
(12) rape at the scene of a robbery causing death thereby (Article 241), 
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Besides these, the following crimes are also deemed to merit capital 
punishment: 
 
(1) organised homicide (Article 3 of the Act on the Partial Revision of the Act 
on the Punishment of Organized Crime, Control of Crime Proceeds and 
Other Matters; and Article 199 of the Penal Code); 
(2) hostage murder (Article 4 of the Act on Punishment of Compulsion and 
Other Related Acts Committed by Those Having Taken Hostages); 
(3) aircraft hijacking (Article 2 of the Act on Punishment of Unlawful Seizure 
of Aircraft); 
(4) acts of piracy (Article 4 of the Law on Punishment of and Measures 
against Acts of Piracy); 
(5) illegal use of explosive substance (Article 1 of the Criminal Regulations 
to Control Explosives)  
 
Currently, the vast majority of death row inmates have been charged for the 
crime of robbery causing death or injury (The Supreme Court 2012b:1); and the 
Nagayama Criteria have been used as a standard for the Supreme Court to 
impose capital punishment on offenders since 1983. Between October 1968 and 
April 1969, 19-year-old Nagayama Norio stole a gun from a US military base, 
and shot two security guards and two taxi drivers with a handgun in Tokyo, Kyoto, 
Hakodate, and Nagoya (Métraux 2009:283–4). The Juvenile Law stipulates that 
those younger than 19 cannot be punished with death, and Nagayama was 19 
and ten months at the time of the crime. In accordance with the Juvenile Law, 
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Nagayama was sentenced to death in 1979.  
 
Debate shortly arose amongst the legal experts on whether or not there should 
be a clear borderline between 18 and 19, and those over 18 should be punished 
harder (Hara 1998:54–5, 65). Nagayama also tried to defend himself by linking 
the motivation for the murder and robbery to his poverty and ignorance, and 
published a best-selling book, Muchi no Namida (Tears of Ignorance), with over 
270,000 copies in print in 1990. His claim was considered in the trial, and the 
Tokyo High Court overturned the sentence of capital punishment and sentenced 
Nagayama to life imprisonment in 1981. The decision was based on the 
following claim: ‘The government should have saved the accused from his poor 
surroundings, It would be unfair to ignore the lack of proper welfare policies and 
lay all the responsibility to him’ (Japan Times, 1 August 2007).  
 
However, the Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision, and on 8 July 
1983 issued the Nagayama Criteria with nine main factors to be taken into 
account in imposing capital punishment (The Supreme Court 1983). According 
to the Supreme Court Criminal Report (Saiko Saiban sho Hanrei) Vol. 37, No. 6, 
‘The death penalty can be applied only when the criminal’s culpability is 
extremely grave and the ultimate punishment is unavoidable from the viewpoint 
of balance between the crime and the punishment as well as that of crime 
prevention effects, taking into account’ the following nine factors: 
 
(1) the nature of the homicide in question;  
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(2) the motivation behind it;  
(3) the method employed in the killing;  
(4) the number of people killed;  
(5) the feelings of the bereaved family toward the culprit;  
(6) the magnitude of the social implications of the case;  
(7) the age of the defendant;  
(8) whether the defendant has a prior criminal record; and  
(9) whether the defendant has demonstrated any remorse for what he or 
she has done (The Supreme Court 1983:609, translated in Métraux 
2009:6) 
 
On the basis of these newly established criteria, Nagayama’s death sentence 
was finally upheld in 1990, and he was executed at the age of 47 on 1 August 
1997. According to Sonobe Itsuo, one of the four judges in the Nagayama Case, 
not all of the factors have equal weight in the death sentence: high importance is 
attached to the method of killing and the number of those killed in particular 
(Yomiuri, 8 March 2009). Therefore, after the Nagayama Criteria were issued, 
there emerged a general understanding that the number of the victims in murder 
cases is the crucial factor in handing down capital punishment.  
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Legal Ambiguities Regarding Death Sentences 
 
In the meantime, it deserves some attention that the Supreme Court has been 
imposing capital punishment in a few cases which involved a sole victim, as if 
the sixth criterion – the magnitude of the social implications of the case – has 
been reflected in the ruling. The first case is that of a 36-year-old male, 
Kobayashi Kaoru, who kidnapped, sexually assaulted and murdered a 
seven-year-old girl in Nara prefecture on 17 November 2004. Considering the 
nature of this crime,18 Kobayashi was sentenced to death on 26 September 
2006. In a second case three men, who had met through a mobile Internet site, 
kidnapped, robbed, and murdered a 31-year-old woman in Aichi prefecture on 
24 August 2007. The misuse of the Internet was highlighted in the rulings (Japan 
Times, 27 August 2007), and the death sentence of one of them was finally 
upheld in 2009 whilst the rest were sentenced to life imprisonment in 2011 and 
2012 respectively.  
 
A third case is that of an 18-year-old male who broke into a house in Hikari city in 
Yamaguchi prefecture on 14 April 1999, and strangled a woman and her baby; 
this case will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. He was initially sentenced to 
life imprisonment in consideration of his age and the possibility that he could be 
rehabilitated. However, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the defendant, 
                                                  
18 According to the Japan Times on 27 September 2006, ‘He took a photo of the dead girl 
and sent it to her mother over the girl's mobile phone, and about a month later sent her a 
message threatening to target the girl's younger sister as well’. He had already spent three 
years in prison for his attempted killing of a five-year-old girl in October 1991, and had been 
paroled from 1996 (Asahi, 31 December 2004). 
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and the death sentence was finally upheld on 20 February 2012.  
 
The legal ambiguities regarding death sentences may suggest at first sight that 
the Supreme Court reflects the domestic criminal situation and public sentiment 
sensitively. Through a case study of England and Wales, Michael Hough, Helen 
Lewis, and Nigel Walker (1988:1) proclaim the influence of public opinion in the 
judiciary process: ‘In theory the severity and proportionality of tariffs are 
determined by legislatures and judiciaries; but in practice both have an eye on 
the audience […who is] the man in the street’. Having said that, as Julian V. 
Roberts (2002:22) cautions, it is not necessarily right to overestimate such social 
factors in the Supreme Court rulings. Rather, more attention needs to be paid to: 
(1) how public sentiment on crimes tends to be shaped and measured; and (2) 
how Supreme Court decisions are made independently from these factors in 
Japan in reality.  
 
According to the results of the Opinion Poll on the Public Image of Japanese 
Society (Shakai Ishiki ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa), the proportion of the Japanese 
public, who thought crime was worsening, increased from ten per cent in 1990 to 
32.4 per cent in 1995; and it also stayed over 30 per cent from 2002 to 2009, 
reaching 47.9 per cent in 2005 (Hamai and Ellis 2008a:67; The Prime Minister’s 
Office 1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2009b). However, scholars argue that the 
increase in public fear of crime mainly stemmed from an increase in reported 
crimes during this period; and that the rapid increase in reported crimes itself 
was a result of a change in the police policy of counting crimes after the 
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Okegawa Stalking Murder Case19 in 1999 (Hamai and Ellis 2006:162). Since 
this murder incident could have been avoided if the police had dealt with the 
victim’s claim more carefully, relatively trivial crimes, which would have 
previously been ignored, started to be formally reported (Hamai and Ellis 
2006:163–4). This generated a sudden and drastic increase in overall recorded 
crime and decreased clear up rate in statistics (Kawai 2004:39; Hamai and Ellis 
2006:166). The media only highlighted the statistics, and the public anxiety 
about the current state of society appeared to have surged and influenced the 
opinion poll results.20 
 
Furthermore, what is important to acknowledge regarding the weight of public 
opinion on Supreme Court decisions is the elite-driven nature of capital 
punishment policy. As Hamai and Ellis (2008a:73) argue, ‘If public prosecutors 
recommend the death sentence in court, which they do increasingly frequently 
[…], it has recently become more certain that this will be the sentence of the 
court’. It may still appear that the public prosecutors reflect the criminal situations 
at the time and public response to them. However, ‘the Japanese prosecutors 
[a]re much more independent from political pressure and the public opinions 
than their American counterparts’ (Johnson 2002 cited in Hamai and Ellis 
2008a:83) since they pay no electoral price for being nonresponsive. Therefore, 
whilst public outcry about criminal situations may appear to be reflected in the 
                                                  
19 On 26 October 1999, a 21-year-old woman was stabbed to death by a man hired by her 
former boyfriend and his brother, at Okegawa Station in Saitama prefecture. Although the 
victim had filed complaints to the police that her former boyfriend was stalking her and 
defaming her and her family, they had been turned down by the police since they would 
cause an extra paperwork to them (Japan Times, 21 December 2005).  
20 With regard to media coverage of crime and its impact on the public, see Chapter 5.  
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Supreme Court rulings on capital cases, it is important to acknowledge the 
mechanism by which public fear is generated, and who uses such expressions 
of fear in order to recommend the death sentence in court in reality.  
 
The following part will further investigate how the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
exerts tremendous power in capital punishment policy.  
 
1.4.2. The Public Prosecutor’s Office 
 
As already mentioned, both the Ministry of Justice and the MOFA have 
maintained that capital punishment comes under the aegis of the Criminal Affairs 
Bureau in the Ministry of Justice,21 and the Public Prosecutor’s Office is merely 
a subordinate institution within the Ministry of Justice. However, public 
prosecutors practically possess the strongest power in judicial issues (Van 
Wolferen 1989:222). This part will highlight the fact that public prosecutors get 
involved in the crucial part of capital punishment policy through: (1) generating 
confessions from offenders in order to result in sentences of capital punishment; 
(2) hindering measures for death row inmates to be proved innocent; (3) 
preparing documents that notify the Minister of Justice on who is to be executed 
next and when; and (4) taking initiatives regarding executions.  
 
  
                                                  
21 Interview with two MOFA ministers, Tokyo, 17 June 2011 
50 
 
Interrogations to Generate Confessions 
 
Drawing on the existing work on the ‘exceptional efficiency’ of the Japanese 
criminal justice system,22 where public prosecutors obtain confessions from 
suspects at a rate of over 90 per cent (Johnson 2002: 15, 243), Johnson has 
compiled an empirical study detailing how Japan’s two thousand prosecutors 
exercise their formidable powers. He calls Japan a ‘paradise for prosecutors’ 
because: 
 
prosecutors have virtually unlimited discretion in deciding whether or not 
to prosecute. […] [W]hatever they decide, they are free to go by their 
own rules, or those of their superiors, regardless of the evidence in hand 
or their personal belief regarding the suspect’s guilt (Van Wolferen 
1989:220–1).  
 
Firstly, despite the fact that Article 3823 of the Constitution of Japan specifies 
that forced confession cannot be used as evidence, it lies at the heart of the 
Japanese criminal justice system: 
 
In Japan confessions are the king of evidence, and prosecutors are 
given wide legal latitude to compose them in their own words and to use 
                                                  
22 Consistent writers on this issue include C. Johnson 1972; Clifford 1976; Aoyagi 1986; 
Foote 1992a; 1992b; Haley 1992; Mukherjee 1994. 
23 According to Article 38 of the Constitution of Japan: No person shall be compelled to 
testify against himself. Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after 
prolonged arrest or detention shall not be admitted in evidence. No person shall be 
convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own confession.  
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them as evidence at trial […] [T]he law gives investigators many tools to 
extract confessions: time, the single most effective instrument in their 
arsenal; a convenient place (police detention cells); control over 
meetings between suspects and defense counsel; and so on (Johnson 
2002:39).  
 
Suspects are detained in daiyo kangoku (police detention cells) for up to 23 days 
for interrogation, and there are no rules governing human rights standards for 
treatment of suspects. For example, prosecutors are not required to tape or 
video-record interrogations.24 According to the interviews conducted by Jiji 
Press with interrogators, this is to respect the wills of offenders: some offenders 
demand to be interrogated only in private with a single investigator, so that 
matters revealed will remain in the interrogation room (Jiji Press, 1 May 2010). In 
other words, they may not tell the truth to the investigators if the whole 
interrogation is to be videotaped, since the real motive is usually something 
private or embarrassing, which they do not want to be known to members of their 
families or to the general public when they are released from the prison (Jiji 
Press, 1 May 2010). However, scholars challenge such a claim and argue that 
interrogations are not videotaped because what often takes place in daiyo 
kangoku is torture in order to generate confessions (Johnson 2002:279).  
 
Indeed, ‘The prosecutor’s activities are not directed by the principle of in dubio 
                                                  
24 This is in contrast to the practice in states such as the UK, Canada, Australia, and many 
states of the US. For example, it became mandatory to video-record in the UK in1986, in 
Alaska in 1985, and Minnesota in 1994 (Johnson 2002:273). 
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pro reo (‘when in doubt, favour the accused’)’ (Van Wolferen 1989:222). Rather, 
the degree to which suspects make a display of remorse is an important factor 
for public prosecutors in recommending sentences (Van Wolferen 1989:188), 
and interrogations are carried out for days and nights during this period until 
confessions are extracted. Furthermore, since prosecutors are evaluated in 
terms of their efficiency in solving the cases (Johnson 2002:243–4), ‘once he 
has decided to prosecute, he will not accept being shown in the wrong’ (Van 
Wolferen 1989:221). Therefore, public prosecutors even resort to using the right 
to submit immediate appeals against retrials25 in order not to lose face, which 
results in miscarriages of justice. In fact, besides the four major retrials in the 
1980s,26 there are still unsolved cases in the process of pleading for retrials, 
some going back decades.  
 
Public Prosecutors and False Charge Cases 
 
Okunishi Masaru, aged 87, is currently the longest-serving inmate in Japan, 
having been detained for 52 years since 1961. He has been on death row on the 
charge of poisoning five women, and may have made a forced confession 
resulting from long interrogation sessions (Amnesty International 2011). 
Secondly, a former boxer, Hakamada Iwao, aged 77, has been on death row for 
                                                  
25 According to Article 448 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ‘When there are grounds 
for a request for a retrial, a ruling shall be rendered to commence a retrial, and Article 448 
(2) also provides that ‘When a ruling to commence a retrial has been rendered, a ruling may 
be rendered to suspend execution of the sentence’. However, public prosecutors can submit 
immediate appeals against this decision since Article 450 stipulates that ‘An immediate 
appeal may be filed against a ruling as prescribed in Article 446, paragraph (1) of Article 447, 
paragraph (1) of Article 448, or paragraph (1) of the preceding Article.   
26 They are the Menda case, the Saitagawa case, the Shimada case, and the Matsuyama 
case, which will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
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45 years since 1968 for the murder of a family of four in 1966 (Amnesty 
International UK 2012). He has been suffering from a mental illness after 
decades of imprisonment and is not even in a fit condition to meet his family or 
attorney to discuss opening a retrial.  
 
In the most recent development in this case, an official meeting was held on 3 
February 2012 at the Shizuoka Regional District as a part of the process of 
pleading for a second retrial. The main focus of the discussion was to conduct a 
DNA analysis all over again to examine the victims’ blood found on five pieces of 
clothing that Hakamada allegedly was wearing at the time of the crime (Japan 
Times, 24 December 2011). However, the Public Prosecutor’s Office protested 
against the proposal, claiming that ‘it would breach the confidentiality if the DNA 
examiner comes into the detention centre for taking some samples from 
Hakamada. It has to be staff of the National Research Institute of Police Science 
who conduct such job’ (Mainichi, 4 February 2012).  
 
The response of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to Hakamada’s defence team in 
2011 implied that securing confidentiality can override proving the guilt or 
innocence of a man who has been on death row for more than four decades on a 
false charge.27 As already discussed, public prosecutors endeavour to gain 
confessions in order to solve cases ‘efficiently’, and recommend sentences to 
the court. However, when their decision is about to be challenged by the defence 
                                                  
27 On 13 April 2012, a DNA analysis result revealed that Hakamada’s DNA was not found on 
any of the clothes used as the evidence of the crime. Hakamada’s defence lawyer has 
currently been preparing for retrials, which can be permitted on the submission of newly 
discovered evidence (Chunichi, 16 April 2012).    
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team, they appear to try to hinder this in order not to lose face. This case can 
indicate that the priority of the Public Prosecutor’s Office has been given to 
‘solving’ the cases efficiently in order to maintain a high conviction rate, and 
capital punishment policy does not appear to have been dealt with as an issue 
concerning human life. 
 
Although the Fukawa case recently highlighted the necessity for a visual record 
of interrogation in daiyo kangoku, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has not tackled 
this issue until today. The Fukawa case concerns a murder-robbery incident in 
Ibaraki prefecture on 30 August 1967; Sakurai Shoji and Sugiyama Takao, aged 
20 and 21 respectively at the time of the crime, were suspected in the murder of 
a 62-year-old carpenter (Mainichi, 24 May 2011). Despite the fact that neither 
their fingerprints nor their hair were found at the murder scene, they were forced 
to make confessions after a series of long interrogation sessions, and sentenced 
to life imprisonment on 3 July 1978 (Mainichi, 14 July 2008). After being released 
on parole in November 1996, they repeatedly submitted petitions for retrials, and 
their petition was finally accepted in September 2005. Tape recordings of their 
‘confessions’ were found to have been edited in 13 places, and a new DNA test 
confirmed the innocence of the two men in June 2011 some 44 years after the 
initial guilty verdict (Mainichi, 24 May 2011). The then Minister of Justice, Eda 
Satsuki (January to September 2011), demanded that, in light of this case, tape 
and video-recording of interrogations should be mandatory (Jiji Press, 8 April 
2011). The Parliamentary League to Realise the Visualisation of Interrogations 
within the Democratic Party of Japan, also supported his initiative. However, no 
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progress has been made until today. 
 
Public Prosecutors’ Initiatives on Executions 
 
Finally, it must be made clear that prosecutors are also responsible for the 
preparation of documents that notify the Minister of Justice on who is to be 
executed next and when. This is based on Article 472 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which provides that execution is carried out on the initiative of the 
head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. It appears inappropriate for public 
prosecutors to be in charge of this task, especially given the fact that it is prison 
guards in the Correction Bureau under the Ministry of Justice who deal with 
death row inmates on a daily basis and are intimately aware of their health and 
mental condition. However, it is important to note again that prosecutors have a 
near monopoly on important posts in the Ministry of Justice. The positions of the 
Director-General of the Criminal Affairs Bureau and the Correction Bureau in the 
Ministry of Justice are regularly filled by former prosecutors, not by senior prison 
officers; and in many cases, the latter post tends to be given to someone with no 
practical experience in correction. Since they are prime candidates, within a few 
years, for promotion to the Chief Public Prosecutor, they merely try to ensure 
that offenders cause no trouble during their periods in office (Kikuta 2002a:22).  
 
In the meantime, the highest position given to those with practical experience in 
correction is head of the Regional Correction Headquarters (Kikuta 2002a:22). 
Since holders of this post will be transferred to another prison after several years, 
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naturally they also place emphasis on avoidance of trouble or incidents during 
their term. Thus, the Correction Bureau does not tend to have an environment 
that welcomes new ideas or opinions from prison officers to improve the current 
situation. It is considered best to follow what has been the rule for decades, and 
their prime objective is to seek (1) to discourage offenders from seeking redress, 
initiating a lawsuit, or disclosing information about prison life; and (2) to keep 
death row inmates in good health and mental condition so execution will be 
carried out smoothly (Kikuta 2002a:22; Mori 2008:216). Consequently, whilst 
capital punishment policy has been dealt with under the aegis of the Criminal 
Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Justice, the Public Prosecutor’s Office plays a 
prominent role in the running of this policy, from generating confessions from 
suspects to taking initiatives regarding executions.  
 
1.4.3. The Ministry of Justice    
 
Having examined the way that the Public Prosecutor’s Office gets involved in 
practice in the crucial part of capital punishment policy, this section will move on 
to examine the limited role that Ministers of Justice can play, in contrast to the 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The first 
part will examine the legal responsibility and rights of Ministers of Justice 
regarding this policy. More precisely, through examining Article 475 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, which specifies the responsibility of Ministers of Justice 
regarding authorisation of executions, it will discuss the legality and propriety of 
some Ministers’ refusal to authorise executions because of their personal beliefs. 
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The second part will divide past Ministers into three types according to their 
interpretations of the aforementioned Article, and their attitudes towards capital 
punishment in general. Highlighting a divergence amongst Ministers of Justice in 
their views on capital punishment on legal, moral, and cultural grounds, the third 
part will clarify why personal convictions of Ministers of Justice cannot have 
significant influence on capital punishment policy. 
 
Legal Responsibility of Ministers of Justice Reconsidered 
 
The pro-death-penalty advocates’ claim is that non-authorisation by Ministers of 
Justice is a neglect of their official duty, and is against the legal provision in 
Article 475 and 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to Article 475 
(1), ‘Execution of the death penalty shall be ordered by the Minister of Justice. 
Article 475 (2) provides more details and requires the Minister to do this ‘within 
six months from the date when the judgment becomes final and binding’ 
although this excludes the period that applications or requests for a retrial or 
pardon are being made. In other words, Article 475 (2) ‘grants the Minister broad 
discretion to extend this period almost indefinitely depending on various factors, 
such as requests for a retrial or pardon’ (The Advocates for Human Rights 
2012:7). Furthermore, Article 476 provides that executions shall be conducted 
within five days upon the order by the Minister of Justice.   
 
Based on these legal provisions, bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice tend to 
argue that non-authorisation can create ‘unfairness’ amongst death row inmates 
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and their families, and amongst the bereaved families of the victims, especially 
when a pro-death-penalty Minister takes over from one who is opposed to the 
death penalty (Yomiuri, 21 September 2009). On the other hand, it deserves 
some attention that some scholars on law and the Constitution of Japan contend 
that Ministers of Justice are not necessarily bound by the provisions of Article 
475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Firstly, Mizutani Norio (2010:1092), 
professor of law at Osaka University, notes that Article 32 of the Act on Penal 
Detention Facilities and Treatment of Inmates and Detainees (Keiji Shuyo 
Shisetsu oyobi Hishuyosha no Shogu ni Kansuru Horitsu) stipulates:  
 
(1) Upon treatment of an inmate sentenced to death, attention shall be 
paid to help him/her maintain peace of mind. (2) Measures such as 
counseling or lectures which may contribute to helping the inmate 
sentenced to death to maintain peace of mind shall be taken by 
obtaining cooperation from nongovernmental volunteers (The Ministry of 
Justice 2007a). 
 
Therefore, Mizutani (2010:1092) argues that Ministers of Justice do not have to 
authorise executions until death row inmate’s peace of mind is secured. 
Secondly, he suggests it is reasonable that Ministers of Justice do not authorise 
executions when debates on capital punishment are taking place both inside and 
outside the country (Mizutani 2010:1092). Internationally, there is a broad and 
growing consensus against the death penalty, represented by various covenants 
of the UN and the acquis communautaire established by the EU. Domestically, it 
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should be noted that Japan introduced saiban-in seido (quasi-jury system) on 21 
May 2009. Under this newly introduced system,28 panels usually composed of 
three judges and six lay assessors,29  and lay assessors chosen from the 
electoral register, determine both guilt (or innocence) and the sentence to be 
imposed.30 Since the public, who do not necessarily have sufficient knowledge 
of law or criminology, started to get involved in imposing death sentences, a new 
legal system has raised public consciousness on capital punishment policy 
(Johnson 2010). 
 
Similarly, in interviews with a professor of law and a researcher on the Japanese 
constitution,31 both scholars defended the legality of decisions by Ministers of 
Justice not to comply with Article 475, since it is a mere advisory provision (kunji 
kitei). Firstly, Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan provides that ‘All of the 
people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, 
be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs’. 
Secondly, Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates that ‘The Emperor or 
the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all 
other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution’. 
                                                  
28 In Japan, the jury system was used from 1928 to 1943. Under this system, jurors used to 
determine guilt or innocence, and the sentence to be imposed was determined by the 
judges. 
29 According to Article 2 of Saiban-in no Sanka suru Keiji Saiban ni Kansuru Horitsu (The 
Lay Assessor Act), panels are composed of one judge and four lay assessors for certain 
cases such as those where guilt seems beyond doubt. 
30 Article 13 of Saiban-in no Sanka suru Keiji Saiban ni Kansuru Horitsu.  
31 Interview with two constitutional scholars, Tokyo, 13 May 2011 
60 
 
Therefore, according to the constitutional scholar,32 it is not necessarily illegal 
for Ministers of Justice to refrain from authorising executions, even though it may 
seem to be against the Code of Criminal Procedure: it is rather mandatory for 
Ministers of Justice to be extraordinarily careful with decisions that relate to 
matters of life or death, as stipulated in Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan. It 
is also their responsibility to encourage debate in the Diet or in the public 
amongst order to amend the law if necessary.33  
 
Thus the ‘responsibility’ of Ministers of Justice provided in Article 475 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure has been interpreted in various ways by scholars in 
reference to the relevant articles in the Act on Penal Detention Facilities and 
Treatment of Inmates and Detainees, and the Constitution of Japan. Similarly, 
whilst most Ministers of Justice appear to construe this provision as an official 
duty, others stress its ‘advisory’ nature. The subsequent section will illuminate a 
divergence amongst Ministers of Justice regarding their views on Article 475 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the issue of capital punishment in general. 
 
  
                                                  
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid. 
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Ministers of Justice: Different Views on Capital Punishment 
 
According to Petra Schmidt, there are roughly three types of Ministers of Justice: 
the doves, the hawks and the in-betweens. More precisely, they are: (1) those 
who are opposed to the death penalty and refuse to authorise executions 
because of their personal convictions or religious beliefs; (2) those who are in 
favour of the death penalty and authorise the executions; and (3) those who are 
opposed to the death penalty but dutifully authorise the execution of one or two 
inmates annually (Schmidt 2001:63–73) (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Three Types of Ministers of Justice  
 
Name Sex Year Length of 
Appointment 
Numbers of 
Executions 
Party 
The Doves      
Eda Satsuki Male 14 Jan 2011 to 2 
Sep 2011 
8 months 0 DPJ 
Hiraoka 
Hideo 
Male 2 Sep 2011 to 13 
Jan 2012 
4 months 0 DPJ 
Tanaka 
Keishu 
Male 1 Oct 2012 to 23 
Oct 2012 
23 days 0 DPJ 
The Hawks      
Hatoyama 
Kunio 
Male 27 Aug 2007 to 2 
Aug 2008 
1 year 13 LDP 
Yasuoka 
Okiharu 
Male 2 Aug 2008 to 24 
Sep 2008 
1 month 3 LDP 
Mori Eisuke Male 24 Sep 2008 to 
16 Sep 2009 
1 year 9 LDP 
Yanagida 
Minoru 
Male 17 Sep 2010 to 
22 Nov 2010 
2 months 0 Democratic 
Party of 
Japan (DPJ) 
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Ogawa 
Toshio 
Male 13 Jan 2012 to 4 
Jun 2012 
5 months 3 DPJ 
Taki Minoru Male 4 Jun 2012 to 1 
Oct 2012,  
4 months 4 DPJ 
  24 Oct 2012 to 
26 Dec 2012 
2 months 0 DPJ 
The 
In-between 
     
Chiba Keiko Female 16 Sep 2009 to 
17 Sep 2010 
1 year 2 DPJ 
 
*Full data from 1980 to 2013 can be found in Appendix IV. 
 
Firstly, the prime examples of the doves are Eda Satsuki (14 January 2011 to 2 
September 2011) and Hiraoka Hideo (2 September 2011 to 13 January 2012). 
Eda was outspoken on the issue of capital punishment and showed his 
anti-death-penalty sentiment clearly throughout his term of office. In his first 
press conference on 15 January 2011, he described capital punishment as a 
‘defective’ (kekkan no aru) penalty, raising the possibility of wrongful executions 
(Financial Times, 21 January 2011). Although he was criticised for this remark 
and promptly retracted it, he only rephrased the term ‘defective’ to ‘troublesome’ 
(nayami ga ooi, nayamashi) (Eda 2011b:6) in the Legal Affairs Committee on 9 
August 2011, and proclaimed his opinion.  
 
Moreover, in the Legal Affairs Committees on 9 March and 9 August 2011, Eda 
posed a fundamental question over the responsibility of Ministers of Justice 
regarding authorisation of executions: why must the death penalty be authorised 
by the Minister of Justice whilst other criminal affairs are dealt with by 
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administrative officers through administrative procedures? Eda (2011b:6) 
suggested that the reason for final decisions regarding executions being left to 
Ministers of Justice was presumably that they had in their position to consider 
the domestic and international trend comprehensively; and it was not right for 
them to authorise executions mechanically. Moreover, like the constitutional 
scholars,34 Eda claimed that Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was 
a mere advisory provision, and argued that there was no legal problem in not 
authorising execution orders (Eda 2011a:5).  
 
Furthermore, the subsequent Minister, Hiraoka Hideo, showed a similarly critical 
attitude towards the issue of capital punishment in Diet meetings. In the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 25 October 2011, he stressed that it was important for 
Ministers of Justice to consider various factors regarding capital punishment; 
and should not authorise execution orders in a simply dutiful manner (Hiraoka 
2011:13). Firstly, he spoke of the international trend that the Japanese 
government should bear in mind: (1) only three out of 34 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries retain capital 
punishment; (2) one of those three, South Korea, has abolished the system in 
practice; and (3) 16 [now 17]35 out of 50 US states have abolished the system 
(Hiraoka 2011: 13). Secondly, regarding the interpretation of Article 475 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, Hiraoka expressed the same view as Eda and 
implied that ministers’ non-compliance with this provision would not necessarily 
                                                  
34 Ibid.  
35 Currently 17 US states have abolished the death penalty: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Mexico, and New York. 
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generate legal problems such as apparent neglect of an official governmental 
duty (Hiraoka 2011:13).   
 
Secondly, examples of those categorised as the hawks include: (1) Gotoda 
Masaharu, (2) Mikazuki Akira, (3) Hatoyama Yukio, (4) Ogawa Toshio, and (5) 
Taki Minoru. Firstly, Gotoda Masaharu (12 December 1992 to 9 August 1993) 
showed a consistent pro-death-penalty attitude, and resumed the authorisation 
of executions in March 1993 for the first time in three years and four months. He 
insisted that once a judge sentenced a convicted criminal to capital punishment, 
the Minister of Justice should authorise the execution as specified in the law: this 
was to maintain legal order in Japan, and those unhappy with this responsibility 
should resign immediately (Gotoda 1993b:3). This approach was also followed 
by his successor, Mikazuki Akira (9 August 1993 to 28 April 1994), who 
authorised executions for four death row inmates, believing in the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment.  
 
Thirdly, Hatoyama Kunio (27 August 2007 to 26 September 2008) ordered 
executions of 13 detainees in less than a year. Since this was the largest number 
of executions since Gotoda resumed them in March 1993, Asahi, a major 
Japanese newspaper, condemned his behaviour by calling him Shinigami, or the 
Grim Reaper on 20 June 2008. As the number of executions began to invite 
foreign criticism, especially from human rights groups such as Amnesty 
International, Hatoyama stressed that capital punishment was a strictly domestic 
issue. He defended it not only on utilitarian grounds, saying that it was 
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necessary to achieve social justice, but also on cultural grounds declaring that 
capital punishment was an indigenous system deeply rooted in Japan’s own 
history and culture (Hatoyama 2008:25): hence, he said, outside parties should 
have no say.  
 
In a more recent case, in his inauguration speech as Minister of Justice on 13 
January 2012, Ogawa Toshio (13 January 2012 to 4 June 2012) expressed a 
similar attitude and said it was the legal responsibility of the Minister of Justice to 
authorise execution orders. With the number of death row inmates in Japan now 
reaching about 130, the largest number since the end of World War II, Ogawa 
stated: ‘It's a very hard duty, but I want to take job responsibility. […] It isn't in line 
with the spirit of the law for the number of death row inmates to continue 
increasing without executions’ (Japan Times, 15 January 2012). In the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 16 March 2012, he also showed his pro-death penalty 
attitude by saying:  
 
Non-authorisation within six months of the final verdict has been a kind 
of a trend since the end of the war, and I do not intend to authorise 
executions of all of them at once. However, I have not changed my mind 
to fulfill my official duty to authorise executions (Ogawa 2012a:11).  
 
During his term, Ogawa authorised three executions in total. Finally, Taki Minoru 
(4 June 2012 to 1 October 2012; 24 October 2012 to 26 December 2012) also 
took a similar approach to Ogawa’s, and tried to justify capital punishment on 
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legal grounds. Firstly, he stressed in the Legal Affairs Committee on 15 June 
2012 that capital punishment was a fair system equipped with an opportunity to 
open retrials, and a reprieve could also be granted when appropriate (Taki 
2012b:44). Secondly, on 28 August 2012, he emphasised the legal responsibility 
of Ministers of Justice regarding executions as follows: 
 
It is not in line with the legal provisions that Ministers of Justice neglect 
the duty of authorising executions due to personal convictions. Once the 
Supreme Court handed down a death sentence after going through the 
agony of judging whether a person should live or die, the Ministry of 
Justice should respect the decision (Taki 2012a:5).   
 
Although Taki stayed in office for only about four months in his first term, he 
authorised executions of four inmates – two each on 3 August and 27 
September 2012. 
 
Thirdly, Chiba Keiko (16 September 2009 to 17 September 2010) is an example 
of an ‘inbetween’ Minister of Justice. Chiba has a long history as an outspoken 
anti-death-penalty advocate and member of the Parliamentary League for the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty. Although she resigned from the Parliamentary 
League when she was given the appointment, for nearly one year she managed 
to avoid authorising executions. Members of several NGOs opposing the death 
penalty looked forward to celebrating one year free of executions.36 However, 
                                                  
36 Interview with two NGO staff, Tokyo, 17 May 2011 
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on 28 July 2010 two death row inmates were executed without prior notice, 
much to the chagrin of anti-death-penalty activists. Newspaper and television 
coverage shed light on positive aspects of the event. Chiba became the very first 
Minister of Justice to witness a hanging, and in press conferences she stressed 
the need for a fundamental debate on capital punishment: 
 
It is not that I changed my mind […] I attended the executions as I 
believe it is my duty to see them through. […] Witnessing [them] with my 
own eyes made me think deeply about the death penalty, and I once 
again strongly felt that there is a need for a fundamental discussion 
(Christian Science Monitor 2010:1). 
 
She showed her enthusiasm to set up a study group on the issue within the 
Ministry of Justice and to allow the media access to the execution sites in order 
to spur domestic debate (Asahi, 28 July 2010). Based on testimony from 
prosecutors who witnessed the hangings, details of how death row inmates are 
brought to the venue and exactly how they are executed were disclosed officially 
on television for the first time, though most of these details had been available in 
existing literature compiled by NGOs. Nonetheless, anti-death-penalty NGOs 
were disappointed with her political decision. They saw this as nothing but a 
performance by the Ministry of Justice to show that a de facto moratorium would 
not occur even under a Minister who opposed the death penalty (Center for 
Prisoners’ Rights 2010). They complained that Chiba’s achievements (setting up 
a study group, allowing media access to the execution chamber, and disclosing 
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execution details) could have been made without authorising even one 
execution. 
 
From examination of the three different types of Ministers of Justice, it may 
appear at first sight that personal convictions of Ministers of Justice can 
influence capital punishment policy: pro-death-penalty Ministers tend to 
authorise executions in a businesslike manner; and anti-death-penalty Ministers 
tend to postpone this decision in reference to the ‘advisory nature’ of Article 475 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Having said that, in reality, Ministers of 
Justice cannot influence capital punishment policy in the long run, and it is 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice, most of whom are former prosecutors with 
a substantial personal network within the Ministry, who exert a tremendous role.  
  
Firstly, as McCargo (2004:105) argues, cabinets are shuffled almost yearly, and 
Ministers do not stay in office long enough to root new ideas within the Ministry. 
This holds true in the Ministry of Justice, and even if Ministers of Justice are 
minded to bring a conscious change to the Ministry aiming to abolish capital 
punishment, they cannot do so within their short term, which only lasts for one 
year on average (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Numbers of Inmates Sentenced and Executed from 1976 and 1994 
 
 
 
*What can be observed in this table is few executions from 1979 to 1984, no executions 
from 1990 to 1992, and a rapid rise in numbers of execution in 1993. However, it needs to 
be noted that (1) Ministers of Justice do not stay in office for more than one year on average; 
(2) the average time between sentence and execution is approximately a decade or longer 
in Japan, and a rise in execution numbers may have been a result of a delay from previous 
years.   
 
For example, Chiba contributed to set up a study group on the issue of capital 
punishment within the Ministry of Justice; allowed media access to the execution 
chamber; and disclosed execution details to the public officially. However, she 
appears to have failed to set either short-term goals such as placing a 
moratorium period, or long-term goals such as the introduction of alternative 
penalties or the abolition of capital punishment. Indeed a later Minister of Justice, 
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Ogawa, claimed that the original purpose of the internal study group within the 
Ministry of Justice must have been to simply discuss the abolition and retention 
of capital punishment or to recognise the current situation, and not necessarily to 
create an alternative system (Ogawa 2012a:32). Although study group meetings 
have taken place ten times since 6 August 2010, none has been held since 19 
December 2011 (Ministry of Justice 2013).  
 
Similarly, former Ministers such as Eda denounced the capital punishment 
system as ‘defective’ (Financial Times, 21 January 2011); and Hiraoka 
introduced the subject of the the international trend of abolishing capital 
punishment in the Legal Affairs Committee (Hiraoka 2011:13). However, neither 
of them appeared to have succeeded in promoting abolitionism within the 
Ministry of Justice, because of their short tenure of office. As a result, most of the 
Ministers naturally tend to focus on following precedents during their terms. In 
other words, they tend to proclaim the retention of capital punishment on legal, 
domestic, and cultural grounds, and complete their official ‘duty’ or authorise 
executions in a business-like manner before the end of the calendar year.  
 
Consequently, even if the personal characteristics of Ministers of Justice may 
appear to determine the future course of capital punishment policy, it is important 
to acknowledge that they can only play a limited role within the institutional 
framework where the bureaucrats operate with a substantial network in the long 
run. After examination of the elite-driven decision making system governing 
capital punishment policy in Japan, the next section will move on to investigate 
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what actors can or cannot replace the business community in the Iron Triangle 
model in its application to capital punishment policy.  
 
1.4.4. Pressure Groups 
 
Given that Ministers of Justice such as Moriyama tend to justify the capital 
punishment system on the grounds of respecting the feeling of the bereaved 
families (Japan Times, 4 October 2002), pro-death-penalty pressure groups 
such as the victim lobby may appear to fit into a position to complete the triad. 
However, the decision making takes place within tightly-knit institutional 
dynamics, where selected elites in the Ministry of Justice and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office have a near monopoly, and there are problems in locating 
pressure groups in the triad as actors of equal influence or power. This section 
will examine where exactly NGOs can be situated regarding capital punishment 
policy. 
 
Firstly, through examining the legal standing of Japanese NGOs compared with 
those in the rest of the world, it will clarify the limited role that pro-death-penalty 
pressure groups can play inthe governmental decision making dynamics in 
Japan. Secondly, it will investigate the lack of partnership amongst the Japanese 
government, the business community and anti-death penalty NGOs. In order to 
avoid or solve false charge cases in practice, it would be helpful to the 
government if campaigners outside the judiciary could ‘intervene’ in capital 
punishment policy. However, this section will clarify why the bureaucratic 
72 
 
decision making mechanism does not allow anti-death-penalty NGOs to have an 
official standing in this issue area. Finally, this section will note the difference 
between Japanese and international anti-death-penalty NGOs in the way they 
see themselves and the possible outcomes of their campaigns within the 
Japanese governmental power dynamics.  
 
Standing of NGOs in the International Scene 
 
According to Claude E. Welch Jr. (2001:263), NGOs have now stepped into the 
domain traditionally reserved for governments and have been bypassing the 
nation-state system. For example, NGOs can ‘deal[…] with problems that grow 
slowly and effect society through the cumulative effect on individuals – the ‘soft’ 
threat of environmental degradation, denial of human rights, population growth, 
and lack of development’ (Mathews 1997:63). Moreover, they can function as 
‘checks and balances’ or watchdogs for the government. This holds true for the 
standing of selected NGOs in Japan to some extent: NGOs in the area of 
international development and humanitarian relief have been working in tandem 
with the Japanese government (Hirata 2002:37).  
 
However, this does not imply that the standing of NGOs has been significantly 
increased in Japan, or that they have started to get involved in the governmental 
decision making mechanism. In reality, these NGOs in Japan are in the hands of 
the bureaucrats and the business community: senior high-profile bureaucrats 
tend to occupy the important posts in NGOs under the practice of amakudari, 
73 
 
and the business community tends to support those NGOs since they can obtain 
tax exemption from the government (Lee and Arrington 2008:84). Although 
NGOs may appear to have been inducing mutual benefit within the Iron Triangle, 
they are particular groups that the government can use to add legitimacy to their 
policy through cooperation37. Therefore, even if anti-death-penalty NGOs can 
‘check’ Japan’s human rights records or function as watchdogs, they have not 
been allowed to contribute to efforts to ‘balance’ official policy. In order to further 
investigate this issue, the following part will clarify (1) why Japanese NGOs in 
particular fields have been working closely with the Japanese government and 
the business community; (2) why anti-death-penalty NGOs have not gained a 
similar status in Japan; and (3) the extent to which domestic and international 
anti-death-penalty NGOs are aware of this closed power dynamics.  
 
Legal Standing of NGOs in Japan  
 
Firstly, it is important to acknowledge the striking difference in the legal status of 
NGOs in Japan and in the rest of the world referring to the provisions of the 
Constitution and the Civil Code of Japan. As Sook-Jong Lee and Celeste 
Arrington (2008:76) argue, NGOs in Japan and those in the rest of the world 
‘tend to operate at different levels of politics, employ distinctive strategies and 
                                                  
37 Japanese NGOs in the field of international development have made important progress 
and gained official status to influence governmental foreign aid policy. Although Japan has 
been the top donor of foreign aid with Official Development Assistance (ODA), it was often 
criticised in the 1950s-70s for giving himotsuki enjo (tied aid), whereby Japanese grant and 
loan aid was tied to purchases from Japan. Faced with international criticism, the MOFA 
started to adopt untied loans, and its focus also shifted to software aid, which includes 
training local community health practitioners (Hirata 2002:37). The number of Japanese 
international development NGOs increased following that change in aid policy, and they 
have become an integral part of ODA policy. 
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organizational structures, and adopt different stances toward their governments’. 
For example, whilst Northern counterparts in particular are usually described in 
Western literature as large, well-funded, and prestigious with either professional 
or semi-professional staff (Holmén and Jirström 2009:431; Welch 2001:268), 
Japanese NGOs tend to be smaller and scattered across the nation, lacking 
sustainable and managerial capability. 
 
It may appear at first sight that this stems from a difference between Asian and 
Western countries. However, variation can also be observed within Asian 
countries. In the mid-1990s, Korean presidents sought to involve NGOs in 
governmental decision making in order to legitimise their democratic reform 
agendas: as a result, Korean NGOs have been working on political issues 
nationwide (Lee and Arrington 2008:78). By contrast, the Japanese government 
inhibited the formation of civic professional groups, which contributed to the 
formation of small, localised, and volunteer-based NGOs in Japan (Lee and 
Arrington 2008:77).  
 
Indeed, the inability of Japanese NGOs to function like those in other states 
stems from the regulations set out in the Constitution and the Civil Code of 
Japan. As Frank J. Schwartz (2002:195) claims, ‘Japan may be the strictest of all 
advanced industrial democracies in regulating the incorporations of 
nongovernmental organizations’. Although freedom of association is guaranteed 
in Article 21 of the Constitution of Japan, Article 34 of the Civil Code of Japan 
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sets some restrictions on giving NGOs legal status.38 Therefore, out of two 
categories of NGOs – incorporated associations (hojin), or unincorporated 
associations (nin-i dantai) or civic groups – the majority of NGOs in Japan are in 
the latter category, not registered with the state. The low standing of NGOs in 
Japan has been contributing to a lack of professional staff as well. Whilst NGOs 
in developing countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Egypt, and Palestine offer 
NGO staff salaries and prestige equivalent to those of governmental posts; and 
Western NGOs also offer competitive salaries to highly skilled personnel, 
Japanese NGOs offer low salaries and less prestige (Hirata 2002:40). This has 
been leading qualified personnel to seek job opportunities not in NGOs but 
rather in international organisations such as the UN (Hirata 2002:40). 
 
Secondly, it deserves some attention that the Japanese government tends to 
influence the goals of particular NGOs by filling their important posts under a 
practice of amakudari, or by supporting them financially. With regard to 
unincorporated associations, although Article 89 of the Constitution of Japan 
imposes some financial restrictions,39 Article 25 specifies that ‘the State shall 
use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, 
and of public health’. Therefore, Article 89 has become reinterpreted to oblige 
the state to provide support for private organisations (Schwartz 2002:203).  
                                                  
38 According to Article 34 of the Civil Code, ‘Any association or foundation relating to any 
academic activities, art, charity, worship, religion, or other public interest which is not for 
profit may be established as a juridical person with the permission of the competent 
government agency’. 
39 Article 89 of the Constitution of Japan specifies that ‘No public money or other property 
shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious 
institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not 
under the control of public authority’. 
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However, in return, financial dependency on the government can create a 
patron-client relationship, which can make NGOs quasi-governmental 
organisations or subcontractors (Schwartz 2002:203–4; Yamamoto 1998:127). 
Whilst most NGOs in the world tend to be financially independent of the 
government since the revenue is largely from individual donations, membership 
fees, and sales of publications, development and humanitarian relief NGOs in 
Japan tend to accept funding from the government although they face direct 
supervision (Lee and Arrington 2008:90). For example, the Japan Platform, 
which aims to provide humanitarian assistance to crisis areas, gets funding not 
only from the government but also from the business community: the 
government can impact the goal of the Japan Platform, and the business 
community can obtain tax exemption (Lee and Arrington 2008:84). Thus, it is 
only NGOs in particular issue areas that can work in tandem with the 
government and the business community, since they can help produce mutual 
benefit within the Iron Triangle.     
 
After a domestic movement to give civic groups incorporated status surged in 
the 1990s, the NPO law was passed on 25 March 1998, which has made the 
application process for associations easier. Moreover, although conservative 
leaders in the LDP, in particular, used to perceive NGOs as adversarial towards 
the government, party politicians appear to have started to show some 
recognition of them as important partners of the government (Kato 1995:28). 
Firstly, Domoto Akiko in the Social Democratic Party of Japan criticised the 
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bureaucratic decision making system and called for inclusion of NGOs at a 
meeting of the House of Representatives Committee on Finance on 18 
November 1994 (Domoto 1994:25). Similarly, Hatoyama Yukio, one of the core 
founders of the Democratic Party of Japan, stressed the importance of shifting 
Japanese society from being state-centred to being citizen-centred (Hatoyama 
1996:122). Moreover, Kato Koichi in the LDP stressed in the House of 
Representatives Budget Committee on 27 January 1995 that LDP leaders had 
started to acknowledge the utility of NGOs over the past few years (Kato 
1995:28). With the introduction of the NPO law, and following changes in 
governmental officials’ attitude towards these entities, NGOs and NPOs have 
received far more recognition in Japan. 
 
In the meantime, what needs to be noted again is that those considered as 
crucial partners in Japanese decision-making are still mostly NGOs in the area 
of international development or humanitarian relief. Human rights NGOs in 
general or anti-death-penalty NGOs do not enjoy similar prestige to participate in 
Japanese human rights policy, and the Japanese government tends to resist 
their pressures. The following part will further investigate why partnership 
between anti-death penalty NGOs and the Japanese government or the 
business community cannot be observed.  
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Lack of Cooperation between Anti-Death-Penalty NGOs and the 
Government  
 
Whilst the government is keen on incorporating international development NGOs 
into its Official Development and Welfare Policies in order to add legitimacy, a 
similar attitude cannot be observed concerning human rights NGOs and capital 
punishment policy. This appears to be because (1) building partnership with 
NGOs, which do not favour the governmental policy, does not lead to mutual 
benefits within the Iron Triangle; and (2) the Japanese government considers it 
appropriate to leave this issue of law and order to bureaucrats in the Ministry of 
Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, without inviting criticisms from 
campaigners outside the judiciary. 
 
In fact, human rights NGOs do not have official consultation status in drafting 
official reports on human rights record in Japan. For example, regarding the 
submission of periodical reports to the UN Human Rights Committee, human 
rights NGOs cannot participate in the drafting process. They get to see the 
reports submitted by the government after they are published by the UN, and 
have to submit alternative reports separately (Neary 2002a:66; 2002b:202). 
Moreover, lack of communication with human rights NGOs regarding their 
recommendations implies that they have been undervalued as a government’s 
partner. For instance, Amnesty International Japan works closely with domestic 
anti-death penalty NGOs such as Forum 90 and the Centre for Prisoners’ Rights, 
and issue protest statements in joint names. However, the Japanese 
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government does not make any formal comments on recommendations made by 
Amnesty International or other human rights NGOs in written form, except for 
direct communication at NGO-led seminars. Domestic anti-death-penalty NGOs, 
in particular, are often seen by the Japanese government as a tiny fraction of the 
public since governmental opinion poll results indicate a wide public support for 
the capital punishment system (see Appendix IV). 
 
Anti-death-penalty NGOs can contribute to avoiding or solving false charge 
cases. This was particularly evident when anti-death-penalty NGOs started to 
act on behalf of innocent death row inmates in the 1980s. NGO bodies tried to 
step into the judicial decision making, believing that false charge cases could not 
be left to the judiciary (Van Wolferen 1989:226), where Supreme Court decisions 
tend to be heavily influenced by the recommendations given by public 
prosecutors. However, the Japanese government tends to claim that the 
Japanese criminal justice system is equipped with a fair retrial system, which 
can prevent miscarriages of justice (Hatano 1983:23; Hayashi 1984:38; Taki 
2012b:44), and hence anti-death-penalty NGOs do not have their say in the triad 
officially.  
 
What also merits some attention is that most of the NGO staff have been 
continuing anti-death-penalty campaigns while fully aware that their voice cannot 
be heard by the government. In other words, domestic anti-death-penalty NGOs 
appear more objective about their own campaigns compared with international 
ones, since they acknowledge the fact that capital punishment policy is 
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elite-driven and NGOs are outside its decision making process. Whereas they 
continue their grassroots campaigns such as collecting signatures from 
supporters and submitting them to Ministers of Justice as an alternative voice to 
the ‘public opinion’ found in the governmental opinion polls, they appear very 
objective about the outcome. For example, regarding their possible impact on 
the execution-free period from 1989 to 1993, most of the NGO workers whom I 
interviewed denied that they had any impact, referring to the elite-driven nature 
of capital punishment policy40. Therefore, whilst international anti-death-penalty 
bodies tend to try to urge the Japanese government to abolish capital 
punishment by pressuring it with reference to the global trend, domestic 
anti-death-penalty NGOs tend to focus on influencing public opinion through 
grassroots activities.41 
 
Lack of Cooperation between Anti-Death Penalty NGOs and the Business 
Community 
 
With regard to the business community, it should be noted that there are some 
partnerships with human rights NGOs. According to a survey, ‘Reality of the 
Enterprises’ Efforts in Respecting Human Rights: Case Study of 70 Enterprises42 
in 2005’, which was conducted by the Buraku Liberation and Human Rights 
Research Institute (BLHRRI), 81.4 per cent (57 companies) of the companies 
include respect for human rights in their corporate ethical codes (BLHRRI 
                                                  
40 Postal correspondence with an NGO worker, 28 February 2011; and interview with an 
NGO worker, Tokyo, 12 April 2011. 
41 Interview with two NGO members, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
42 90 per cent of companies that answered the survey are large companies of capital scale 
with more than 500 million yen (3.85 million pounds). 
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2005:26-8). Issue areas that they engage in range from personal data protection 
to non-discrimination at the time of recruitment against people of buraku43 origin, 
the handicapped, and women. Moreover, the survey result shows that 52.9 per 
cent (37 companies) have partnerships with NGOs on the buraku issue; 20 per 
cent (14 companies) onissues relating to the disabled; and 11.4 per cent (eight 
companies) in issues concerning women (BLHRRI 2005: iv; 84).44 Furthermore, 
whilst human rights that companies are required to protect were limited to the 
domestic employees’ working rights until the 1970s, various issues outside of 
labour-management relations have also been tackled comprehensively 
nowadays. They include issues of: (1) child labour and forced or bonded labour 
employed by suppliers abroad; (2) destruction of indigenous people’s traditional 
way of life; and (3) ‘taking part’ in the human rights violation indirectly by building 
partnership with companies accused of aiding apartheid in South Africa or 
making business deals with the military government of Myanmar (Tanimoto 
2004:11–2, 15). 
 
In order to raise its profile in the international business scene, Japanese 
companies have also been keen to build partnership with international 
organisations through complying with their human rights protection initiatives. 
                                                  
43 According to BLHRRI (2012:1), Buraku people are: ‘the largest discriminated-against 
population in Japan. They are not a racial or a national minority, but a caste-like minority 
among the ethnic Japanese. They are generally recognized as descendants of outcaste 
populations in the feudal days. Outcastes were assigned such social functions as 
slaughtering animals and executing criminals, and the general public perceived these 
functions as “polluting acts” under Buddhist and Shintoist beliefs’. 
44 Other companies also have links with NGOs of several other issue areas such as zainichi, 
or ethnic Korean residents born and brought up in Japan; international human rights; and 
human rights education, although the breakdown is not disclosed in the survey result.  
82 
 
The prime example is the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),45 
which refers to embracing responsibility to further social good adhering to ethical 
standards and international norms. CSR-related standards have also been set 
by international organisations and NGOs,46 and it is worth noting that Keidanren, 
or the Japan Business Federation, also adopted the Charter for Good Corporate 
Behaviour47 in 1991, corresponding to the international trend of supporting CSR 
(Keidanren 2004). Among the internationally recognised human rights initiatives, 
the Global Impact, which was declared in 1999 by the UN, is based on the idea 
that ‘open markets and human well-being can go hand in hand’ (UN 2012:3). Its 
prime objective is ‘to align business operations and strategies everywhere with 
ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, 
environment and anti-corruption’ (UN 2008:2), and out of approximately 10,000 
in all, 385 Japanese firms and organisations currently support this initiative (UN 
2013). 
 
Whilst there exist some partnerships between the business community and 
human rights NGOs, it is difficult to observe any in the area of capital 
punishment. This fact appears to be closely related to the question of whether 
proclaiming abolitionism in companies’ corporate principles would help their 
                                                  
45 According to McWilliams, A. et al. (2006:1-2), examples of CSR are (1) to commit to 
prevent global warming by manufacturing aerosol products with no fluorocarbons, and to 
reduce emissions and pollution abatement by promoting recycling; (2) to promote employee 
empowerment by non-discrimination of women and minority; and (3) to work closely with 
community organisations. 
46 They include: the Global Compact by the UN; the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises; the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines by the Global Reporting Initiative; and Social 
Accountability 8000 by Social Accountability International.  
47 The charter was renamed ‘the Charter of Corporate Behaviour’ in 1996. 
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business interests. In fact, partnership with anti-death-penalty NGOs would not 
bring any mutual benefits to the Iron Triangle. Provision of funding to 
anti-death-penalty NGOs, which are not in favour of the governmental policy, 
would undermine companies’ relations with the government. Secondly, given 
that capital punishment policy has been dealt with as an issue of law and order, it 
is natural that the business community would not show any interest in opposition 
to that policy, unless it would provide them with prestige like internationally 
recognised organisations can offer. Thirdly, since the governmental opinion polls 
show strong public support for capital punishment, it is natural for companies to 
estimate that supporting abolitionism in their corporate principles would risk their 
business opportunities. Consequently, whilst the business community shows 
some commitment to human rights issues both domestically and internationally, 
its motive appears to be heavily related to its commercial interests. 
 
1.4.5. Is the Iron Triangle Model Applicable to Capital Punishment Policy? 
 
Having discerned the actors who (1) underpin the legal legitimacy of the system, 
(2) get involved in the actual running of the system, and (3) represent and justify 
the policy on legal, domestic, and cultural grounds both internally and externally, 
it is important to evaluate the extent to which the Iron Triangle model can 
account for capital punishment policy making.  
 
Firstly, bureaucrats play a tremendous role in capital punishment policy. Whilst 
Ministers of Justice are the top authority on this issue, and their personal 
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characteristics may appear to influence policy making in the short term, it is the 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice who consistently justify the retention of the 
system on legal, domestic, and cultural grounds, and ensure continuation of the 
policy. Given that the ruling party, the LDP, is pro-death-penalty in nature, LDP 
party politicians may also appear to possess a significant power in the other 
corner of the triad. However, important decisions regarding this policy are made 
by the bureaucrats often irrespective of the views of party politicians. As Van 
Wolferen (1989:33, 145) argues, approximately 80 per cent of all legislation 
passed is drafted by bureaucrats, and Diet members merely rubber-stamp the 
documents. This holds true of capital punishment policy: LDP party politicians, 
who tend not to stay in office for more than one year because of the frequent 
cabinet reshuffles, cannot get involved in the actual policy making process. The 
reason why the ruling party, the LDP in particular, appears to be holding power in 
the triad is that approximately 25 per cent of the LDP Diet members are 
ex-bureaucrats under the amakudari system; and the perpetual dominance of 
the LDP appears to have been allowing bureaucrat-led policy making (Krauss 
1989:39, 52-3). 
 
Secondly, it should be recalled that the Public Prosecutor’s Office, a subordinate 
institution of the Ministry of Justice, gets involved in the crucial part of capital 
punishment policy, from generating confessions by accused persons to taking 
initiatives regarding executions. Although the Supreme Court makes the final 
judicial decisions regarding death sentences, they tend to be heavily influenced 
by the recommendations of public prosecutors (Hamai and Ellis 2008a:73). This 
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relates to the fact that all the 15 judges in the Supreme Court are former public 
prosecutors, and the Supreme Court is not independent of bureaucratic control 
in practice. Finally, with regard to what can take the place of the business 
community in the triad model, the pro-death-penalty victim lobby may appear to 
fit, given that the Japanese government often cites the feelings of the victims’ 
bereaved families. However, NGOs cannot support a corner of the triad, since 
neither pro- nor anti-death-penalty NGOs have official status to get involved in 
capital punishment policy. Only selected NGOs are allowed to contribute to the 
Japanese decision making for mutual benefit within the 
bureaucrats-politicians-business community triad, and anti-death-penalty NGOs, 
which are not in favour of the governmental policy, have not been included in this 
dynamic. 
 
Consequently, the application of the Iron Triangle model to capital punishment 
policy presents difficulties, given that this policy is primarily elite-driven, and 
important decisions are made irrespective of the views of party politicians or 
pressure groups. The following part will go on to examine the governmental 
approach on capital punishment policy in detail. It will highlight that capital 
punishment policy has been merely treated as one of the governmental policies 
on which Ministry bureaucrats make sure precedents are followed.  
 
1.5. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT POLICY AS AN ISSUE OF LAW AND ORDER 
 
First of all, it is important to note that capital punishment policy has been dealt 
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within the Ministry of Justice as an issue of law and order. There are two 
government agencies concerned with human rights protection in Japan: the 
Human Rights Bureau in the Ministry of Justice and the Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs Division in the MOFA. I approached both of these bodies to 
see if they would agree to an interview. In January 2011, the Human Rights 
Bureau declined my request, stating that it was not in charge of capital 
punishment. I was urged to contact the Criminal Affairs Bureau. In the meantime, 
two senior ministers in the MOFA division, one of whom was previously in the 
Ministry of Justice, agreed to be interviewed in June 2011 through the help of the 
other MOFA minister. Initially, the two former ministers did not respond to my 
request. However, the latter minister, a vocal anti-death-penalty activist who 
belongs to the Parliamentary League against the Death Penalty, agreed to my 
interview cordially, and forwarded my letter to them again. Although the interview 
with two MOFA ministers in the Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division 
was thus achieved, they denied any responsibility for dealing with the issue of 
capital punishment, now or in the future. According to them, ‘there is no such 
issue on the earth that is not related to human rights. However, it is impossible to 
deal with every single issue in the human rights divisions in governmental 
agencies, and we had better prioritise major issues and tackle them efficiently’.48 
Both groups thus maintained that capital punishment was not a human rights 
concern but an issue of legal punishment under the aegis of the Criminal Affairs 
Bureau in the Ministry of Justice.  
 
                                                  
48 Interview with two MOFA ministers, Tokyo, 17 June 2011 
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1.5.1. ‘Institutional Ambivalence’ in Japan’s Capital Punishment Policy 
 
In the meantime, ‘institutional ambivalence’ can also be observed in Japan’s 
capital punishment policy. According to David Garland (2010:99–100): 
  
‘[t]he visible sign of this ambivalence are laws that go unenforced, 
sentences that go unexecuted, legal proceedings that create endless 
delays, and a great deal of discomfort on the part of the judges, 
government ministers, and penal officials charged with administering the 
punishment’.  
 
This applies to the case of Japan: (1) the average time between sentence and 
execution is approximately a decade or longer; (2) a ‘hesitant’ attitude can be 
observed in the execution procedure; and (3) the Ministry does not appear 
particularly enthusiastic about conducting a large number of executions per year 
(see Appendix I). Firstly, ‘[c]ondemned inmates are selected for execution on the 
basis not of longevity on death row but of other ill-defined criteria’ (Johnson and 
Zimring 2009:62). Execution dates may have been strategically chosen in order 
to gain support from the public.49 Secondly, although the Japanese government 
                                                  
49 For example, regarding the execution of Nagayama Norio on 1 August 1997, Hara Yuji 
(1998:60), Yasuda (1998:103) and Johnson (2005:258) claim that the Ministry of Justice 
appeared to have justified his execution when similar juvenile murder cases occurred 
successively. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, public interest in Nagayama’s 
activities as a novelist through the 1980s to 90s was prominent. Therefore, the Ministry of 
Justice appeared to have chosen the execution date carefully so that the public would not 
protest (Yasuda 1998:103). In fact, 1997 was a particular year in which successive violent 
juvenile crimes started to occur. Among them, the Sakakibara case attracted plenty of media 
attention and generated a public outcry in particular. After the offender was arrested on 28 
June 1997, Nagayama was executed on 1 August 1997, which was within less than two 
months. Therefore, anti-death-penalty advocates considered that the Ministry had a political 
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consistently justifies the judicial right to deprive a person of life in order to 
maintain legal order in Japan, some efforts on behalf of prison guards who get 
involved in hanging show a hesitant attitude on the part of the Ministry of Justice 
regarding state killing. 
 
Regarding the execution, Article 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
that it is carried out on the instructions of the head of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office.50 Regarding the exact method of execution, prison guards cover the 
inmate’s eyes with a white cloth and tie both arms behind with handcuffs and 
legs with strings (Hara 2001:17). Once a noose is placed around the prisoner’s 
neck, three prison guards press buttons on the wall, each pressing one: only one 
of the three buttons really works, a device to relieve the psychological burdens of 
prison guards (Mainichi, 28 August 2010). When the correct button is pressed, 
the 90 centimetres square plate that the inmate is standing on opens and he falls 
down for around four metres; the rope becomes taut when he reaches around 15 
centimeters from the ground (Hara 2001:25).51 It is worth noting that even if the 
door falls instantly, inmates do not die immediately, it takes 15-20 minutes, which 
violates the UN Convention against the Torture. Prison guards who carry out the 
execution receive special payment worth 20,000 yen (154 pounds), and 
                                                                                                                                                  
strategy to justify Nagayama’s execution in line with the outbreak of similar crimes. 
50 According to Article 98 (1) of the National Civil Service Law, it is senior staff of the 
Correction Bureau who get involved in the actual hanging procedure whilst a prosecutor, an 
assistant public prosecutor, and the Director and other staff of the Correction Bureau are 
present at the execution, along with a doctor of the Correction Bureau to confirm the 
inmate’s death. 
51 The execution is well-rehearsed, the height and weight of the inmate being measured in 
advance (Hara 2001:25). The length of the rope that will go around the inmate’s neck is 
adjusted so that it can hold his weight, and a solid metal block which is the same weight of 
the inmate is used to confirm that the square door on the ground falls instantly (Hara 
2001:25). 
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according to an in-depth interview by Hara (2001:26) usually they either use up 
the money on drinks to forget what happened at the execution venue, or donate 
all the amount into the offertory box at the shrine, praying for the executed 
person to rest in peace. Given that fake buttons have been equipped for hanging 
and special payment is provided to them to relieve their psychological burdens, 
the Japanese government appears to have a legitimacy problem about state 
killing.  
 
Finally, Japan is one of the world’s least frequent users of capital punishment.52 
As Ministry bureaucrats are still desperate to conduct at least one execution per 
calendar year, this does not appear to stem from sympathy towards the victims’ 
bereaved families. Rather, it has been discussed in the existing literature 
(Kakusho 1991; Mori 2008; Johnson and Zimring 2009) that the Ministry’s 
retention of capital punishment relates to: (1) securing annual funding by acting 
on precedents; and (2) the lack of legal status and rights of death row inmates as 
a result of the state’s approach to this policy from the viewpoint of law and order.  
 
1.5.2. State’s Approach on Human Rights of Death Row Inmates 
 
Firstly, it is suggested that annual executions are linked to the Ministry’s survival. 
In a parallel case, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport conducts 
roadworks across the nation at the end of the year in order to use up the annual 
                                                  
52 China, Vietnam, North Korea, India and Pakistan do not report execution statistics, and 
the true total number of executions can be higher than being estimated. However, more than 
95 per cent of all executions are believed to take place in China, and the estimates range 
from 2,000 to 15,000 per year (Johnson and Zimring 2009:21).  
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budget (Mori 2008:18). If the Ministry does not spend the same amount of the 
funds as in the previous year, a smaller fund could be allocated the following 
year. Likewise, bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice appear to seek to execute 
at least one death row inmate a year in order to keep the capital punishment 
system in use annually (Johnson and Zimring 2009:48; Mori 2008:18). Of course, 
this does not necessarily mean that capital punishment would be abolished as a 
result of lack of funds. It could continue because of the conservative nature of 
the Japanese bureaucratic decision making system. In other words, the Ministry 
of Justice has been treating this policy as an issue of law and order; and tends to 
act on precedents and conduct executions annually in order to leave a record 
that the system has been in use.  
  
Relating to this point, another argument is that the Ministry’s dutiful conduct on 
the basis of the law appears to relate to death row inmates’ lack of legal status or 
rights. More precisely, since death row inmates do not fall into the category of 
‘prisoners’ in the Japanese government’s eyes, executions tend to be conducted 
as a ‘duty’ in the arena of law and order. According to Kakusho Toyokazu 
(1991:13), death row inmates’ legal status and rights have not been officially 
established in Japan. Whilst prisoners in general are supposed to go back to 
society after correction and rehabilitation, that is not the case for death row 
inmates unless they are proved innocent in retrials or reprieved (Kakusho 
1991:13). Referring to Article 484 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,53 Kakusho 
                                                  
53 Article 484 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that ‘When a person who has 
been sentenced to death, imprisonment with or without work or a misdemeanor 
imprisonment without work is not under detention a public prosecutor shall summon that 
person. If that person does not respond to the summons, the public prosecutor shall issue a 
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(1991:17) argues that death row inmates have been considered by the 
government as those who are merely waiting for execution. More precisely, 
detention is shikei no shikko no ichibu shikko (a part of the execution procedure), 
and what prison guards have to make sure is that death row inmates are in good 
health so that executions will be conducted in an uneventful manner (Kakusho 
1991:16). Indeed, once the inmates are executed, they will be counted as those 
‘released from prison’ in Japan. As Kawai Mikio (2009: 234) analyses, this must 
be partly to keep statistical coherence in the numbers of inmates that come in 
and go out after correction and rehabilitation; but partly because there is an idea 
in the Ministry of Justice that death row inmates can be ‘released’ only through 
the execution (Hara 1998:198). Whilst other prisoners complete their sentence 
through rehabilitation, death row inmates appear to be expected to add to their 
death sentence by generating a feeling of remorse through being detained in a 
solitary cell with limited communication with others.54 The Ministry of Justice 
does not allow them to atone for deaths they have caused in any other way, and 
makes prison guards ensure that this process is not disrupted by inmates’ 
suicide (Mori 2008:216).55  
                                                                                                                                                  
writ of commitment’. 
54 According to Article 36 of the Act on Penal Detention Facilities and Treatment of Inmates 
and Detainees, ‘Treatment of an inmate sentenced to death shall be conducted in an 
inmate's room throughout day and night, except where it is deemed appropriate to conduct it 
in the outside of the inmate's room. (2) The room of an inmate sentenced to death shall be 
a single room. (3) No inmates sentenced to death shall be permitted to make mutual 
contacts even in the outside of the inmate's room, except where deemed advantageous in 
light of the principle of treatment prescribed in paragraph (1) of Article 32.  
55 For this reason, prison guards notify the inmate one or two hours before the execution in 
the morning (Amnesty International 2011:1). Therefore, death row inmates ‘are given only 
enough time to clean their cells, write a final letter and receive last rites’ (New York Times, 
30 June 2002). According to Shi to Kabe (Death and Wall), published in 1953 by Tamai 
Sakuro, a former Director-General of the Osaka Detention Centre, notification used to be 
given to inmates one or two days before the execution, and they could meet their family and 
order whatever they wanted to eat for the last supper. However, after 3 October 1975 when 
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Ministry’s such stance on death row inmates is evident in detention conditions 
and the execution procedure in Japan indeed. Firstly, whilst death row inmates 
are detained isolated from their close families, they can maintain contact with 
chaplains.56 This system might at first sight appear to have been prepared by 
the Ministry of Justice out of concern for death row inmates. However, it needs to 
be noted that the chaplain system has also been strategically run by the Ministry 
of Justice in order to conduct executions ‘smoothly’. Approximately 70 per cent 
of chaplains are Buddhists, the remainder being Shinto and Christian. Their 
purpose is to help inmates develop a feeling of remorse and prepare them to be 
executed in a peaceful state of mind. However, Menda Sakae, a former death 
row inmate, is disturbed by the emphasis that Buddhist chaplains place on the 
teaching of causality: he contends that if inmates are encouraged to believe that 
they were already doomed by their previous life, they may resign themselves to 
the inevitable and refrain from fighting against what they know to be false 
charges (Menda 2004:139). 
 
Limited correspondence between death row inmates and their families or friends, 
and lack of prior notification to them before executions, appear to be justified by 
the government on the theory that excessive communication between them can 
                                                                                                                                                  
Tsuru Shizuo, then a death row inmate, committed suicide on the day of execution, the rule 
was amended. The Ministry of Justice believed that Tsuru’s suicide was directly linked to the 
fact that he was notified of his execution in the late afternoon before the execution day 
(Menda 2004:134). 
56 According to Article 68 of the Act on Penal Detention Facilities and Treatment of Inmates 
and Detainees: ‘The warden of the penal institution shall make efforts to make available the 
opportunities for inmates to participate in religious ceremonies presided over by religious 
leaders (limited to nongovernmental volunteers; hereinafter the same shall apply in this 
paragraph), or to receive religious teachings from religious leaders’. 
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hinder death row inmates from ‘concentrating on death’. However, as Johnson 
(2005:260) claims:  
 
If isolation helps the condemned to ‘accept the inevitable’ and ‘prepare 
for death,’ it does so by killing twice: first socially and then physically. If 
secrecy is designed to protect the ‘honor and privacy’ of the offender’s 
family, it does so by sacrificing democratic values […such as] 
transparency, accountability, and openness.  
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1.5.3. Japan’s Retention of Capital Punishment on Legal Grounds 
 
Kakusho’s argument on death row inmates’ lack of legal status or rights can also 
be supported by a recent statement of a judge in the Hiroshima District Court on 
23 May 2012. A death row inmate convicted in the Hikari murder case57 sued an 
author and publisher of a book, Fukuda kun wo Koroshite Nani ni Naru? (What’s 
the Point of Killing Fukuda through Capital Punishment?) (Masuda 2009) over 
the violation of his right to privacy rights.58 However, the judge at the Hiroshima 
Regional District Court, Ueya Shin-ichi, turned down his claim on 23 May 2012, 
clarifying that: ‘Death sentence has been sentenced to the plaintiff, and there is 
no risk of great loss to him’ (Nikkei, 23 May 2012). Ueya’s remark highlighted the 
state’s approach on capital punishment and its neglect to ensure the basic rights 
of death row inmates. More precisely, his remarks can be interpreted as 
suggesting that the violation of the basic rights cannot be a major issue for death 
row inmates since they are merely waiting for death.  
 
Capital punishment has been treated as an issue of law and order, and has been 
justified upon the basis of:  
 
(1) Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan, which allows a legal punishment 
                                                  
57 The case of a crime on 14 April 1999, when an 18-year-old male broke into a house in 
Hikari city in Yamaguchi prefecture, and murdered a woman and her baby.  
58 In the book his real name, several pictures, and letters that Fukuda wrote to the author 
were disclosed although disclosure of the name of the offender, who was a minor at the time 
of the crime, is usually withheld. His claim was that he had agreed to be interviewed by the 
author believing that publication of this book would help him avoid the death sentence. 
However, since his death sentence was confirmed regardless of the contents of the book, he 
sued the author and publisher, demanding a halt to publication and financial compensation 
(Nikkei, 23 May 2012).  
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to deprive a person of life or liberty exceptionally;  
(2) the Penal Code and the Nagayama Criteria, which specify crimes that 
are punishable by death and set out nine main criteria;  
(3) Articles 475 and 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stipulate 
the responsibility of Ministers of Justice regarding the timing of authorising 
and conducting executions; 
(4) Article 11 of the Penal Code, which specifies the execution method as 
hanging;  
(5) Article 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that 
execution is carried out on the instructions of the head of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office; and 
(6) Article 98 (1) of the National Civil Service Law, which specifies that civil 
servants have to carry out duties set by senior staff.  
 
Whether the Ministry of Justice officially holds executions, abolishes the capital 
punishment system, or installs an alternative penalty such as life imprisonment 
without parole, it requires the Ministry to repeal or amend the existing legal 
provisions. Given that the Ministry of Justice tends to endeavour to act on 
precedents upon the basis of law, it is unlikely that the Ministry will take such an 
initiative. It also merits particular attention that whilst the Japanese government 
thus justifies capital punishment as a legal penalty, ‘institutional ambivalence’ is 
observed in the low number of annual executions, ill-defined criteria on the 
selection of death row inmates, and mental and financial support for prison 
guards who get involved in the actual execution.  
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1.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter overviewed the way in which capital punishment policy has been 
run within the tightly-knit institutional framework, exploring the applicability of the 
Iron Triangle model, and clarified the government’s approach on this policy 
through examining detention conditions and execution procedure. After 
reviewing the current academic approach on Japan’s retention of capital 
punishment, the first part introduced Japan’s elite-driven policy making within the 
bureaucrats-politicians-business community triad. Noting that the three actors 
are highly interdependent because of the perpetual dominance of the LDP, it 
examined the extent to which this model fits the decision making process for 
capital punishment policy. Firstly, it highlighted bureaucratic control of this policy 
through examining the Supreme Court, key government agencies, and pressure 
groups. This chapter contended that whilst the Supreme Court is theoretically 
independent of institutional power dynamics, it tends to make decisions 
reflecting the Public Prosecutor’s Office’s approach on capital punishment 
(McCargo 2004:103). Although the Public Prosecutor’s Office is a subordinate 
institution of the Ministry of Justice, in practice it gets involved in the crucial part 
of this policy, from obtaining confessions from accused persons to taking 
initiatives regarding executions.  
 
Secondly, presenting the divergence amongst Ministers of Justice in their 
personal beliefs on the issue of capital punishment, this chapter argued that 
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these cannot be a determining factor for retaining or abolishing the capital 
punishment system. Although the Minister of Justice is a top authority on this 
policy in theory, each Minister tends not to stay in office for more than a year 
because of cabinet reshuffles, and cannot influence the capital punishment 
question in the long run. This chapter argued that it is instead a cluster of 
employed-for-life bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office who exert tremendous power in the actual decision making 
process.  
 
Thirdly, the chapter critically examined the role that pressure groups can play in 
this policy. Although the Japanese government tends to justify capital 
punishment on grounds of respecting the feelings of victims’ bereaved families, 
they do not possess a significant role in the triad in reality. Similarly, 
anti-death-penalty NGOs have not been included in the decision making system 
even though they could function as a watchdog and help the judicial authority 
solve or avoid false charge cases with their own investigations. Since capital 
punishment has been treated by the government as a criminal justice issue, 
anti-death-penalty NGOs have not been admitted as appropriate bodies to 
advise the government.  
 
The applicability of the Iron Triangle model to capital punishment policy was then 
evaluated. The chapter argued that capital punishment policy is primarily 
elite-driven, and decision making is conducted by the bureaucrats in the Ministry 
of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office independently of the views of party 
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politicians or pressure groups. Although the ruling party may appear to play an 
equal role to bureaucrats, it is because of the fluidity of bureaucrats under the 
system of amakudari, and the long dominance of the LDP has helped 
bureaucrat-led decision making (Krauss 1989:39, 52-3). With regard to the 
pressure groups, they do not appear to hold the corner of the triad, since they 
have not been allowed to get involved in capital punishment policy making. 
Therefore, in the application of the Iron Triangle model to capital punishment 
policy, the triad is not a perfect triad, and decision making is primarily 
bureaucrat-led. In other words, whilst bureaucrats exert tremendous power and 
the LDP supports that power with intimate personal networks between them, 
actors in the third corner have been missing, which makes the triad incomplete.  
 
The second part further investigated the governmental approach to capital 
punishment policy. It showed that the Ministry of Justice has been dealing with 
this policy as an issue of criminal justice on the basis of law, and not as an issue 
of human rights. Such a governmental approach can be observed in the 
detention conditions and execution procedure, which do not place much 
emphasis on human rights of the death row inmates, but rather on how to detain 
and execute them in an uneventful manner. Moreover, capital punishment policy 
leaves some legitimacy problem regarding state violence, as represented by the 
special consideration shown to prison guards who get involved in the actual 
hanging. However, this policy has been consistently justified on the basis of law, 
and it is unlikely that the Ministry of Justice would repeal or amend these 
provisions to halt executions or abolish the system. This is an important point for 
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scholars on the issue of capital punishment, and both domestic and international 
anti-death-penalty lobby, to acknowledge in order to have a better understanding 
of Japan’s capital punishment policy in general or to promote their campaigns in 
Japan. Although Japan’s retention of capital punishment tends to be considered 
as national resistance to the international anti-death penalty norm, it is important 
for those scholars and critics to understand that capital punishment is seen as 
an issue of law and order, on which the government is not willing to invite 
international criticism from a human rights perspective.  
 
The following chapter will move on to examine how the Japanese government 
has been justifying capital punishment with reference to domestic and cultural 
factors, and investigate the validity of its arguments. It will also explore how the 
study of the de facto moratorium period can tell scholars and activists about the 
elite-driven nature of capital punishment policy.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Governmental Justification for Capital Punishment and the de facto 
Moratorium Period Reconsidered 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 has examined the elite-driven nature of Japan’s capital punishment 
policy. It clarified that capital punishment has been dealt with by the Japanese 
government as an issue of law and order, and important decisions regarding this 
policy are conducted by bureaucrats in selected governmental agencies. 
However, the Ministry of Justice tends to justify capital punishment not only on 
legal grounds but also on domestic and cultural grounds. The first part of the 
present chapter will critically examine the validity of the governmental 
justification for capital punishment. More precisely, through reconsidering what 
kind of cultural features have been claimed to be associated with capital 
punishment in Japan, it will explore whether or not policy elites’ narratives which 
make reference to culture have been influencing the public and scholars to 
believe that capital punishment policy is domestically and culturally determined.  
 
Firstly, it will investigate the government’s retention of capital punishment on the 
basis of its deterrent effect and public support for the system. Whilst 
governmental opinion poll results indicate that the vast majority of the Japanese 
public support capital punishment believing in its deterrent effect, comparison 
with other non-governmental opinion polls and an in-depth survey by an 
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independent research body provides alternative views. This chapter will raise 
methodological problems with the governmental opinion polls, and highlight the 
divergence between the public’s and the state’s official approach on capital 
punishment.  
 
Secondly, it will clarify the limited role that culture plays in capital punishment 
policy in Japan. After briefly reviewing theoretical research on the role of culture 
in rejecting particular international norms and in shaping legal punishment, it will 
critically examine the application of a cultural value to justification of capital 
punishment. A former Minister of Justice, Moriyama Mayumi, claims that capital 
punishment is deeply embedded in the Japanese view of guilt. She invokes the 
example of a concept, shinde wabiru, meaning atonement for one's crime or 
shameful behaviour by killing oneself (Japan Times, 4 October 2002); and other 
Ministers of Justice such as Okuno Seisuke (1980c:8) and Goto Masao (1989:3) 
also proclaim the same idea. However, this part will discuss the conceptual and 
methodological problem in application of this concept to capital punishment 
policy, highlighting the divergence between pro- and anti-death-penalty victim 
lobbies in their views on social justice.  
 
Thirdly, it will explore where exactly public resistance to the abolition norm stems 
from. After investigating Japanese people’s human rights and legal 
consciousness, it will claim that public resistance does not appear to stem from 
cultural features but from a lack of sympathy towards the activities of domestic 
anti-death-penalty groups. Through examining domestic and cultural factors 
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comprehensively, this part will illustrate that although there appears to exist a 
social norm to treat death as a price worth paying for serious crimes, decisions 
regarding capital punishment policy are made by selected elites independently 
of cultural factors. A critical evaluation of the existing hypotheses on the 
government’s retention of the system will then follow. It will address the issue 
that existing research on Japan’s capital punishment policy has been conducted 
considering irrelevant domestic or international factors without acknowledging 
the elite-driven nature of the system. 
 
Finally, the second part of this chapter will propose a better approach to 
investigate the de facto moratorium periods in Japan. The existing literature 
places excessive emphasis on the causal relationship between the personal 
convictions of Ministers of Justice, or contemporary domestic or international 
events, and non-execution of people condemned to death; and it tends to 
overlook how consistently the Ministry of Justice tried to justify the system during 
this period. This part will clarify that investigation of this period from the 
appropriate standpoint can provide a better understanding of the elite-driven 
capital punishment policy in Japan.   
 
2.2. ‘PUBLIC OPINION’ ON THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM 
 
The Japanese government frequently cites public opinion poll results for the 
justification of the capital punishment system. According to the results in 2009, 
85.6 per cent of the Japanese public support the system, and 62.3 per cent 
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believe in its deterrent effect (Appendix IV). Furthermore, a former Minister of 
Justice, Ogawa Toshio (13 January 2012 to 4 June 2012), has proclaimed the 
voices of lay assessors in saiban-in seido to be ‘public opinion’. In the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 28 March 2012, Ogawa claimed that death sentences 
which have been imposed in saiban-in seido since its introduction in May 2009 
demonstrate that lay assessors have been supporting the death penalty (Ogawa 
2012b:8–9). 59  Thus, he tried to strategically incorporate the voices of lay 
assessors, who imposed death sentences, as ‘public opinion’, as if Ministers’ 
refusal to authorise executions would go against ‘the conclusion that ordinary 
citizens drew after going through the agony (of judging whether a person should 
live or die)’ (Wakasa quoted in Japan Times, 6 April 2012).  
 
Whilst the Japanese government claims that the majority of the Japanese public 
supports capital punishment believing in its preventive effect, mainly through the 
results of the opinion polls, they do not provide any other data to underpin their 
claim. The following part will provide alternative view on ‘public opinion on capital 
punishment’ through examining the existing literature on the deterrent effect, and 
analysing opinion polls conducted by governmental and non-governmental 
bodies. 
 
                                                  
59 After the introduction of saiban-in seido, nine people were sentenced to death in the 
first court in 2009, four in 2010, and nine in 2011 (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
2012; The Supreme Court 2012a). The cases involved include the Pachinko parlour murder 
case where Takami Sunao, 41 at the time of the crime, set fire to a pachinko parlour in 
Osaka on 5 July 2009, killing five people and leaving 10 injured. Takami was sentenced to 
death in the first court on 31 October 2011 (Nikkei, 31 October 2011). 
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2.2.1. The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment 
 
The deterrent effect of capital punishment has been denied by various 
international scholars.60 However, the debate is still open-ended in Japan, and 
findings by Western scholars – in which some of the target periods date back to 
the 1920s – are still largely cited in the Japanese literature on comparative 
criminology. Firstly, Torsten Sellin conducted a comparative analysis on 
homicide rates in the US states with and without capital punishment from 1920 
to 1958. According to the results, the homicide death rates trend was similar 
regardless of the availability of capital punishment (Sellin 1959; Lamperti 
2008:4). On the other hand, Isaac Ehrlich and Gary S. Becker (1972), Isaac 
Ehrlich (1973;1975), Joanna Shepherd (2002), Hashem Dezhbakhsh and Paul 
Rubin (2003) proclaim the deterrent effect of capital punishment. In particular, 
Ehrlich challenged Sellin’s findings by conducting similar research but with 
different methodology. He chose the target period from 1933 to 1969, and 
investigated the preventive effect of capital punishment considering the role of 
social factors such as unemployment and per capita income (Ehrlich 1975; 
Lamperti 2008:6). Ehrlich then claimed that a slightly negative relationship was 
observed between the murder rate and the execution rate. 
 
In Japan, major scholars who deny the deterrent effect are Masaki Akira61 
                                                  
60  Major classical scholars who deny the deterrent effect of capital punishment are: 
Raymond T. Bye (1919), Edwin H. Sutherland (1925), Clifford Kirkpatrick (1925), George B. 
Vold (1932), and Torsten Sellin (1959). 
61 Masaki was one of the main contributors to the awakening of abolitionism in the 1950s 
through his activities. Masaki issued a magazine, Shakai Kairyo (Social Reform), to spread 
his anti-death penalty beliefs, conducted informal meetings for prison guards and death row 
inmates, respectively, and published the meetings’ outcomes in Keisei’, a monthly magazine 
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(1964; 1968) and Tamiya Yu (2000). For example, Masaki, a former 
Director-General of the Correction Bureau in the Ministry of Justice and public 
prosecutor, calls the belief in the deterrent effect of capital punishment a 
superstition, and criticises the government’s justification for the system through 
the example of the World War II (Masaki 1968:70–2). According to Masaki, 
prison guards’ execution of death row inmates upon the order of the state 
authority is no different from wartime when state killing was justified: since Japan 
renounced war, it should also renounce the death penalty (Masaki 1968:70–2). 
Meanwhile, others proclaim the preventive effect of capital punishment: Motoji 
Shinkuma (1939), Ono Sei-ichiro (1950) and Uematsu Tadashi (1958). For 
example, Uematsu questions the credibility of the existing research on the 
correlation between the abolition of capital punishment and the decrease or 
non-increase in serious crimes. He argues that it is natural that no increase in 
serious crimes is observed right after the abolition of capital punishment, since 
he believes that the system is usually abolished when the crime rate is fairly low 
(Uematsu 1958:316).62  
 
Whilst there thus appears to exist a fair amount of literature on the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment, two main concerns remain about the arguments by 
proponents of the death penalty in Japan. Firstly, it is not appropriate for 
Japanese scholars to try to apply decades-old Western findings to the 
contemporary Japanese context mechanically. Without empirical data collected 
                                                                                                                                                  
from the Correction Association (Yasuda et al. 1996:107).  
62 However, this contradicts the fact that France abolished capital punishment in 1981 
despite the fact that murders of children were occurring successively and there was the 
highest public support (63 per cent) for the system at the time (Badinter et al. 2008:169).  
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in modern Japan, foreign research findings are not necessarily a valid reason to 
proclaim the deterrent effect of Japan’s capital punishment system.  
 
The second concern is that most of the Japanese scholars who evaluate the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment tend to develop their arguments focusing 
on its psychological effect without empirical data to underpin their claims. 
Proponents tend to claim that human fear of losing life has been constraining 
people from committing serious crimes (Motoji 1939; Ono 1950; Uematsu 1958), 
but what makes their work appear unreliable is that some offenders commit 
crimes because they do not fear death (Bye 1919: 98). In fact, Takuma Mamoru, 
who murdered eight pupils and wounded 15 others at Osaka Kyoiku University 
Ikeda Elementary School on 8 June 2001, is reported to have declared that ‘it is 
such a shame that I murdered only eight people. I should have murdered more if 
I get executed through capital punishment in any way’; and ‘I wanted to be 
executed through capital punishment. I want to die sooner’ (quoted in Mori 
2008:118; Shinoda 2008:185). Given that there are cases of the existence of 
capital punishment motivating people to commit serious crimes, the credibility of 
the deterrent effect of capital punishment is doubtful.  
 
Although there is no systematic empirical research on the deterrent effect of the 
capital punishment system in Japan, governmental opinion polling indicates that 
majority of the Japanese public believes in the deterrent effect. The question 
posed in the opinion poll was ‘What do you think about the argument that serious 
crimes would increase or remain unchanged if capital punishment is abolished?’, 
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and 62.3 per cent of the respondents answered that ‘Crimes would increase’ 
(see Appendix IV). Having said that, it is highly problematic that what the general 
public – most of whom are not experts in criminology or do not have basic 
knowledge on the capital punishment system – answered in the opinion poll has 
been used by government officials as a solid foundation to claim the preventive 
effect of capital punishment. The subsequent section will further investigate how 
the Japanese government shapes ‘public opinion’ in order to make its policy look 
democratic and legitimate.  
 
2.2.2. Public Opinion on Capital Punishment Reconsidered 
 
When capital punishment was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of 
Japan on 12 March 1948, supplementary opinions on the role of public opinion 
on the capital punishment system were also provided by four judges: Shima 
Tamotsu, Fujita Hachiro, Iwamatsu Saburo, and Kawamura Matasuke. 
According to them: 
 
The judgment of whether certain punishments are cruel is a question 
that should be decided according to the feelings of the people […,and] 
what at one time may be regarded as not being a cruel punishment may 
at a later period be judged the reverse. In such a situation the 
interpretation of Article 31 of the Constitution will probably be limited as a 
matter of course and the death penalty will be eliminated as a cruel 
punishment which contravenes the Constitution (translated by Maki 
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1964:161-2). 
 
Supplementary opinions appear to allow public feelings to be a determining 
factor in discussing the cruelty of capital punishment in Japan. It may appear 
that capital punishment policy reflects public opinion, which is ‘the prime mover 
in democracies’ (Lippmann 1997:161). However, it is questionable whether the 
level of cruelty in punishment can be left to emotional argument by ‘the man in 
the street’ (Bring 2009:2), who does not necessarily have sufficient knowledge in 
the area of crime and punishment. Furthermore, whilst the climate of public 
opinion on the capital punishment system in general can be found in the opinion 
polls, the credibility of findings on ‘public opinion’ needs re-evaluation before 
they can be considered as a crucial source of justification for capital punishment.  
 
Firstly, although public support for capital punishment has been consistently high 
over years, ‘these are temperatures taken in a climate of death penalty secrecy 
and “censored democracy”’ (Johnson and Zimring 2009:85). This cannot be a 
major determinant in shaping capital punishment policy when the public are not 
fully informed about the system or the degree of the deterrent effect. As Johnson 
and Zimring (2009:62) claim, ‘If transparency and accountability are two 
hallmarks of a healthy democracy, then the secrecy and silence that surround 
capital punishment in Japan seem decidedly undemocratic’. Secondly, public 
opinion can be influenced by governmental behaviour. As Sangmin Bae 
(2008:119) argues, ‘[p]olicy changes precede opinion changes, suggesting that 
the former cause the latter rather than vice versa’. In order to explore how ‘public 
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opinion’ is shaped and used for the governmental justification of capital 
punishment, the following section will examine public opinion polls conducted by 
the Prime Minister’s Office and non-governmental agencies. Through examining 
the methodological problems in framing governmental opinion polls and 
comparing their results with those of polls conducted by non-governmental 
agencies, it will highlight the divergence between the public’s and the state’s 
approach to the capital punishment question. 
 
‘Public Opinion’ in Governmental Opinion Polls 
 
Since 1956, the Prime Minister’s Office has been conducting the Opinion Poll on 
Basic Legal System (Kihonteki Hoseido ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa), every five 
years since 1994, surveying 3,000 men and women aged 20 or older nationwide. 
The result in 2009 revealed that public support for capital punishment reached 
85.6 per cent, the highest percentage ever, compared with 81.4 per cent in 2004, 
79.3 per cent in 1999, and 73.8 per cent in 1994 (Prime Minister’s Office 1994; 
1999; 2004a; 2009a). Whilst these results appear to demonstrate strong public 
support for capital punishment, examination of the questions posed leaves room 
for doubt. In seeking public opinion regarding capital punishment, the poll 
required participants to choose between three choices: (1) ‘it is unavoidable in 
certain circumstances,’ (2) ‘it should be abolished in all circumstances,’ and (3) ‘I 
do not know.’ The results in 2009 were 85.6 per cent, 5.7 per cent and 8.6 per 
cent, respectively (see Appendix IV). As Sato Mai (2008:17) analyses, the first 
two answers appear to have been framed strategically in order to produce 
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results which would justify the governmental policy. In contrast to the second 
answer, the first one leaves some room for discussion regarding the level of 
public support for capital punishment. In other words, those who do not 
necessarily feel strong support for capital punishment may choose the first 
answer (Sato 2008:17).  
 
Similarly, methodological problems in framing questions in public polls have also 
been pointed out by anti-death-penalty Diet members. For example, in the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 9 August in 2000, Fukushima Mizuho (2000:12) of the 
Democratic Party of Japan claimed that phrases used in the governmental 
opinion polls are heavily biased. However, the then Minister of Justice, Yasuoka 
Okiharu, maintained the validity of the survey, and no change to the phrasing of 
the questions is planned until today. According to Yasuoka,  
 
the second answer that ‘capital punishment should be abolished in all 
circumstances’ exists as one of the opinions in the existing debate 
regarding this system. In order to grasp public opinion accurately, it is 
not necessarily inappropriate to set such answer (Yasuoka 2000:12).  
 
However, if the Japanese government desires to grasp public opinion on the 
issue of capital punishment accurately, what is required is not posing ‘for or 
against’ type of questions or answers. Instead, attention needs to be paid to 
what degree of knowledge the Japanese public possess on the issue of capital 
punishment, and what factors can influence their opinion. For example, if the 
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details of detention conditions and execution procedure are provided, or if false 
charge cases are presented as an example of the downside of the capital 
punishment system, it would presumably generate different results (Sato 
2009:1–2). Secondly, prevailing crime situations can heavily influence public 
opinion. If the survey dates are close to notable crimes or trials, it may make the 
public hesitant or resistant to choose the second answer.  
 
Furthermore, it deserves some attention that the preconceived notion from the 
results of the governmental opinion polls, that ‘the majority of the Japanese 
public support capital punishment’, may hinder respondents from going against 
the ‘mainstream’. For example, results of the other questions in the same 
opinion poll appear to show the public’s tendency to stick to what they are 
already familiar with in society. With regard to the second question, ‘In case of 
abolishing capital punishment, which do you think is better?’, results were: 
‘abolish it straight away’ 35.1 per cent, ‘decrease the number of the use of capital 
punishment first’ 63.1 per cent, and ‘I do not know’ 1.8 per cent (see Appendix 
IV). Regarding the third question, ‘Do you think Japan should not abolish capital 
punishment in the future; or can abolish the system when the situation 
changes?’, results were: ‘Japan should not abolish the system’ 60.8 per cent, 
‘Japan can abolish the system in the future’ 34.2 per cent, and ‘I do not know’ 5.0 
per cent (see Appendix IV).  
 
The public tendency to follow what is considered mainstream in the society is not 
necessarily unique to the Japanese public. As Walter Lippmann argues, ‘when a 
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system of stereotypes is well fixed, our attention is called to those facts which 
support it, and diverted from those which contradict’ (Lippmann 1997:78). When 
the governmental opinion polls show an increasing percentage of public support 
for capital punishment, it may make the abolitionists seem a tiny fraction of the 
public, which could affect public views on the existing legal system. ‘Public 
opinion’ can fluctuate depending on people’s level of knowledge on the capital 
punishment system, the proximity of the survey dates to certain incidents, and 
semi-established moods or ideas on the issue questioned (Sato 2009:1–2). In 
order to demonstrate the diversity in public opinion on the capital punishment 
system in Japan, the next part will introduce results of opinion polls conducted 
by newspapers and TV services, and an individual research group.  
 
‘Public Opinion’ in Non-Governmental Opinion Polls 
 
Firstly, in opinion polls conducted by the Yomiuri newspaper in 1993, 1998, and 
2006, surveying 3,000 men and women aged 20 or older nationwide, 
respondents were asked for their opinion on the abolition or retention of capital 
punishment. The results in 2006 were: (1) It should be retained, 56.9 per cent; 
(2) I would rather think that it should be retained, 23.5 per cent; (3) I would rather 
think that it should be abolished, 9.3 per cent; (4) It should be abolished, 5.3 per 
cent; and (5) I would rather not answer, 5.0 per cent (see Appendix V). What 
makes this survey distinct from governmental opinion polls is that choices 
include neutral answers which start with ‘I would rather think’. The Japanese 
public tend to answer that they ‘feel neutral’ or ‘do not know’ when they are 
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asked about likes or dislikes concerning political matters (Richardson 1998:25), 
and the survey appears to have been framed to allow some ambiguity in their 
answers. Having said that, those who support retention outnumbered the other 
choices in 2008 since the question itself was straightforward.  
 
Whilst the survey conducted by the Yomiuri newspaper did not investigate in 
what circumstances respondents would consider abolition, two other opinion 
polls presented the option of life imprisonment without parole as an alternative 
penalty to capital punishment. Firstly, according to the results of the opinion poll 
conducted by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) in 1994, surveying 
1,800 men and women aged 20 or older nationwide, 62.8 per cent of the 
respondents answered that the capital punishment system was necessary in 
Japan (see Appendix VI). In the meantime, the second question, about the 
option of introducing life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to capital 
punishment, revealed that 40.5 per cent agreed whilst a slightly larger number of 
respondents, 42.9 per cent, called for the retention of capital punishment. 
Furthermore, in answer to the final question, ‘Do you agree with the idea that we 
put executions on hold and discuss the issue of capital punishment 
fundamentally?’, 37.6 per cent agreed whilst 28.9 per cent disagreed (see 
Appendix VI). Although the result of the first question tends to be primarily used 
by proponents in order to justify capital punishment policy, a second look at the 
rest of the results in this survey indicates a different perspective to the issue.  
 
Secondly, another opinion poll was conducted by the Asahi newspaper in 1994 
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asking 509 members of the House of Representatives their views on capital 
punishment. Being anti-death-penalty in editorial policy, Asahi offered five 
choices from which respondents chose: (1) It should be abolished right now (8.4 
per cent); (2) It should be abolished with introduction of an alternative 
punishment such as life imprisonment without parole (19.6 per cent); (3) 
Executions should be put on hold and  debate should be spurred meanwhile 
(19.2 per cent); (4) It should be as it is right now (40.2 per cent); and (5) Others/I 
do not know (12.6 per cent) (see Appendix VII). Although 40.2 per cent of the 
respondents answered that the capital punishment system should be retained, it 
deserves some attention that 19.6 per cent showed support for the introduction 
of alternative punishment.  
 
Opinion polls conducted by non-governmental bodies did not necessarily show a 
strikingly different result from the governmental one. The survey conducted by 
Yomiuri in 2006 showed 56.9 per cent public support for retention of the capital 
punishment system, and the NHK observed 62.8 per cent support in 1994. 
However, analysis of the other questions and answers can provide alternative 
views of public opinion on capital punishment in Japan. Whilst the governmental 
opinion poll tends to suggest that a vast majority of the Japanese public support 
capital punishment, polls conducted by non-governmental bodies show that the 
public are not necessarily resistant to the idea of placing an alternative penalty to 
capital punishment or setting a moratorium period while discussing the future of 
the system (see Appendix VI). This can illustrate the fact that public opinion can 
vary depending on how questions are phrased and answers are set, and are 
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also susceptible to the prevailing public mood. 
 
‘Public Opinion’ under the Secretive Policy of the Ministry of Justice 
 
Finally, for a better analysis of the level of public understanding on the capital 
punishment system in Japan, findings of an in-depth survey conducted by the 
Japan-UK Deliberative Public Consultation Project are worthy of close attention. 
This project has been organised by Mike Hough, Honjo Takeshi, Kimura Masato, 
and Sato Mai, and it aims to examine the Japanese public’s level of knowledge 
on the criminal justice system (Sato 2009:3). In 2009, the project team 
conducted a deliberative survey of 50 men and women aged between 20 and 58 
who live in the Tokyo metropolitan area (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama). 
The purpose of this survey was to investigate how the capital punishment 
system has been construed by the Japanese public and to evaluate their level of 
knowledge, at the time of the introduction of saiban-in seido from 21 May 2009 in 
Japan (Sato 2009:3). Participants in the deliberative survey followed five main 
procedures:  
 
(1) A survey was conducted among the participants online in order to 
examine their attitudes towards capital punishment;  
(2) A leaflet was shortly delivered to the participants which included 
detailed information on the capital punishment system;  
(3) Deliberative consultation took place on 4 April 2009 at Waseda 
University in Tokyo. It included a session to provide information about the 
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system, two group discussions, and debate and Q&A sessions by guest 
speakers (both retentionist and abolitionist);  
(4) A post-deliberation survey was conducted straight after the previous 
procedure in order to assess the changes in their attitudes towards the 
system; and 
(5) Follow-up telephone interviews were conducted among 10 participants 
who changed their views after the deliberative consultation (Sato 2009:5).  
 
Some key findings from this survey are that: (1) 40 per cent of the participants’ 
attitudes towards capital punishment were changed through the provision of 
information on the system, from retentionists to abolitionists and vice versa; and 
(2) participants stated that little information regarding capital punishment has 
been disclosed in Japan and that they were not aware of its problematic nature 
before the deliberative consultation was conducted (Sato 2009:7). As briefly 
discussed in the Introduction, Japan’s capital punishment policy is characterised 
by confidentiality and secrecy, and the general public appears to have been 
supporting the system without sufficient knowledge. According to Johnson 
(Johnson 2006:70):  
 
Capital punishment in the United States has become increasingly hidden, 
privatized, and bureaucratized over the last 150 years, but the secrecy 
and silence that shroud Japan’s death penalty are taken to extremes not  
seen in other nations. 
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Indeed, it was only from November 1998 that the Ministry of Justice started to 
disclose when executions took place and of how many convicts, and only from 
November 2007 that the names of those executed started to be disclosed. Until 
then, it was anti-death-penalty NGOs that were reporting the names of the 
executed through their own investigations. Moreover, what merits some attention 
is that Japan does not usually conduct executions during parliamentary sessions 
or public and political holidays (FIDH 2008:4).63 These are the times when the 
Japanese public are distracted or anti-death-penalty Diet members or NGO 
members have difficulty voicing dissent (Johnson 2005: 259). This secretive 
policy in Japan is strikingly different from another retentionist country, the US. 
Mori (2008:75) gives the example of the North Carolina Department of 
Correction: all the information about death row inmates has been disclosed on 
its official website, a convict’s face, full name, age, race, and date of sentence of 
death are disclosed (North Carolina Department of Public Safety 2012). Whilst 
capital punishment policy is thus ‘accessible’ to the public there, it is largely 
hidden in Japan under the name of “protect[ing] the ‘honor and privacy’ of the 
offender’s family” (Johnson 2005:260). 
 
From the findings of opinion polls conducted by both governmental and 
non-governmental bodies, and an in-depth survey by an independent research 
body, two main issues must be noted for a better understanding of public opinion 
                                                  
63 Some executions have recently been conducted between parliamentary sessions on the 
authorisation of pro-death-penalty Ministers such as Ogawa Toshio (13 January 2012 to 4 
June 2012), on 29 March 2012; and Taki Minoru (4 June 2012 to 1 October 2012; 24 
October 2012 to 26 December 2012) on 3 August 2012. However, this is a recent trend in 
2012, and it is hazardous to conclude that the Ministry of Justice has changed its secretive 
policy.    
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on the issue of capital punishment in Japan. Firstly, public and Diet members’ 
calls for the retention of capital punishment do not necessarily stem from 
enthusiastic support for the system. Rather, they appear to come from: (1) their 
aversion to a change in the existing criminal justice, which they believe to have a 
deterrent effect with; (2) a lack of option to discuss the alternative penalty to 
capital punishment in the governmental opinion poll; and (3) a lack of knowledge 
on the capital punishment system. In fact, although results in the 
non-governmental opinion polls did not show a strikingly opposite view to that 
shown in the governmental opinion polls, it showed a variation when life 
imprisonment without parole was put forward as an alternative penalty to capital 
punishment (see Appendix VI and VII). In other words, although the Japanese 
public tend to follow the existing mood and support the existing legal system, 
they do not necessarily oppose strongly the idea of halting executions to discuss 
the issue of capital punishment fundamentally. However, two important factors 
that have been hindering this discussion from gaining root in Japan appear to 
relate to the bureaucratic decision making, which puts emphasis on following 
precedents, and to ethical concerns regarding punishment.  
  
Firstly, the capital punishment system has been justified as a legal penalty on 
the basis of: (1) Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan, which allows a legal 
punishment to deprive a person of life or liberty exceptionally; (2) Article 11 of the 
Penal Code, which specifies the execution method as hanging; (3) the Penal 
Code and the Nagayama Criteria, which specify crimes that are considered 
suitable for capital punishment according to nine main criteria; and (4) Articles 
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475 and 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stipulate the 
responsibility of Ministers of Justice regarding the timing of authorising and 
conducting executions. Whether the Ministry of Justice halts executions officially, 
abolishes the capital punishment system, or installs an alternative penalty, it 
requires repealing or amending these existing legal provisions. Given that the 
bureaucrats endeavour to act on precedents, it is unlikely that they take an 
initiative to go through all these legal changes.  
 
Secondly, it should be noted that some disagreement can be observed within the 
anti-death-penalty lobby and among death row inmates on the option of 
introducing life imprisonment. For example, the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations and Forum 90, the largest anti-death-penalty NGO in Japan, has 
been supporting the idea of introducing life imprisonment without parole as an 
alternative to capital punishment (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 2008).64 
The Japan Federation of Bar Associations passed a resolution calling on the 
Japanese government to replace capital punishment with life imprisonment 
without parole in August 2012 (Japan Times, 21 February 2013). The Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations and Forum 90 both acknowledge that the general 
public will not support the immediate abolition of capital punishment, believing in 
the myth that this system deters crimes. Therefore, these bodies claim that 
introducing a penalty of an equivalent amount of suffering can be a compromise 
and a firm step towards the abolition of capital punishment (Japan Federation of 
Bar Associations 2008).  
                                                  
64 Interview with two NGO workers, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
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By contrast, some NGOs such as the Centre for Prisoners’ Rights do not support 
the introduction of alternative punishment as a temporary solution. Their 
argument is that: (1) imprisoning prisoners for life can be more cruel than capital 
punishment, since it deprives them of any chance to get rehabilitated and go 
back to society; and (2) it is not ethically right to impose another punishment in 
order to abolish capital punishment in the first place.65 Furthermore, according 
to Fukushima Mizuho, leader of the Social Democratic Party, who conducted 
surveys among death row inmates on this issue in 2012, opinions also vary 
amongst death row inmates. For example, a death row inmate, Kaneiwa Yukio, 
supports the introduction of life imprisonment without parole since it can relieve 
him from fearing every morning if the prison guard will stop at his door for the 
execution (Japan Times, 21 February 2013); but another death row inmate, 
Okamoto Keizo, claims that such a penalty is more cruel as it will deprive 
inmates of a purpose to live (Japan Times, 21 February 2013). Although the 
Japanese public are not necessarily resistant to an alternative penalty to capital 
punishment, the bureaucratic decision making system and internal disagreement 
within the anti-death-penalty lobby appear to have been preventing constructive 
discussion of the subject in Japan.  
 
This section compared public opinion found in governmental and 
non-governmental opinion polls. Although great attention tends to be paid to the 
percentages of answers given by respondents, it is important to recognise with 
                                                  
65 Interview with an NGO member, Tokyo, 12 April 2011. 
121 
 
what intentions questions and choices have been framed, with what degree of 
knowledge the public chose particular answers, and what social incidents and 
atmosphere can influence the results of the opinion polls. In order to measure 
public opinion accurately, it is necessary for the bodies conducting polls to add 
sufficient information on the capital punishment system and on an alternative 
punishment. However, the Japanese government has maintained that questions 
or answers in this survey are not biased, and no change has been made until 
today. It is very important to acknowledge the fact that ‘public opinion on capital 
punishment’ has been shaped strategically and used as a primary source for 
justification of capital punishment policy, even though it could fluctuate 
depending on the phrases used and timing of the survey. The following part will 
move on to examine the validity of the government’s justification for capital 
punishment with reference to Japanese culture.  
 
2.3. JAPANESE CULTURE AND THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM 
  
Japanese culture is another factor primarily cited by pro-death-penalty Ministers 
of Justice in order to make capital punishment policy look culturally determined 
and to deter international pressures. First of all, a former Minister of Justice, 
Hatoyama Kunio, contends that capital punishment is an indigenous system 
deeply rooted in Japan’s own history and culture (Hatoyama 2008:25). Similarly, 
at a seminar ‘Judiciary and Human Rights in Countries that Hold Observer 
Status with the Council of Europe’ held on 28 and 29 May 2002, Moriyama 
Mayumi claimed that capital punishment is deeply embedded in the Japanese 
view on guilt, represented by a concept, shinde wabiru, meaning atonement for 
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one's crime or shameful behaviour by killing oneself (Japan Times, 4 October 
2002). Relating to this concept, the Japanese government claims that capital 
punishment functions as victim satisfaction. Government officials frequently use 
the phrase ‘respecting the feelings of the victims’ bereaved families’ (higaisha 
kanjo wo koryo shite), and cite a pro-death-penalty victim lobby’s claim that it is a 
‘responsibility’ for murderers to atone for crimes through death (Moriyama 
quoted in Japan Times, 4 October 2002; Métraux 2009:282). Furthermore, 
Sakata Michita argues that the Japanese have nurtured their own culture living 
in the islands for approximately 2,000 years: abolishing capital punishment can 
go against it (Sakata 1982b:20). This means that outside parties should have no 
say.  
 
The second part of this chapter will critically examine the role that culture plays 
in the elite-driven capital punishment policy in Japan. Firstly, it will briefly review 
the existing theoretical research on the state’s rejection of international norms for 
cultural reasons, and on the relations between legal punishment and culture. 
Secondly, it will investigate Moriyama’s claim that the concept of shinde wabiru 
has been widely accepted as a social norm and supports the retention of capital 
punishment. After recalling an actual occasion when an act of shinde wabiru was 
committed in Japan, it will present conceptual and methodological problems 
regarding the application of this cultural value to justification of capital 
punishment. It will also examine the divergence between pro- and 
anti-death-penalty victim lobbies in their views of this concept.  
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Finally, it will clarify where exactly public resistance to the abolition norm stems 
from. It will critically investigate the degree to which Japanese consciousness on 
human rights and legal questions has been contributing to shape the public 
pro-death-penalty sentiment or resistance to the abolition of capital punishment. 
Presenting the characteristics of the largest anti-death-penalty NGO in Japan, 
Forum 90, it will then argue that public resistance does not appear to stem from 
cultural features but from a lack of sympathy towards the activities of domestic 
anti-death-penalty groups.  
 
2.3.1. Culture and Legal Punishment 
 
First of all, normative theory tries to offer a way to examine the state’s 
reluctance to adhere to international norms, or ‘collective expectations about 
proper behavior for a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996:54). A national 
attachment to a competing norm and cultural factors have been raised as 
influential variables in this dynamic (Checkel 1999:6; Hawkins 2001:11; Cortell 
and Davis 2005:4), and some scholars (Checkel 2012; Sithole 2012) find it 
useful to apply this framework to the state’s non-compliance with 
anti-death-penalty norm. However, a fundamental question concerning the 
extent to which capital punishment policy is culturally determined in Japan has 
been overlooked in the theoretical approach. In order to investigate the degree 
to which a normative theory would help understand Japan’s resistance to 
abolitionism, this section will first introduce the mechanism through which 
international norms are transmitted to the domestic arena. 
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Firstly, Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999:11) present step-by-step 
procedures of norm socialisation: (1) processes of adaptation and strategic 
bargaining; (2) processes of moral consciousness-raising, shaming, 66 
argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion; and (3) processes of 
institutionalisation and habitualisation. These procedures can be explained 
more in detail by a ‘life cycle’ of norm transplantation that Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink (1998:895) present: norm emergence, norm cascades, and 
norm internalisation. In the first stage, norm entrepreneurs/leaders – 
international organisations, transnational advocacy networks or NGOs, and 
domestic elites – attempt to socialise other states to become norm 
followers/takers. This is based on the assumption that the state’s compliance 
with a norm depends on the domestic mobilisation of actors that socialise states 
to adhere to new norms and values (Moravcsik 1997; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
2005:1380).  
 
Norms then cascade in the second stage with ‘a combination of pressure for 
conformity, a desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of 
state leaders to enhance their self-esteem’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:895). 
Although ‘international society is a smaller group than the total number of states 
in the international system’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999:11), the embarrassment of 
not belonging to it; and their desire to obtain a ‘social proof’ as a legitimate 
                                                  
66 Shaming here means creating a tension between norm-abiding and norm-violating 
countries to make the latter realise that international norm compliance has now become one 
of the crucial constitutive elements of modern statehood or a member of international 
society (Risse and Sikkink 1999:8,15; Risse and Ropp 1999:234). 
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member of it are supposed to make states consider the acceptance of norms 
(Axelrod 1986:1105). In other words, ‘[s]tates may obey international norms 
because doing so is right and moral, helps to shape and maintain an ordered 
international environment, and gains them respect in the eyes of the world’ (Bae 
2008:126). 67  Finally, norm internalisation occurs when norms acquire a 
taken-for-granted quality that does not require a broad domestic debate, such 
as norms relating to women’s voting rights and slavery (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 895; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005:1385).  
 
With regard to denial of international norms in the domestic arena, Andrew P. 
Cortell and James W. Davis (2005:4) argue that it is not necessarily the case ‘in 
advanced industrial democracies with a history of national attachment to a 
competing norm [...since] powerful states have strong material incentives to 
reject international norms’. For example, Jeffery Checkel argues that diffusion is 
more rapid and smooth when a ‘cultural match’ exists to a great extent, which 
varies from positive (+), null (0) to negative (-), indicating a degree of a 
congruence between international and domestic norms (Checkel 1999:6). 
Under this assumption, ‘[i]nternational norms are more likely to have an impact 
if they resonate with established cultural understandings, historical experience, 
and the dominant views of domestic groups’ (Hawkins 2001:11). Finally, Risse 
and Sikkink point out ‘that denial of the norm almost never takes place in the 
form of open rejection of human rights, but is mostly expressed in terms of 
                                                  
67  Bae (2008:111) takes an example of Ukraine and argues that its ‘policy change 
regarding the death penalty was mainly based on strategic means-ends considerations at 
both domestic and international levels’.  
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reference to an allegedly more valid international norm, in this case national 
sovereignty’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999:23-24). 
 
Normative explanation from cultural perspectives may appear useful to examine 
Japan’s resistance to some international norms. For example, the 
anti-nuclear-proliferation norm is an example of a positive cultural match. Since 
the end of World War II, Japan has been preserving three main non-nuclear 
principles: not to make such weapons; not to possess them; and not to bring 
them into Japan.68 Also, the anti-whaling norm can be cited as a typical 
example of a negative cultural match between meat-eating and fish-eating 
countries (Hirata 2004:188). Similarly, Japan’s non-compliance with the 
anti-death-penalty norm may appear at first sight to be due to a cultural 
difference. The government tends to claim that this issue should be left to the 
national criminal justice system, the climate of public opinion, and Japanese 
cultural assumptions regarding death and guilt. However, what has been 
overlooked in the existing approach is that the issue of capital punishment is 
primarily elite-driven in Japan, and important decisions are made by policy elites 
irrespective of domestic or cultural factors.  
 
As Sato (2009:1–2) argues, ‘public opinion’ can fluctuate depending on (1) 
people’s level of knowledge on the capital punishment system, (2) the proximity 
of the survey dates to certain incidents, and (3) semi-established moods or ideas 
                                                  
68 However, it should be added that this can also be construed as a socialised norm as a 
product of the American security guarantee, given that the renunciation of war was included 
in the US occupation policy (Johnson and Zimring 2009:60–1).  
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on the issue questioned. Furthermore, what is important to note is that all of 
these factors appear to have been influenced by the governmental approach on 
this issue. The secretive policy by the Ministry of Justice does not allow the 
public to have a correct understanding of the capital punishment system, and the 
governmental opinion polls appear to have been strategically phrased in order to 
generate certain answers to justify capital punishment legitimately (Chapter 2). 
‘Strong public support on capital punishment’, which is generated from the 
governmental opinion poll results, can also affect respondents as a 
semi-established views (Lippmann 1997:78). Given that it is elite culture that 
precedes mass culture, it is inappropriate to assume that Japan’s 
non-compliance of the anti-death-penalty norm has been driven by the climate of 
public opinion or their cultural views on death and life.  
 
Governmental justification of capital punishment on domestic and cultural 
grounds appears to intend to deter external pressures as an illegitimate 
intervention in internal affairs. Thus, normative theory from cultural perspectives 
does not fully account for the actual dynamic regarding Japan’s capital 
punishment policy. Rather, more attention needs to be paid to Japan’s 
institutional structure, where capital punishment policy is treated as an issue of 
law and order, and pressures from human rights perspectives are resisted.   
 
Furthermore, David Garland’s view of the influence of culture in shaping penal 
regulations and institutions should be noted: 
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Penal laws and institutions are always proposed, discussed, legislated, 
and operated within definite cultural codes. They are framed in 
languages, discourses, and sign systems which embody specific cultural 
meanings, distinctions, and sentiments, and which must be interpreted 
and understood if the social meaning and motivations of punishment are 
to become intelligible (Garland 1993:198). 
 
Since Garland contends that cultural sentiments can frame punishment, the 
capital punishment system may appear to be embedded in Japanese culture. 
However, the ‘culture’ associated with Japan’s capital punishment system is not 
necessarily that of the general public. Rather, it is a routinely held institutional 
culture of the Ministry of Justice, which has been encouraging death row inmates 
to resign themselves to the inevitable (Menda 2004:139) and helping prison 
guards conduct executions in a smooth, efficient and uneventful manner on the 
basis of law. The following part will reconsider the validity of the governmental 
justification for capital punishment on the basis of Japanese culture, and argue 
that cultural sentiment among the general public is an independent variable in 
this system. 
 
2.3.2. Capital Punishment as Social Justice and Victim Satisfaction 
Reconsidered 
 
As noted above, a former Minister of Justice, Moriyama Mayumi, claims that 
capital punishment is deeply embedded in the Japanese view on guilt, 
represented by a concept, shinde wabiru. This part will examine whether or not 
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such a social norm exists in Japanese civil society with an overwhelming public 
consensus, and whether the general public and the victim lobby believe that 
capital punishment functions as victim satisfaction. It will recall the actual 
occasion when an act of shinde wabiru was carried out in Japan, and the 
Japanese view on criminals relating to this concept. It will then raise conceptual 
and methodological problems involved in application of this concept to the 
capital punishment system, and also present divergence within the victim lobby 
on how they believe criminals should atone for their crimes.  
 
The Social Norm on Atonement through Death, ‘Shinde Wabiru’  
 
General Nogi Maresuke and his wife committed seppuku following the state 
funeral of Emperor Meiji in 1912. His suicide note revealed that it was junshi – to 
commit seppuku upon the death of the lord – in order to expiate his disgrace in 
two main events: the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 in which he lost the imperial 
banner to the enemy, and the devastating result of the Russo-Japanese War 
in1904-05 where 56,000 lives were lost, including his two sons. In the latter 
event in particular, although General Nogi was first stationed at Port Arthur with 
approximately 90,000 soldiers, the Commander in Chief, Oyama Iwao, sensed 
that defeat was imminent under Nogi’s leadership. Therefore, Oyama appointed 
Kodama Gentaro as the Chief of General Staff of the Manchuria Army at the end 
of November 1904 instead (Lifton 1977:65).  
 
Since this decision was not announced to the public, Nogi was celebrated as a 
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national hero following Japan’s victory (Lifton 1977:66). He took this as an 
undeserved honour, and a sense of shame made Nogi plead that he deserved 
death on each occasion when he was granted an audience with the Emperor, 
and in his meetings with the major (Lifton 1977:53). However, his death was not 
permitted since they both knew that Nogi genuinely meant to atone for his 
disgrace, and Emperor Meiji told him to live at least until his (the Emperor’s) 
death (Lifton 1977:53). On the day of the state funeral of Emperor Meiji in 1912, 
Nogi committed seppuku with his wife in order to atone for his disgrace. Nogi’s 
case drew a great deal of worldwide scholarly attention to the study of the 
seppuku ritual; and this cultural value, shinde wabiru, may appear to have been 
still accepted as a social norm in the contemporary era, relating to the Japanese 
view on criminals or death row inmates. For example, Komiya Nobuo claims that 
‘Japan is not a heaven for offenders in terms of rehabilitation because the 
reintegrative function of Japanese society is limited’ (1999:387).  
 
According to Komiya, self-discipline is the virtue admired in Japan, and this has 
been a key factor not only in maintaining Japan’s exceptionally low crime rate 
but also in ‘expelling’ criminals from society (Komiya 1999). For example, 
schools in Japan are often inhospitable to original or critical thinkers since group 
harmony is highly stressed, and pupils learn to ‘restrain selfish behaviour 
through various small group activities […and to] continuously monitor[…] one 
another’s behaviour within the group’ (Komiya 1999:383). Fearing ‘deprivation of 
membership’, pupils become submissive to authority, and this surveillance 
system also works in society even after they grow up. In the meantime, ‘one who 
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neglects […this repressive rule] is likely to be labelled as a social misfit and 
gradually excluded from one’s group’ (Komiya 1999:373). In other words, whilst 
self-control makes the group members’ bond stronger and contributes to building 
of a crime-free society, once they become criminals it is less likely for them and 
their families to be accommodated in the society again.  
 
These ‘exclusive’ attitudes of the public to offenders may imply that the 
Japanese public appreciates a social norm of shinde wabiru to some extent. 
However, three main concerns are aroused by Moriyama’s claim that the capital 
punishment system has been underpinned by such Japanese concept in the 
modern period. Firstly, the seppuku ritual is a particular historical and political 
event linked with a particular set of sociological phenomena, and Nogi’s case 
was also a symbolic suicide, which aimed at appealing to the public in a 
traditional samurai spirit (Lifton 1977:73, 79, 92) – a sentiment not common 
amongst the contemporary Japanese public. Secondly, it has been overlooked 
by the Ministry of Justice, the pro-death-penalty lobby, and the general public in 
the contemporary context that spontaneity is required when an act of shinde 
wabiru is expected. This action is considered meaningful only when it is 
committed by people on their own initiative after a feeling of remorse has been 
generated from the bottom of their hearts.69 If it is conducted by the state’s 
authority on the dates that the ministry bureaucrats choose at their convenience, 
it is a mere state killing.  
 
                                                  
69 Interview with an attorney, Tokyo, 13 April 2011. 
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Thirdly, one should note that the existence of another Japanese proverb, ‘tsumi 
wo urande hito wo uramazu’ (condemn the crime rather than the criminal), has 
been ignored in the governmental justification for capital punishment. If the 
government proclaims that capital punishment is deeply embedded in Japanese 
culture, it also needs to account for that proverb, contrasting to shinde wabiru. 
The following section will further investigate this issue and introduce arguments 
by both pro- and anti-death-penalty victim lobbies. It will summarise the main 
claims from both lobbies about how criminals should atone for their crimes, and 
critically examine how frequently the concept of shinde wabiru can be found in 
death sentences or the popular media as a widely accepted social norm. 
 
The Pro-Death Penalty Victim Lobby 
 
In relation to this concept, it is also important to examine the pro-death-penalty 
lobby’s claim that only capital punishment can bring social justice to the 
bereaved families. The Hikari case is a high-profile murder incident where the 
victims’ bereaved family proclaimed such an opinion. On 14 April 1999, an 
18-year-old male broke into a house in Hikari city in Yamaguchi prefecture. The 
offender, whose name was withheld until 201270 since he was a minor at the 
                                                  
70 When several media agencies disclosed the name of the offender in the Hikari case in 
2012, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations voiced concerns, stressing that he was a 
minor at the time of the crime (Kyodo, 24 February 2012). Sankei, Asahi, Yomiuri and Nikkei 
disclosed the name when the death sentence was finally upheld in February 2012. It had 
been withheld considering that he was a minor (the legal age of adulthood is 20 in Japan) 
and would go back to civil society after correction or rehabilitation. However, these 
newspaper agencies concluded that the opportunity for that had been lost and there was no 
need to hide his identity (Sankei, 22 February 2012). In the meantime, the Mainichi and 
Tokyo newspapers withheld it, considering that it was still important for the offender to be 
corrected and show remorse towards the bereaved family, and leave the possibility of 
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time of the crime, raped and strangled a 23-year-old woman, and strangled her 
baby daughter. What made this case distinct from other juvenile crimes was that: 
(1) Motomura Hiroshi, husband and father of the victims, called for the death 
sentence vocally; and (2) Yasuda Yoshihiro, an anti-death-penalty lobby activist 
and defence attorney for Asahara Shoko – leader of the Aum Shinrikyo 
responsible for the Aum gas attack on the Tokyo underground railway in 199571 
– joined the defence team in the Hikari case from March 2006. The media 
coverage of these two helped create a simplistic picture of a ‘for or against’ 
argument on capital punishment amongst the public. As Hamai and Ellis 
(2008a:80) argue: 
 
Motomura had a very charismatic persona as the grieving husband and 
father that was well attuned to TV chat shows and tabloid styles of 
approach. In front of TV cameras and reporters, he has often produced 
emotional attacks on offenders and argued that he would kill the 
murderer in his own case, if he were released. 
 
Whilst Motomura’s claim as a victim gained much sympathy from the public 
(Hamai and Ellis 2008a:80), the argument of the defence team, which comprised 
20 veteran attorneys including Yasuda, sounded poor and did not garner support 
from the public towards the offender. The team stressed that both victims died 
accidentally and that the offender even tried to revive both of them by raping the 
                                                                                                                                                  
retrials or a reprieve as well (Sankei, 22 February 2012).  
71 Sarin gas was spread by the Aum Shinrikyo Sect in the Tokyo underground on 20 March 
1995 – the biggest security threat in Japan in decades, in which massive numbers of the 
Self-Defence Forces with approximately 60,000 policemen were deployed. 
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dead woman and leaving the dead baby in a cupboard so that Doraemon, a 
robotic cat manga character, could make any dreams come true or would do 
something to them (Japan Times, 6 January 2010). The disclosure of the 
provocative letters which offender wrote about the victims and Motomura also 
made the public doubt the credibility of the defence team’s claim, and this 
murder case left an extremely negative image of the anti-death-penalty 
movement in Japan (Sankei, 22 February 2012). It was only the Broadcasting 
Ethics and Programme Improvement Organisation that vocally claimed that the 
excessive media coverage from the victims’ perspective had been producing an 
unbalanced view of the case (Sankei, 16 April 2008).  
 
The offender in the Hikari case was initially sentenced to life imprisonment 
considering his age and the possibility that he could be rehabilitated. However, 
right before the ruling on 22 April 2008 when the offender was sentenced to 
capital punishment at the age of 27, Motomura stated that ‘It’s his responsibility 
to let society know about the consequences of killing someone’ (quoted in Hamai 
and Ellis 2008a:81). He implied that the death sentence on the offender could 
remind society that only capital punishment serves as social justice and can 
deter further serious crimes. On the other hand, Motomura’s campaigns were 
not all about stirring up pro-death penalty sentiment in the public. His 
appearance in the media appears to have contributed to make other victims’ 
bereaved families become publicly visible, and brought several changes to the 
legal provisions (Hamai and Ellis 2008a:79).  
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Firstly, cooperating with Okamura Isao, an attorney whose wife was murdered 
on 10 October 1997, Motomura established an NGO, the National Network for 
Victim Support (Zenkoku Higaisha no Kai), on 23 January 2000. Motomura 
spoke on behalf of victims’ bereaved families who could not express their 
feelings openly, and the Basic Act on Crime Victims was also enacted in order to 
protect their rights in November 2004. In the meantime, it appears that such 
victim-driven activism was also strategically used by the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office to amend the Juvenile Law in November 2000 and May 2007. In particular, 
the amendment of the Juvenile Law in 2000 was the first since World War II 
(Hamai and Ellis 2008b:33), and it lowered the minimum age for sending minors 
to reformatories from 16 to 14 in 2000 and from ‘14 to around 12 (in 2007), 
stirring concerns among lawyers and legal experts that tougher penalties might 
infringe on the rights of minors and might not lead to a reduction in juvenile 
delinquency’ (Japan Times, 11 April 2008). Harsher punishment of juvenile 
offenders was thus legalised as if it was influenced by the growing power of the 
victim lobby.  
 
By contrast, when the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the defendant and 
the death sentence was upheld on 20 February 2012, this appears to have put a 
brake on the pro-death-penalty mood in Japan. According to the judge, 
Kanetsuki Seiichi, ‘Despite a severe sense of victimization by the bereaved 
family, sincere remorse is not seen as the defendant made irrational pleas’, and 
the death sentence was inevitable (Mainichi, 20 February 2012). Following this, 
an editorial in Asahi on 21 February 2012 posed an ethical question to the public, 
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asking whether taking the life of one who had committed the crime as an 
18-year-old boy was social justice and would bring happiness to Motomura.  
 
Death sentence was finalised to the defendant. However, if he had not 
reached the age 18 at the time of the crime, this court decision would not 
have been made. The decision was that there is no other way than death 
for him to atone for the crime even considering his immaturity and 
possibility of correction and rehabilitation. […] Death sentence is 
challenging for the judges to give. A modern state, which aims to protect 
the individual life, deprives an individual of life under the name of law. 
This is the contradiction that anti-death penalty lobby claims (Asahi, 21 
February 2012).   
 
Asahi thus alarmed the public about the legal legitimacy issue regarding state 
killing. In fact, in contrast to Motomura, another victim lobbyist in a capital 
punishment case has been lecturing across the country proclaiming the 
importance of rehabilitation of offenders: Harada Masaharu. The following 
section will introduce an alternative voice to what the Japanese government 
cites as ‘the feelings of victims’ bereaved families’.  
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The Anti-Death-Penalty Victim Lobby 
 
On 24 January 1983, Harada Akio, 30-year-old truck driver, was killed in an 
incident that proved to be an insurance scam.72 After Hasegawa was sentenced 
to death in two trials, he kept sending more than 100 letters to Harada Masaharu, 
the victim’s brother, from death row; most of them were filled with words of 
apology and hope for the best for his family. He also sent some drawings which 
were Hasegawa’s self-portraits (Mori 2008:51). It was not until around 1986 that 
Harada finally started reading Hasegawa’s letters, and he visited Hasegawa in 
the detention centre in 1993. Facing Hasegawa who was apologising sincerely, 
Harada felt a sense of comfort and healing for the first time, if not forgiveness 
(Harada 2004). Harada also got to know that Hasegawa’s sister and son 
committed suicide as they were ashamed of Hasegawa being arrested. Harada 
then started to believe that another unnatural death such as suicide should be 
avoided, and that Hasegawa should compensate for his wrongdoings by living 
and expressing remorse to Harada for the rest of his life (Harada 2004:104).  
 
Since Hasegawa had already exhausted the appeals process and the death 
sentence had been finalised by then, Harada handed in a petition on 18 April 
2001 to the then Minister of Justice, Komura Masahiko, calling on him to halt 
Hasegawa’s execution. Komura declared in front of a TV crew that Hasegawa’s 
execution would not be authorised so soon (Harada 2004:108–9). However, 
                                                  
72 Although his death was initially believed to be a traffic accident, it was discovered on 2 
May 1984 that the president of his company was involved in the murder (M. Harada 
2004:76–7).  
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despite the pleas of Harada, Hasegawa was executed on 27 December 2001 
under the authorisation of the following Minister of Justice, Moriyama Mayumi. 
Although the Japanese government often claims that capital punishment is 
carried out considering the feelings of the victims in Japan, Hasegawa was 
executed against the feelings of Harada.  
 
Through this experience, Harada claims that executing offenders through capital 
punishment does not necessarily bring closure to the incident or satisfaction to 
the bereaved families (Harada 2004). Similarly, Katayama Tadaari, who lost his 
eight-year-old son in a traffic accident on 28 November 1997, has declared that: 
 
It should be realized that each bereaved family has different views […,] 
and within a family the father, mother, or the victim's brothers and sisters 
have their own opinions. We cannot refer to ‘victims’ or ‘bereaved 
families’ in a lump. […] I want to see a system where victims are fully 
supported financially and psychologically and they could have a venue 
for dialogue with offenders, who will return to society in the future, rather 
than feuding with each other (Japan Times, 21 November 2007). 
 
Harada describes crime victims as those who were pushed off a cliff by criminals, 
and the rest of the Japanese citizens as those who live peacefully on the cliff 
(Harada 2004:51–2): the latter never say, ‘Hang in there! We will lift you up!’ but 
only shouts from above, ‘You must be hurt. We will also push the criminal off the 
cliff so you would feel better’ (Harada 2004:51–2). Harada claims that the third 
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party usually seeks to promote more severe punishment for the criminals without 
being aware of what they can really do to heal the bereaved families’ mental 
wounds. Thus, there exists some divergence within the victim lobby on the ways 
criminals should atone for crimes. Whilst the government proclaims that capital 
punishment is deeply embedded in cultural values concerning death and life, 
and functions as victim satisfaction, some victim lobby campaigners do not share 
the same idea. It is only the voice of pro-death-penalty victim lobby that is used 
as a primary source for the governmental justification of capital punishment. The 
following section will move on to explore how the media have been contributing 
to build ‘public opinion on capital punishment’.  
 
The Influence of Media in Shaping Pro-Death Penalty Sentiment amongst 
the Public 
 
First of all, it appears that the media tend to let the public make up their minds 
whether to support Motomura’s vocal pro-death-penalty campaigns or Yasuda’s 
anti-death-penalty campaigns. They usually report only when an incident occurs, 
the offender is arrested, and capital punishment is imposed on offenders. These 
reports give very basic information, yet ‘enough’ information for the public to 
build up a myth that capital punishment is social justice, and to develop their fear 
about abolition of the system. Indeed, the media do not often feature detention 
conditions or the exact method of execution in detail. As a result, it is difficult for 
the public to observe psychological changes in offenders’ feelings towards the 
bereaved families or the crimes they committed, as the Harada case shows. In 
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other words, the public have been supporting capital punishment over years 
without being provided with sufficient information about the death row inmates.  
 
It is not necessarily the media’s fault that the public are not fully informed about 
the capital punishment system. Rather, it closely relates to the secretive policy of 
the Ministry of Justice that has been hindering the media from gaining access to 
Ministry officials for investigation. However, in my interviews with writers of two 
main newspaper agencies, both stated that writers tend to develop sympathy 
towards the bereaved families in the process of getting to know about the victims 
through interviews, and articles tend to be written from the victims’ perspectives73. 
Although it is not impossible for them to interview offenders, writers cannot 
usually spend the same amount of time as they spend to interview bereaved 
families: it is usually impossible once the offender is detained. It is also crucial 
for the media to allow some minority victim lobby voices to be heard to the public 
in order to demonstrate that capital punishment does not necessarily bring 
justice to all the victims’ bereaved families. 
 
Furthermore, it merits some attention that Motomura’s and the general public’s 
support for capital punishment appears to come from a simple reason rather 
than a complex cultural factors: it comes from lack of understanding about the 
second heaviest penalty, or life imprisonment with parole. According to Article 28 
of the Penal Code:  
 
                                                  
73 Interview with a senior writer at a newspaper agency, Tokyo, 12 May 2011; postal 
correspondence with a senior writer at a newspaper agency, 21 May 2011. 
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‘When a person sentenced to imprisonment with or without work evinces 
signs of substantial reformation, the person may be paroled by a 
disposition of a government agency after that person has served 
one-third of the definite term sentenced or 10 years in the case of a life 
imprisonment’.  
 
Therefore, the public tend to perceive life imprisonment with parole as a fairly 
mild penalty, considering that those convicted of serious crimes can be released 
within ten to 15 years. However, statistics from 2007 showed that offenders have 
been released in 31 years and ten months on average; and ‘the chances of 
release on parole among lifers have almost disappeared and a life sentence 
really does mean “until death” in Japan’ (Hamai and Ellis 2008a:73; Kiriyama 
2008:171). In order to reduce the ‘gap’ between the heaviest and the second 
heaviest penalty, there exists a movement promoting the introduction of life 
imprisonment without parole (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 2008). 
However, as discussed in the previous part, domestic discussion has not 
advanced yet. The governmental opinion polls do not pose such questions, and 
the ethical debate on whether life imprisonment without parole would be as cruel 
as capital punishment, or more, has not been resolved amongst legal experts or 
within the anti-death-penalty lobby, Therefore, public support for capital 
punishment does not appear to stem from a definite reliance on and 
understanding of the capital punishment system itself. Rather, it is heavily 
influenced by the media coverage of serious crimes and incorrect understanding 
of the second heaviest punishment in Japan, which stems from a lack of 
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governmental effort to discuss the issue fundamentally.  
 
To sum up, what makes the ‘retributive’ sentiment look Japanese appears to be 
strategic narratives by the policy elites. Whilst social norms on atonement 
through death may exist in civil society, influenced by the Japanese public’s 
possession of self-discipline and their views on criminals and death row inmates, 
the existence of such a norm does not necessarily lead the state to retain capital 
punishment. Given that the issue of capital punishment is elite-driven, it is the 
governmental discourse, which refers to the historical and cultural practice, that 
has been making Japanese culture look like a determining factor for justification 
of the system. Having examined what cultural features have been proclaimed by 
the Japanese government to be supporting capital punishment, the following 
section will investigate what other cultural factors appear to be hindering the 
Japanese public from complying with the anti-death penalty norm. 
 
2.3.3. Public Resistance to the Anti-Death Penalty Norm Reconsidered 
 
Whilst a cultural value of shinde wabiru may not be appreciated by contemporary 
Japanese public, other cultural features may also appear to be associated with 
public support for capital punishment. This section will critically examine the 
extent to which Japanese legal and human rights consciousness have been 
contributing to public resistance to the abolitionism. It will contend that it is not 
necessarily Japanese cultural values that have been hindering the abolitionism 
movement, but the principles and characteristics of domestic anti-death-penalty 
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NGOs that have been failing to garner wide public support for abolition. 
 
Japanese Human Rights and Legal Consciousness 
 
First of all, retention of capital punishment in Japan might at first sight imply that 
the Japanese public have lower human rights consciousness than those in 
Western countries. However, in reality, since the Japanese government has 
been treating the issue of capital punishment from the perspective of criminal 
justice, the Japanese public do not appear to have been given opportunities to 
discuss it from a human rights perspective in the first place.  
 
The Public Survey on Defence of Human Rights (Jinken Yogo ni Kansuru Yoron 
Chosa) is conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office every five years; and 1,776 
out of 3,000 people aged 20 or older responded in 2007. With regard to the 
question: ‘Which of the following human rights issues are you concerned with?’, 
19 issues are listed as possible choices (see Appendix VIII). What merits some 
attention is that domestic human rights issues raised by the Prime Minister’s 
Office are mostly different from what international society has been mainly 
concerned with in Japan, for example: (1) treatment of prisoners; (2) lack of an 
independent national human rights institution; (3) historical responsibility for the 
ianfu (comfort women) system during the wartime; and (4) the rights of minorities 
and foreigners (Amnesty International 2008; UN Human Rights Committee 
2008).  
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Of course, it is natural that domestic concerns raised by the national government 
tend to be daily or local issues whilst those by raised by international society 
tend to be more internationally critical issues for a global comparison. Having 
said that, since treatment of prisoners is not listed in the survey, there is little 
chance that the public would treat related issues such as detention conditions 
and execution methods for death row inmates as human rights issues in Japan. 
Excluding these issues from the opinion polls appears, indeed, to be preventing 
the public from engaging in a domestic debate on capital punishment. Therefore, 
it is a difficult task to statistically observe the Japanese public’s attitude towards 
human rights of prisoners or death row inmates in particular, or to claim that 
retention of capital punishment stems from the low human rights consciousness 
of the Japanese public.  
 
Similarly, the state of Japanese legal consciousness may appear to explain why 
the general public do not show much sympathy towards domestic anti-death 
penalty activities. In other words, if the Japanese public has ‘low’ legal 
consciousness, they may not necessarily show particular interests to the 
activists’ campaigns which try to challenge the existing legal system. For 
example, a low litigation rate in Japan by comparison with other industrialised 
countries (Kawashima 1967; Cole 2007) may make it look as though the 
Japanese public have ‘low’ legal consciousness and do not support the 
anti-death-penalty lobby which tries to challenge the existing legal provisions. 
According to Meryll Dean (2002:4), the Japanese public tends to ‘regard law like 
an heirloom samurai sword, something to be treasured but not used’; and prefer 
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to settle disputes informally through mediation.  
 
A legal sociologist, Kawashima Takeyoshi, agrees on this point, and also claims 
that the Japanese public do not appear to assert their legal rights. Whilst duty or 
norms are emphasised in Japanese society, terms such as ‘rights’ (kenri) did not 
exist when Japan imported a Western legal system, which has made translation 
work challenging (Kawashima 1967:15). Kawashima also claims that once a 
contract is made in any profession, a master-servant relationship arises: when 
troubles occur in this power dynamic, mediation is preferred and any hard feeling 
is expected to be ‘washed away’ (mizu ni nagasu) through apology or small 
compensation. If someone still tries to bring a lawsuit, this behaviour is seen as 
morally wrong, subversive, and rebellious; this appears to have been 
contributing to the low litigation rates in Japan (Kawashima 1963:45). This also 
relates to Wagatsuma Hiroshi and Arthur Rosett’s work on the apology culture in 
Japan. According to them, the Japanese tend to apologise even when it is not 
entirely their fault, and this derives from their wish to maintain community 
harmony and stability (Wagatsuma and Rosett 1986). Such a cultural preference 
might not appear to motivate the Japanese public to support the 
anti-death-penalty lobby’s vocal campaigns, which try to urge the government to 
repeal or amend legal provisions.  
 
However, as with human rights consciousness, it is not easy to evaluate 
Japanese legal consciousness on a scale from low to high in the first place. 
Regarding the reason why the informal way is preferred for solving problems, it 
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is worth noting the conciliation methods employed in Japan. For example, 
companies usually provide employees with a mediating service in the case of 
traffic accidents, and there is no need for the individual to bring a lawsuit. Legal 
procedures come in only after exhausting all the available conciliation methods, 
and by the time this is done, the problem is normally being solved peacefully by 
mediators’ efforts. Therefore, the low litigation rate in Japan does not necessarily 
stem from ‘low’ legal consciousness among the Japanese public, but from what 
is preferred as an alternative conciliation method. More precisely, the legal 
consciousness of the Japanese public cannot be examined through the lens of 
culture or institutions, but should rather encompass both study areas (Feldman 
2007:63).  
 
The next section will examine the characteristics of one of the largest 
anti-death-penalty NGOs, which appears to be playing a larger role than any 
cultural factors in failing to gain sympathy from the majority of public for the 
cause of abolition.  
 
Characteristics of Anti-Death-Penalty NGOs in Japan 
 
Currently, Forum 90, which was founded in 1990, is the largest 
anti-death-penalty NGO in Japan. Yasuda Yoshihiro is one of the key founders of 
Forum 90, and as already discussed, he is a criminal lawyer widely known for his 
activities in high-profile murder cases. He was one of the defence counsel for 
Asahara Shoko, who was responsible for the Aum gas attack on the Tokyo 
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underground railway in 1995, and of the offender, then a minor, in the Hikari case 
in 1999.  
 
The former case was the biggest security threat in Japan in decade, in which 
massive numbers of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) with approximately 60,000 
policemen were deployed. Aum Shinrikyo was not only a religious group with 
approximately 10,000 members led by Asahara Shoko, but also an organisation 
that sought to protest against the government by committing crimes; 58 SDF 
members had been identified as Aum members by the autumn of 1995. This 
sect’s commitment to organising crimes from the late 1980s to the early 90s is 
abundantly clear74. Some core members were among the brightest scientists in 
Japan, and the gas attack was planned using their skills so that the impact would 
be as big as possible (Katzenstein 1996:71). The media featured this 
organisation as an atrocious murder group or a brainwashed spooky cult group, 
and getting rid of it from the society became a high priority for restoring public 
safety in Japan (Osawa and Mori 2008:157). The public desired that Asahara 
should be sentenced to death and executed as soon as possible, and the trial for 
the Aum gas attack was opened even though most psychiatrists diagnosed that 
Asahara did not have the mental capacity to stand trial (Kaga and Yasuda 
2008:133)75.  
 
                                                  
74 They include: (1) the Sakamoto family murder on 4 November 1989; (2) the Matsumoto 
gas attack on 27 June 1994; (3) the shooting of the National Police Agency Chief, 
Kunimatsu Takaji, on 21 June in 1995; and (4) a case of a letter bomb sent to the Tokyo 
Governor on 16 May 1995 (Katzenstein 1996:71–2). 
75 The trial started on 24 April 1996, and Asahara was sentenced to death on 27 February 
2004 after 257 trial sessions (Nakamura 2006:378). 
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Whilst the Aum Gas Attack created an extremely negative image of the 
anti-death-penalty movement (Sankei, 22 February 2012), the public resistance 
to the abolitionism became more evident after Yasuda joined the defence team 
of the Hikari Case. In defence of a minor offender, the team claimed that he tried 
to revive both victims using the power of the Doraemon, a robotic cat manga 
character, which could make any dreams come true or would do something to 
them (Japan Times, 6 January 2010). However, as soon as the media featured 
the defence team’s claim, Yasuda received tremendous amount of criticism. For 
example, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations received more than 8,000 
claims from the public demanding the disbarment of Yasuda (Sankei, 22 
February 2012), and Forum 90 received harassing calls every day.76  
 
In my interview, an anonymous NGO member stated that Yasuda’s activities as 
a defence attorney became a setback to their anti-death penalty campaigns 
indeed.77 Because of his professional responsibility and of passion to bring 
abolitionism to Japan, Yasuda tends to argue from the perspectives of the 
criminals, and not out of line with those of the victim lobby or the general 
public.78 Since Yasuda is a key figure of a well-known anti-death-penalty NGO, 
abolitionist lobby tends to be labeled as those who put an extreme emphasis on 
the human rights of criminals but undervalue the feelings of victims or their 
bereaved families.79 As a result, the public tend to show resistance to the 
abolitionism activities, which appear to go against the public good.  
                                                  
76 Interview with two NGO member, Tokyo, 17 May 2011 
77 Interview with an NGO member, Tokyo, 12 April 2011 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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Cultural explanations for the Japanese public’s failure to show sympathy 
towards anti-death-penalty NGO activities – for example, that the Japanese 
public have a distinctive view of death and life or possess ‘low’ human rights or 
legal consciousness – do not necessarily tell the full story. Rather, it is the 
distinctive characteristics of anti-death-penalty NGOs that appear to have 
caused their failure to win support amongst the public, with different ideas of 
social justice, simply because of those campaigners’ professional activity and 
their passion to bring abolitionism to Japan.80  
 
The present chapter has thus clarified the limited role that culture plays in the 
bureaucratic decision making mechanism. Applying the analytical framework 
presented so far, the following part will move on to evaluate the validity of the 
existing hypotheses on Japan’s retention of capital punishment.  
 
2.3.4. Existing Hypotheses on Governmental Retention of Capital 
Punishment Reconsidered  
 
As presented in Chapter 1, Johnson (2011:141–4) discusses that Japan’s 
retention of capital punishment relates to the following historical factors: (1) the 
US occupation; (2) the characteristics of Japanese political parties; and (3) 
Japan’s geographical position and its stability as a democratic country. 
Regarding the first hypothesis, it is not impossible to assume that Japan would 
have abolished the system if that had been included in post-war US policy. 
                                                  
80 Ibid. 
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However, no literature has systematically examined the causal relationship 
between the US occupation and the retention of capital punishment, and 
Johnson (2011:142–3) himself expresses caution about the validity of this claim 
and emphasises the necessity for further research.  
 
With regard to the characteristics of Japanese political parties and their 
resistance to political changes including the abolition of capital punishment, this 
appears to explain Japan’s retention of the system to some extent. Since the 
pro-death-penalty LDP ruled for approximately 54 years from its foundation in 
1955 until 2009 (with 1993 as an exception), the relationship between 
bureaucrats and LDP politicians became highly interdependent over these years. 
In the meantime, it is not necessarily right to assume that a change in the ruling 
party can bring about a shift in capital punishment policy. Of course, after the 
Democratic Party of Japan took over from the LDP in August 2009, several 
changes were observed: the issue of capital punishment was ‘re-discovered’ by 
Ministers of Justice such as Chiba Keiko, Eda Satsuki, Hiraoka Hideo and 
Ogawa Toshio, and executions were put on hold for approximately 20 months 
(Chapter 1). Furthermore, it is worth noting that politicians in other parties have 
different views on capital punishment.81 For instance, Fukushima Mizuho in the 
Social Democratic Party is an outspoken anti-death-penalty advocate and has 
been showing a particular interest in human rights protection. Kamei Shizuka, 
leader of the People’s New Party and a former police officer, is also against 
                                                  
81 However, no matter how outspoken Diet members are on the capital punishment system, 
they tend to be sensitive to public opinion and reluctant to include the abolition of capital 
punishment in their manifestoes at election time, with Kamei Shizuka as an exception.  
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capital punishment and has published a book, Shikei Haishi Ron (Debate on the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty), in 2002. Therefore, a change in the ruling 
political party may appear a significant factor for the future of capital punishment 
policy in Japan.  
 
Having said that, as Chapter 1 has demonstrated, it is employed-for-life 
bureaucrats who are in charge of the actual decision making irrespective of any 
change in the ruling party. Although some Ministers of Justice in the Democratic 
Party of Japan contributed to the domestic debate on the rights and wrongs of 
capital punishment, executions have been resumed by pro- and 
anti-death-penalty Ministers of Justice until today. Therefore, whilst a strong 
linkage between the perpetual dominance of the LDP and retention of capital 
punishment can be observed, it is doubtful if a change in the ruling political party 
could bring a rapid shift towards abolition of capital punishment system. 
 
Regarding the claim that Japan’s geographical independence and stability as a 
democratic state would not make the international society sanction Japan for not 
complying with international norms (Johnson 2011:144), these are merely 
arguments that the Japanese government has been using in order to legitimise 
its policy. Firstly, Japan’s resistance to international pressures from 
organisations such as the UN, the EU, Amnesty International, and the Council of 
Europe82 may appear on a simple map as ‘Japan v the West’ at first sight. Whilst 
                                                  
82 Japan obtained observer status in the Council of Europe in 1996, and is entitled to 
participate in the Committee of Ministers and all intergovernmental committees. However, 
Japan has not met the requirement declared in the Statutory Resolution (93) that those who 
acquire observer status should be ‘willing to accept principles of democracy, the rule of law 
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Europe is currently a death penalty free zone, Japanese governmental officials 
tend to proclaim that those outside its sphere should have the right to choose 
their own criminal justice system without interference from international society 
(Moriyama 2001b:8). What is more, one academic points out that the 
anti-death-penalty norm appears to be considered by the Japanese government 
as a mere ‘European ideology’.83  
 
However, being outside Western sphere of influence does not necessarily mean 
that Japan defies all the pressures from outside. Japanese social and political 
norms have the capacity to be heavily influenced by external actors, although 
such ‘external actors’ are often limited to the US as a result of its unique and 
intimate relationship since the end of World War II. Rather, what is important to 
acknowledge is that the Japanese government has been treating capital 
punishment policy as an issue of law and order, not an issue of human rights. 
Hence it is not necessarily the case that the Japanese government refuses to 
comply with the internationally recognised anti-death-penalty norm out of 
disagreement with the human rights norm. Instead, it appears that the Ministry of 
Justice simply acts on precedents upon the basis of the law, and tends not to 
welcome new ideas or opinions for dealing with capital punishment policy from a 
human rights perspective, or abolishing this historically-held governmental policy 
by amending legal provisions. Therefore, it is not necessarily critical to focus on 
                                                                                                                                                  
and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ (Council of Europe 1993:1). In 2001, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe warned both Japan and the US that the possession of observer status would be 
threatened if any significant progress in the implementation of the resolution could not be 
made by 1 January 2003 (Council of Europe 2001:3). The Japanese government did not 
respond to this.  
83 Interview with an academic, Tokyo, 12 April 2011 
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Japan’s geographical situation in explaining the non-compliance with the 
anti-death-penalty norm.  
 
Secondly, ideas that Japan’s external relations with the US, South Korea, and 
Asia as a whole can affect Japan’s capital punishment policy (Johnson 
2011:145–8) do not appear valid, given that capital punishment is a criminal 
justice issue in Japan. As already discussed above, Japan’s social and political 
norms have the capacity to be heavily influenced by its close ally, the US, and it 
is not impossible to estimate that an initiative by the US could determine the 
future course of capital punishment in Japan. However, as Johnson himself 
discusses, the US and Japan have not employed a similar approach in 
legitimising the use of capital punishment. In the US, communication between 
death row inmates and their families has been secured to a certain standard, 
and most states have been employing lethal injections to kill inmates more 
humanely with less pain (Johnson 2005:259). In Japan, on the other hand, death 
row inmates’ communication has been limited, the execution date is not notified 
to the families in advance, and hanging is the only execution method regardless 
of the debate on whether it infringes Article 36 of the Constitution which forbids 
cruel punishment. Given that Japan has not mirrored its counterpart in detention 
and execution method, or in the strategy of legitimising state killing, it is doubtful 
to assume that the US can set a future course for Japan. Similarly, the Japanese 
government does not appear to be affected by any change in other Asian 
countries’ capital punishment policy, since it proclaims that each country has the 
right to retain the capital punishment system depending on public sentiment and 
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the domestic crime situation (Moriyama 2001b:8).  
 
Finally, regarding three internal factors – (1) strong public support for capital 
punishment; (2) a unique Japanese view on sin and human rights; and (3) a 
‘punitive’ way of thinking among Japanese from the perspective of victims’ 
bereaved families – the present chapter has claimed that they are independent 
of the actual governmental decision making. Firstly, comparison of opinion polls 
by the government and non-governmental bodies, and an in-depth survey by an 
independent research body, provided alternative views. Although opinion polls 
conducted by non-governmental bodies did not necessarily show a strikingly 
different result from the governmental one, it highlighted the divergence between 
the public’s and the state’s official approach on capital punishment. Depending 
on the questions posed, the public showed some understandings and interests 
in holding executions in order to discuss the issue of capital punishment 
fundamentally; or in introducing an alternative penalty such as life imprisonment 
without parole (see Appendix VI and VII).  
 
Secondly, whilst the social norm regarding atonement through death appears to 
exist in civil society, influenced by the Japanese public’s possession of 
self-discipline and their views on criminals and death row inmates, the existence 
of such a norm does not necessarily lead the state to retain capital punishment. 
The issue of capital punishment is elite-driven, and it is the governmental 
narratives, which refer to historical and cultural practice, that have been making 
the Japanese culture look like a determining factor for justification of the system. 
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Thirdly, the present chapter posed different perspectives to the governmental 
claim that all the victim lobby demands shinde wabiru for criminals. Whilst the 
government tends to justify capital punishment as victim satisfaction, and the 
media feature a pro-death penalty victim lobby sensationally, there exists an 
anti-death-penalty victim lobby, which poses an ethical question about whether 
state killing can bring closure to a crime. Finally, the following part will move on 
to examine how the investigation of the de facto moratorium period can tell 
scholars and activists about the elite-driven nature of capital punishment policy.  
 
2.4. THE DE FACTO MORATORIUM PERIOD RECONSIDERED 
 
As already explained, the Japanese government tends to justify capital 
punishment policy on domestic and cultural grounds consistently, and 
endeavours to conduct executions annually. However, at times executions do 
not take place for years, and this has been making some scholars and 
anti-death-penalty lobby supporters call such a period de facto moratorium 
period. As mentioned in the Introduction, discussions in the existing literature on 
this period revolve around the causal relationship between the personal 
convictions of Ministers of Justice and non-authorisation of executions. However, 
there has not been any serious attempt to define this phenomenon or investigate 
its implications for the study of capital punishment policy in Japan from 1989 to 
1993. This section will clarify whether there was a moratorium equivalent period 
during this period in Japan. In order to investigate this, the following factors will 
be discussed: (1) what the nature of the moratorium period is; (2) who tends to 
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describe, or refuse to describe, an execution-free period as a de facto 
moratorium period; and (3) what factors tend to make an execution-free period 
look like a moratorium period. In order to do this, this part will review political and 
non-academic debate and reconsider the nature of this period. It will then 
propose what kind of approach is required to investigate this period for a better 
understanding of Japan’s capital punishment policy.  
 
2.4.1. The Political Debate 
 
Firstly, as already discussed in Introduction, the Japanese government has not 
treated the de facto moratorium period as a political event, and there has been 
no official statement issued setting out a dominant governmental discourse on 
the subject. For example, when executions were resumed for the first time in 
three years and four months in 1993, press conferences were not held to explain 
why executions had been put on hold or why they were resumed. Ministry 
bureaucrats did not make official comments in the Diet meetings, either. Whilst it 
is difficult to trace the governmental and ministerial discourse on this event, 
three ministers in the MOFA84 provided me with some unofficial views on the de 
facto moratorium period in my interviews. Their main claim was that: (1) this 
period was independent from the influence of the then international 
anti-death-penalty movement; and (2) it is doubtful if there existed an 
internationally recognised anti-death-penalty norm during this period in the first 
place.    
                                                  
84 Interview with a MOFA minister, Tokyo, 9 May 2011; and with two MOFA ministers, Tokyo, 
17 June 2011. 
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Regarding the then international anti-death penalty movement, the UN’s initiative 
can be cited as an example. Recalling Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty,85 was adopted on 15 December 1989 and entered 
into force on 11 July 1991. In the voting, 59 states voted for, 26 voted against, 
and 48 abstained in 1989; Japan and the US voted against the protocol. In my 
interview, an anti-death-penalty MOFA minister stressed that no matter how hard 
international society tries to urge Japanese governmental agencies to abolish 
capital punishment, the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
resist such pressures, and it must have been the same during the de facto 
moratorium period.86  
 
With regard to the two other MOFA ministers, they asked me back the following 
questions: (1) whether or not there was a ‘de facto moratorium period’ from 1989 
to 1993; (2) whether or not the anti-death-penalty norm was already firmly 
established worldwide in the late 1980s; and (3) why the Japanese government 
was and still is required to follow the international trend in the first place.87 Using 
the figures for voting on the resolution, in which 26 voted against and 48 
abstained whilst 59 states voted for, government officials often claim that the 
sum of those who voted against and abstained outnumbered those who voted 
                                                  
85 It is called the UN Resolution Concerning Abolition of the Death Penalty in a short form. 
86 Interview with a MOFA minister, Tokyo, 9 May 2011 
87 Interview with two MOFA ministers, Tokyo, 17 June 2011. 
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for.88 Therefore, their argument is that there still was a divergence in this ethical 
principle amongst a substantial number of countries; and that there was no such 
thing as an internationally supported anti-death-penalty norm in the 1980s. 
Interviewees also denied that the adoption of the UN resolution led Japanese 
bureaucrats to refrain from conducting annual executions,89 and two MOFA 
ministers, in particular, implied that the anti-death-penalty norm was and still is a 
mere European or Western ideology.90  
 
In short, they argued that since not all the states share the exactly same political 
cultures, it is not appropriate for Western countries to seek by one-sided 
pressure to impose such values on Japan.91 Such responses from government 
ministers sounded like a model answer that they usually use when they are 
questioned about capital punishment policy in Japan. Throughout the interview, 
two MOFA ministers also appeared reluctant to be asked questions about 
Japanese policy being internationally accused from a Western perspective. One 
of the academics whom I interviewed concluded that this may stem from 
resistance of Japanese governmental officials to a kind of ‘Western arrogance’ 
that tries to impose Western values on other countries, believing the West has a 
better cause.92 
                                                  
88 According to the result of the Second Protocol of the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the 
death penalty, 55 voted for, 28 voted against, and 45 abstained on 22 November 1989. In 
the Legal Affairs Committee on 5 December 1989, Ishigaki Yasuji (1989:3) in the MOFA 
combined the number of the latter two, and denied that the anti-death penalty norm was not 
widely supported in the world yet. 
89 Interview with a MOFA minister, Tokyo, 9 May 2011; and with two MOFA ministers, 
Tokyo, 17 June 2011. 
90 Interview with two MOFA ministers, Tokyo, 17 June 2011. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Interview with an academic, Tokyo, 13 April 2011. 
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2.4.2. The Non-Academic Debate 
 
Whilst the Japanese government does not treat the de facto moratorium period 
as a politically significant period, it is worth presenting the events that have been 
suggested by a TV agency and anti-death-penalty NGO staff as possible factors 
contributing to the de facto moratorium period: (1) the death of Emperor Showa 
in 1989; and (2) international anti-death penalty initiative in 1989.  
 
Firstly, the death of Emperor Showa (Hirohito) in 1989 was briefly mentioned in a 
broadcast in an educational television series by the NHK on 27 February 2011. 
The main focus of the programme, entitled ‘Homu Daijin no Kuno (Agony of 
Ministers of Justice)’, was to examine what led a former anti-death-penalty 
Minister of Justice, Chiba Keiko, to decide to authorise executions for three 
death row inmates in July 2010, before one year of a de facto moratorium period 
had passed. The de facto moratorium period from 1989 to 1993 was briefly 
presented in the programme in comparison, and the NHK made a correlation 
with the death of Hirohito, or Emperor Showa: ‘Since Emperor Showa died in 
1989, executions were put on hold for the first time after the war’ (NHK 2011). 
One anti-death penalty MOFA minister supported this hypothesis, though he 
could not explain exactly how that event affected the running of the capital 
punishment system in Japan.93 
 
                                                  
93 Interview with a MOFA minister, Tokyo, 9 May 2011. 
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The proponents of this hypothesis appear to argue that the death of Emperor 
Showa made the then Ministers of Justice refrain from hanging death row 
inmates. However, it is not empirically proved that this event had an effect on the 
Japanese capital punishment policy specifically. Of course, the social and 
political impact that the death of the Emperor had on the Japanese government 
and civil society should not be underestimated. Japan uses two calendar 
systems: one is Western, the other is nengo system where the name of the era 
changes with the death of an emperor and his succession of his eldest son. 
Showa (enlightened peace or harmony) was the name of the era that Hirohito 
served as an emperor, and he was called ‘Emperor Showa’. Moreover, Emperor 
Showa is associated with historical events such as World War II and the pacifism 
and economic miracle that Japan achieved in the post-war period. Therefore, the 
psychological impact of his death to Japan should not be underestimated as a 
mere end of an era under the nengo system.     
 
However, the suggestion about the Emperor’s death and a halt to executions 
appears to be based on hearsay rather than on empirical evidence. Firstly, there 
is no record that reprieve was granted to death row inmates on this occasion. 
Secondly, one of the former Ministers of Justice during the de facto moratorium, 
Sato Megumu, did not mention that this event affected his decision concerning 
authorisation of executions, or induced a mood of voluntary restraint on the use 
of capital punishment within the Ministry of Justice.94 Similarly, one academic, 
who is one of the most consistent writers on capital punishment policy in Japan, 
                                                  
94 Postal correspondence with a former Minister of Justice, Sato Megumu, 8 February 2011. 
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also showed a sceptical attitude towards this hypothesis.95 Given that the media 
have a potentially enormous role in shaping the public understanding of political 
events, it was wrong to speak of a correlation between the death of Emperor 
Showa and the beginning of the de facto moratorium as an established fact, 
without support from empirical research.  
 
Secondly, an anti-death-penalty NGO worker, who has been acting on behalf of 
innocent death row inmates, spoke of the impact that international pressure 
must have had on the Japanese government back then.96 What merits some 
attention is that the UN’s initiative was not a one-off event that grabbed 
worldwide attention solely on the day it was adopted. Ever since the resolution 
entered into force on 11 July 1991, those who voted against or abstained have 
been adopting it in the following years. Given that Japan halted executions from 
10 November 1989 for three years and four months, this informant claimed that 
the UN’s initiative to the Japanese policy making had indirect influence, even if it 
did not impel the government to adopt the resolution.97  
 
By contrast, most of the NGO staff denied such international influence on the 
non-execution period, considering the elite-driven nature of this policy. For 
example, another NGO worker who was interviewed at the same table as the 
one just cited disagreed with her, and argued that the de facto moratorium took 
place totally independently of any international movement.98 That NGO worker 
                                                  
95 Interview with an academic, Tokyo, 13 April 2011. 
96 Interview with an NGO staff(a), Tokyo, 27 May 2011. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Interview with an NGO staff(b), Tokyo, 27 May 2011. 
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is one of the editors of Nenpo Shikei Haishi (Annual Report: Abolishing Capital 
Punishment), which has been following the domestic trend of capital punishment 
in Japan, and he appeared confident in denying any causal relationship. In his 
opinion, it is doubtful that any international event influenced the Japanese 
government bureaucrats of the time to start considering where international 
society was heading or what political price the Japanese government would pay 
by going against such global initiative.99 However, the gap between those two 
interviewees was bridged by other anti-death penalty NGO workers, who said it 
was not necessarily a single event or person that alone had an impact on 
pro-death-penalty sentiment, but there was rather a combination of domestic 
and international events such as the disclosure of four major false accusation 
cases in the 1980s; the adoption of the UN Resolution Concerning Abolition of 
the Death Penalty in 1989; and anti-death-penalty campaigns by NGOs at that 
time.100 
 
These hypotheses on the beginning of the de facto moratorium period exist 
amongst some MOFA ministers, TV programme producers, and 
anti-death-penalty advocates, and appear to have been partly accepted as 
important in approaching the de facto moratorium period. However, more 
important topics have been overlooked in the discussion hitherto. Firstly, the 
issue of capital punishment is the province of a narrow elite in the Ministry of 
Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and it is mistaken to argue that 
domestic or international factors influenced capital punishment policy making 
                                                  
99 Ibid. 
100 Interview with two NGO staff members, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
163 
 
during this period. Secondly, the hypotheses are based on the presumption that 
there was a de facto moratorium caused by internal or external factors, but 
without investigation of what the nature of the moratorium period was, or 
whether or the execution-free period from 1989 to 1993 was a moratorium. 
Clarifying the conceptual issues regarding this period, the following section will 
highlight the importance of investigating how consistently the Ministry of Justice 
promoted the pro-death-penalty norm during the execution-free period.  
 
2.4.3. The De Facto Moratorium Period in Japan’s Capital Punishment 
Policy 
 
The significant fact about moratorium periods is that executions are put on hold 
temporarily. Even if inmates are still detained on death row, it is guaranteed that 
they will not be executed for a certain period. On the other hand, the Japanese 
government has never set a moratorium period officially till today. Therefore, 
during the period from 1989 to 1993, which is called the de facto moratorium 
period in the existing literature, no significant change was observed in the status 
of death row inmates, and they were in constant fear of execution. 
 
Despite this fact, some people amongst scholars, anti-death penalty NGOs, and 
the media tend to treat this period as worthy of close attention as if there was a 
change in the governmental approach on capital punishment policy. Firstly, 
discussion in the existing literature (Schmidt 2001; Johnson 2006) stresses the 
causal relationship between personal convictions of Ministers of Justice and 
their non-authorisation of executions. It tends to suggest to readers that the 
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issue of capital punishment is heavily dependent on who serves as Minister of 
Justice.  
 
Secondly, anti-death penalty NGOs tend to treat the de facto moratorium period 
as a politically significant phenomenon, and try to make this period serve as a 
smooth transition period towards abolition. Indeed, they consider execution-free 
periods as a stage when that the Japanese government abolished capital 
punishment in practice, and seek to make this period as long as possible, 
expecting that the Ministry of Justice will abolish capital punishment in law.101 
For example, they tend to strengthen their anti-death-penalty campaigns during 
this period, for example by collecting signatures from supporters and submitting 
them to Ministers of Justice as an alternative voice to ‘public opinion’ found in the 
governmental opinion polls.102  
 
Furthermore, the media tend to highlight the length of time during which 
executions have been put on hold, citing Ministers’ personal views on capital 
punishment. For example, in light of the recent de facto moratorium period which 
lasted for one year and eight months from 28 July 2010 to 29 March 2012, most 
of the newspapers put the phrase ‘no execution for the first time in 19 years’ in 
their article titles (Asahi, 28 December 2011; Nikkei, 28 December 2011; Yomiuri, 
28 December 2011) in order to stress the ‘abnormality’ of this period.  
 
How these three groups of commentators treat the de facto moratorium periods 
                                                  
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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appears to vary. Scholars tend to try to account for the central fact that 
executions are put on hold; anti-death-penalty NGOs tend to use this period as 
an opportunity to promote abolition as a final aim; and the media tend to alert the 
public that this form of legal punishment has not been in use. Despite the 
difference in their intentions and implications, what has been overemphasised is 
that this time period is ‘different’ in nature from the rest of the period, and that 
personal convictions of Ministers of Justice bring changes to capital punishment 
policy. In reality, apart from the fact that executions did not take place, no 
significant change can be observed in capital punishment policy during this 
period.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, important decisions regarding capital punishment are 
made by elites in the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
Therefore, one should not try to overestimate the characteristics of Ministers of 
Justice, who do not stay in office for more than a year on average and cannot get 
involved in the crucial part of the decision making process. Similarly, whilst 
contemporary domestic and international events tend to be instantly linked to 
explanations of why executions were put on hold, it is wrong to consider that 
these events led the Japanese government to take a political initiative with the 
intention of discussing abolition. Rather, what is important to acknowledge is that 
the moratorium equivalent period was not set by the Japanese government with 
political intentions, but non-authorisation of executions by Ministers of Justice, 
who did not serve long enough because of almost yearly cabinet reshuffles, 
appeared to have created a ‘gap’ in capital punishment policy. More precisely, 
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various factors including the personal convictions of Ministers of Justice and 
contemporary domestic or international events appear to have made this time 
phase look like a moratorium period. Therefore, trying to investigate what led to 
a de facto moratorium is not a suitable approach to understanding of Japan’s 
capital punishment policy. Rather, what is important to investigate is how 
consistently the Japanese government justified the policy even during the de 
facto moratorium period. 
 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
 
Through examining domestic and cultural factors comprehensively, this chapter 
investigated the governmental claim that capital punishment is culturally 
determined. Firstly, public opinion has been cited by the government as a 
primary source for justification for capital punishment. However, comparison of 
the opinion polls conducted by the government and non-governmental bodies 
indicated that ‘wide public support’ for the capital punishment system mainly 
stems from the strategically phrased questions in the governmental opinion polls. 
Indeed, analysis of the results of opinion polls conducted by non-governmental 
bodies and an in-depth survey by a research team suggested that: (1) the 
majority of the Japanese public is not fully informed about the human rights 
issues of death row inmates; and (2) the public have shown some understanding 
of and interest in introducing life imprisonment without parole as an alternative 
punishment. Besides the fact that ‘public opinion’ can fluctuate depending on 
their level of knowledge on the capital punishment system, and how questions 
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are phrased in the questionnaire; it is also important to acknowledge that 
important decisions regarding this policy are made by elites, irrespective of 
public opinion in reality.   
 
Secondly, it investigated what kind of cultural features have been claimed by the 
government to be associated with and to support capital punishment. Firstly, it 
challenged the theoretical approach to governmental and public non-compliance 
with the anti-death-penalty norm on cultural grounds. It has been discussed in 
the existing literature that culture has an influence on shaping legal punishment 
and that national attachment to a contrasting domestic norm can hinder the 
importing of international norms. However, this chapter argued that it is policy 
elites’ recurring use of narratives making reference to culture that has been 
influencing the public and scholars to believe that capital punishment policy is 
domestically and culturally determined.  
 
For example, although a concept of shinde wabiru appears to have been 
accepted as a social norm in Japanese society, a problem emerges when the 
government seeks to use it as a source to legitimise state killing. Secondly, not 
all the victim lobby believes that capital punishment functions as social justice; 
and secondly, it has been overlooked that shinde wabiru requires spontaneous 
acceptance by convicts. Moreover, the existence of a proverb, contrasting to 
shinde wabiru, has been completely ignored in the governmental narratives. The 
act of shinde wabiru can be appreciated as a virtue since it symbolises that 
convicts sincerely have a feeling of remorse towards the victims and their 
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bereaved families. However, given that capital punishment is conducted at the 
convenience of the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, under 
the ill-defined criteria governing the way some inmates are chosen out of dozens, 
it is hazardous to consider that capital punishment policy has been designed to 
reflect death row inmates’ will to atone for crimes through death.  
 
Thirdly, this chapter posed methodological problems of measuring Japanese 
human rights and legal consciousness relating to support for capital punishment. 
Firstly, capital punishment has been conceived by the public as an issue of 
criminal justice because of the governmental approach, and it is wrong to 
conclude that the Japanese public have a weaker human rights consciousness 
by global standards and therefore support capital punishment. Secondly, it 
argued that the state of Japanese legal consciousness may partially account for 
the public ‘indifferent’ attitude towards campaigns, which demand the 
government to repeal or amend the existing legal provisions. However, it 
appears that public reluctance to comply with the anti-death penalty norm largely 
stems from a lack of sympathy towards the activities of domestic anti-death 
penalty NGOs. Since a key figure in a well-known anti-death-penalty NGO puts 
extreme emphasis on the human rights of criminals or death row inmates, the 
public appears to tend to perceive their activities as undervaluing the feelings of 
victims or their bereaved families. 
 
Finally, this chapter has suggested that further investigation of the de facto 
moratorium periods from appropriate perspectives can provide scholars and 
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activists with a better understanding of Japan’s capital punishment policy. 
Scholars and activists have been paying tremendous attention to a wide range of 
domestic or international factors as influential factors affecting the de facto 
moratorium period; and the media also highlight the length of the execution-free 
period. However, it is important for them to acknowledge the fact that the de 
facto moratorium period was never implemented by the Japanese government 
with any political intentions. Rather, non-authorisation of executions by Ministers 
of Justice caused by the frequent cabinet reshuffles created a ‘gap’ in capital 
punishment policy, which made it look as though there was a change in 
government policy. This part discussed that the execution-free period should not 
be treated as a politically significant phenomenon out of line with government 
policy, and there should be no attempt to specify what led decisively to the de 
facto moratorium periods. Rather, this part proposed that it is more beneficial to 
focus on how consistently the Ministry of Justice tried to justify capital 
punishment policy even when executions were put on hold.  
 
The following chapters will move on to empirically examine the de facto 
moratorium period from 1989 to 1993, applying the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 1. Although various domestic and international factors 
have been considered as influential factors contributing to the de facto 
moratorium, the following case study will illuminate the fact that capital 
punishment policy is primarily elite-driven, and the Japanese government 
consistently justified the system even during the execution-free period.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Governmental Justification for Capital Punishment from 1980 to 1989 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapters analysed the capital punishment system in Japan 
highlighting the tightly-knit institutional mechanism within which selected elites in 
the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office operate. This chapter 
and the following two will focus on how consistently the Ministry of Justice has 
been seeking to construct a dominant discourse on this system. As already 
discussed, the government frequently cites public opinion as a primary reason 
for retaining capital punishment. Therefore, the first part of each chapter will 
briefly examine the prevailing social climate on capital punishment at certain 
times, which was often a result of media coverage of, and the governmental 
response to, the contemporary crime situations. The second part will investigate 
the official comments on capital punishment by Ministers of Justice in press 
conferences and Diet meetings. It will clarify how consistently the Ministry of 
Justice tried to justify the capital punishment system using domestic factors as 
‘legitimate’ reasons. 
 
The present chapter examines the period from 1980 to 1989, that is, the ten 
years before the de facto moratorium period. Firstly, it will introduce several key 
events that aroused domestic discussions on the Japanese criminal justice 
system during this period: disclosure of false charge cases and successive 
171 
 
serious murder cases. Through examining the media coverage of and 
governmental response to these incidents, and the absence of effective 
anti-death-penalty NGO activities at the time, it will clarify why these events did 
not necessarily cause a setback to retentionism in the civil society. The second 
part will explore the governmental discourse on capital punishment by pro-death 
penalty norm entrepreneurs, or Ministers of Justice and bureaucrats in the 
Ministry of Justice. It will investigate exactly how the Japanese government dealt 
with the issue of false charge cases, in order to legitimate the retaining of capital 
punishment even at the risk of detaining and executing innocent people.  
 
3.2. PERSISTENT PRO-DEATH PENALTY MOOD IN THE PUBLIC? 
 
According to the governmental poll results, 62.3 per cent of the Japanese public 
supported capital punishment in 1980, and 66.5 per cent in 1989 (Appendix IV). 
Although there exists a methodological problem regarding the governmental 
opinion polls (Chapter 2), Japanese civil society in the 1980s did not appear a 
fertile ground to discuss abolitionism fundamentally. The following section will 
examine key events during this period and investigate why they did not become 
major impediments to the prevailing argument that capital punishment functions 
as social justice.  
 
3.2.1. Public Reaction to the Disclosure of the Four Main False Charge 
Cases in the 1980s  
 
Firstly, the 1980s was when four major retrials revealed miscarriages of justice, 
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which resulted from forced confessions by police and prosecutors: the Menda 
case, the Saitagawa case; the Shimada case and the Matsuyama case. As 
Petra Schmidt (2001:148) argues:  
 
[a]ll [the four cases] occurred during the postwar turmoils, when the 
violent investigation methods of prewar times were still applied. Police, 
prosecutors and judges had been trained under the old system, and a 
confession was still regarded as the most important and absolute 
evidence. Moreover, the techniques of forensic science had not yet been 
very highly developed. 
 
In the Menda case, Menda Sakae, a 23-year-old black market rice dealer, was 
detained for 34 years and seven months until 15 July 1983, on a false charge of 
murdering a priest and his wife with a knife and an axe on 29 December 1948. 
Although Menda had an alibi that he stayed at a guesthouse with a prostitute on 
the day of the crime, a policeman made her testify that it was on 30 December 
1948 that Menda stayed with her, and forced him to confess with torture which 
lasted over nights (Foote 1992b:20; Schmidt 2001:143). 103  Menda’s death 
sentence was upheld on 5 January 1952 on the sole basis of two pieces of 
‘evidence’: (1) a confession extracted by torture and (2) Menda’s axe with some 
type O blood on (Shiotani 1994:21).104 Although the three other murder cases 
                                                  
103 Menda happened to know that a policeman, Masuda, was tolerating a minor prostitution 
business, and Masuda felt a strong urge to make Menda a suspect for this crime (Menda 
2004; Shiotani 1994:48).  
104 Given that Menda’s grandmother, who had often used the same axe, also had type O 
blood, what was found was not necessarily the blood of the victims. However, further 
investigation was not conducted since the confession was used as prime evidence.  
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are different in nature,105 some similarities can be observed in how suspects 
were chosen and forced to confess: the defendants either were not engaged in 
professional work of high social status or had previous crime records. In order to 
pursue greater efficiency in ‘solving’ murder cases, the police appeared to have 
charged socially and economically vulnerable people with insufficient 
investigation. 
 
Disclosures of miscarriages of justice were widely featured in the media in the 
1980s, and this could have become a setback to the ‘persistent’ 
pro-death-penalty sentiment amongst the Japanese public. However, there was 
not a full debate amongst the public on whether or not capital punishment 
functions as social justice when there is a risk of detaining and killing innocent 
people. Most of the interviewees including governmental ministers, NGO staff, 
and attorneys who specialise in capital cases, argued that it was closely linked to 
the fact that the Japanese government and the media dealt with a series of false 
charge cases as a separate issue from capital punishment, and did not 
encourage domestic debate on the immediate abolition of capital punishment.106  
 
                                                  
105 (1) In the Saitagawa case, the police forced Taniguchi Shigeyoshi, a 19-year-old 
unemployed man with a few previous criminal convictions, to make a confession under 
torture. Taniguchi was detained for 33 years and 11 months until 12 March 1984 on a charge 
of stabbing a 62-year-old black market rice dealer (Foote 1992b:30). (2) In the Shimada 
case, 24-year-old Akabori Masao, who had mental disability and two previous criminal 
convictions for theft, was forced to confess to kidnapping a six-year-old girl, and was 
detained for 34 years and eight months until 11 February 1989 (Schmidt 2001:146). (3) In 
the Matsuyama case, 24-year-old Saito Sachio, who had been arrested for causing bodily 
harm a few weeks before, was forced to confess to murdering four members of the Ohara 
family and setting fire to their house, and was detained for 28 years and seven months until 
11 July 1984 (Schmidt 2001:145).  
106 Interview with: (1) a MOFA official, Tokyo, 9 May 2011; (2) an NGO worker, Tokyo, 12 April 
2011; and (3) two NGO workers, Tokyo, 17 May 2011.  
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For example, as will be discussed in the following section in detail, the then 
Minister of Justice stuck to the claim that erroneous judgments should not 
happen in Japanese criminal justice system since it is equipped with a fair 
three-tiered judicial system (Okuno 1980c:3, 19), so that even if human errors 
are made in the first or second trial, it will be clarified in the Supreme Court with 
careful investigation of the case. Moreover, the media coverage of the four main 
false charge cases put much emphasis on the violent interrogation methods in 
daiyo kangoku (police detention) and a poor blood test or lack of adequate DNA 
test technology in the late 1940s and early 1950s, not necessarily on the 
existence of the capital punishment system itself (Yasuda et al. 1996:112).  
 
Besides the lack of fundamental efforts by the government or the media to tackle 
false charge cases, it should be noted that anti-death-penalty NGOs were still in 
the making, and lacked social impact to advance the domestic discussion of the 
issue during this period. The 1980s in Japan were the period when individual 
activities gradually started to take the form of collective action For example, it 
was a chaplain, Shiotani Soichiro, who acted on behalf of Menda for 
approximately 30 years at his request, - not yet a group of activists.107 Various 
anti-death-penalty NGOs started to be founded in the 1980s,108 and it was after 
the disclosure of false charge cases that they began to act systematically on 
                                                  
107 Postal correspondence with a former death row inmate, Menda Sakae, 8 March 2011; 
and interviews with two NGO workers, Tokyo, 17 May 2011 
108 They include: (1) On-na no Kai (Women’s Anti-Death Penalty Group); (2) Shikei Shikko 
Teishi Renraku Kaigi (Liaison Conference for Suspending Death Penalty); (3) Mugi no Kai 
(Group of Straw, or an anti-death-penalty group with death row inmates as full members); 
(4) Shikei Jiken Tanto Bengoshi no Kai (Attorney Group that Specialises in Capital Cases); 
and (5) Kyuen Renraku Centre (Rescue Liaison Centre).  
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behalf of other falsely charged death row inmates. However, anti-death-penalty 
NGOs constantly received complaints from the public telling them not to mix the 
issues of acting on behalf of particular innocent convicts and advancing 
anti-death penalty campaigns in Japan (Yasuda et al. 1996:116).  
 
Considering the methodological issues regarding the governmental opinion polls 
(Chapter 2), the results of those polls cannot properly be taken as showing that 
the Japanese public during this period was pro-death-penalty.109 However, it still 
merits some attention that the public showed aversion to the emergence of 
collective anti-death penalty actions. A similar view also appeared to have been 
shared by the attorneys then specialising in false charge cases. Whilst they 
strongly denounced the efficiency-centred public prosecutors’ work, where the 
priority is given to obtaining confessions from suspects, not many of them 
supported the idea of abolishing capital punishment immediately (Yasuda et al. 
1996:112–3). As Yasuda points out, their professional mission was to save 
innocent convicts through retrials, and most of them believed that convinced 
criminals must be punished legally and deserved death to make atonement 
when appropriate (Yasuda et al. 1996:112–3).  
 
3.2.2. Public Reaction to Serious Murder Cases and Two Capital Cases in 
the 1980s 
 
Another reason why disclosure of false charge cases did not particularly 
                                                  
109 According to the government opinion polls, 62.3 per cent of the Japanese public 
supported capital punishment in 1980, and 66.5 per cent in 1989 (Appendix IV). 
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advance abolitionism in Japanese society in the 1980s appears to relate to 
sensational media broadcasting of serious murder cases and inappropriate 
governmental responses to them during this period: (1) the Shinjuku bus arson 
attack case; (2) the Miyazaki Tsutomu case; (3) the Nagoya murder case; and 
(4) the Ayase murder case. Regarding the Shinjuku bus arson attack case,110 it 
was first mis-reported that the offender was mentally disabled. Expressing 
concern that mentally disabled people tend to be exempted from death 
sentences and become repeat offenders, the then Minister of Justice, Okuno 
Seisuke, vocally called for harsher punishment towards mentally disabled 
people (Okuno 1980a:5); this will be discussed more in the following section. In 
the second incident Miyazaki Tsutomu, 26 or 27 at the time of the crimes, 
molested and strangled four primary school girls in Tokyo and Saitama 
prefectures from 1988 to 1989. Because of the abnormality of the crimes that he 
committed,111 a national sensation quickly arose (Japan Times, 18 June 2008).  
 
The third and fourth incidents were both committed by juvenile offenders and the 
media sensationally featured their brutality. The Nagoya murder case arose from 
a murder-robbery and gang-rape incident in Nagoya in Aichi prefecture from 23 
to 25 February 1988. What particularly merits some attention is that five out of 
the six criminals were teenagers; one of them was first sentenced to death on 28 
                                                  
110 Maruyama Hirofumi, 38 at the time of the crime, threw some burning newspaper and a 
bucket of petrol into a bus in Shinjuku, Tokyo on 19 August 1980; six people died and 14 
were seriously injured. 
111 He burned a four-year-old girl’s body and sent her bones and teeth to her parents, and 
he is also reported to have eaten her flesh and drunk her blood (Japan Times, 18 June 
2008). 
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June 1989.112 Similarly, the Ayase murder was committed by seven juvenile 
offenders: they kidnapped and tortured a 17-year-old high school girl for 41 days 
from 25 November 1988 in Ayase, a suburb of Tokyo. What aroused public 
attention regarding this case was not only the cruel nature of the crime, but also 
the media’s response to it. The identities of juvenile offenders are usually hidden 
in court, and the media do not disclose them, respecting Article 61 of the 
Juvenile Law, which ‘prohibits the publication of information that reveals the 
identity of suspects or convicted criminals below the age of 20’. However, a 
weekly magazine, Shukan Bunshu, revealed their real names in its issue of 20 
April 1989, claiming that ‘beasts do not deserve human rights’ (Hanada cited in 
Tanihara et al. 2005:334).  
 
According to an interview conducted by Asahi with Hanada Kazuyoshi, the then 
editor of Shukan Bunshu, this decision was made in order to: (1) impose a ‘social 
sanction’ on the offenders, who are protected by the Juvenile Law; (2) denounce 
the responsibility of the educational institution and parents of the offenders, and 
call for amendment of the Juvenile Law; and (3) pose a question to Japanese 
journalism, which makes it a custom not to disclose the names of juvenile victims 
or offenders (Tanihara et al. 2005:334). Article 61 of the Juvenile law does not 
provide for punishment or fine for violation of the right of juveniles to have their 
names concealed, and decisions are at the discretion of the media agencies in 
practice (Brislin and Inoue 2005:3). According to Hanada, the editorial team 
realised how brutal this case was as they proceeded their investigation, and they 
                                                  
112 His death sentence was reduced to life imprisonment on 16 December 1996. 
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decided to treat this case exceptionally (Hanada cited in Tanihara et al. 
2005:334).  
  
In the meantime, whilst juvenile crimes were featured sensationally in the media, 
one death row inmate at the time, Nagayama, who had also been a minor at the 
time of the crime, grabbed public attention as a novelist from the 1980s to 90s. 
He published a book Kihashi (Wooden Bridge) in 1984 and was granted the New 
Japanese Literature Award; and his Muchi no Namida (Tears of Ignorance) in 
1990 became a best-selling book with over 270,000 copies in print at that time. 
Claiming that his poverty and ignorance had led him commit a series of serious 
murders, ‘From prison, he pleaded for tolerance and sought to win sympathy 
with his novels and poetry’ (Métraux 2009:286). Nonetheless, virtual interaction 
with a death row inmate through his literature did not necessarily help promote 
the idea of abolishing capital punishment amongst the public. The New York 
Times (26 April 1990) suggested that Japanese media were not necessarily 
sympathetic to Nagayama, but supported the Supreme Court decision: 
 
Several newspapers warned last week that capital punishment should 
be imposed carefully but that it was appropriate in this case because of 
what one called ''the coldbloodedness of the slayings, the motives for the 
crimes and the great pain suffered by the families of the victims.'' 
 
Indeed, the Hidaka Murder Case113 highlighted the lack of public interest in the 
                                                  
113 Hidaka Yasumasa and Nobuko, committed an murder for insurance-related reasons in 
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legal rights of death row inmates. Although a married couple, Hidaka Yasumasa 
and Nobuko, had been appealing against the rulings since they were sentenced 
to death on 4 March 1987, they withdrew the appeal on 11 October 1988 after 
hearing about the opportunity that a reprieve would possibly be granted. 
Emperor Hirohito was very ill at that time, and there was a rumour in the prison 
that a reprieve from execution would be handed down at his death only if the 
final verdict has been delivered (Yasuda 1998:98). Article 6 (4) of the ICCPR 
stipulates the right to plead for reprieve,114 as do Articles 3 and 4 of the Pardon 
Act115 and Article 337 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.116 However, 
reprieves for death row inmates in Japan have been very rare, except for some 
special events such as when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 
1952. Although anti-death-penalty NGOs tried repeatedly to convince the 
Hidakas not to give up their right to appeal, they did abandon the appeal 
(Yasuda 1998:98). Emperor Showa died on 7 January 1989, but those prisoners 
were not reprieved in the end.117  
                                                                                                                                                  
Yubari, Hokkaido, on 5 May 1984. It was first dealt with as a fire accident, but after a 
conspirator turned himself in, the Hidakas were arrested on 19 August 1984. 
114 It provides that ‘Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or 
commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death 
may be granted in all cases’ (The UN Human Rights Committee 1966). 
115 According to Article 3, ‘Except as otherwise specially provided for by the Cabinet Order 
of the preceding Article, general pardon shall have the following effect with respect to crimes 
for which general pardon has been granted: (i) In the case of a person against whom a 
judgment of conviction has been rendered, the rendition thereof shall cease to have effect; 
(ii) In the case of a person against whom a judgment of conviction has not yet been 
rendered, the power to prosecute shall be extinguished’. Moreover, Article 4 stipulates that 
‘A special pardon shall be granted with respect to a specific person against whom a 
judgment of conviction has been rendered’. 
116 According to Article 337, ‘The court shall, by a judgment, render a dismissal for judicial 
bar when: (i) The case has gone through a final and binding judgment; (ii) The punishment 
is repealed by laws and regulations established after the crime; (iii) There is a general 
pardon; (iv) There is a lapse of the statue of limitations’. 
117 The Hidakas were both executed on 1 August 1997. 
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Although anti-death-penalty activists protested against this, claiming that 
decisions on amnesty or reprieve are ill-defined and can mislead convicts to give 
up their rights to appeal or seek retrials, this case did not necessary make the 
general public look at the Hidakas sympathetically (Yasuda 1998:98). For 
example, no public movement to reconsider the legal rights of the death row 
inmates emerged (Yasuda 1998:98). Just as anti-death-penalty NGOs faced 
protests from the public calling on them not to mix the two issues of acting on 
behalf of falsely charged people and abolishing a legal system thought to uphold 
social justice, Nagayama’s contribution to the literary world did not necessarily 
make the public reconsider in what other ways criminals convicted in serious 
murder cases could atone for their crimes.  
 
 
3.2.3. Public Retentionism in the 1980s 
 
To summarise, even though the four false charge cases were disclosed 
successively, it did not necessarily help lead the public to call for abolition of 
capital punishment immediately in the 1980s. This appears to be because: (1) 
the media and the Japanese government handled these events as a negative 
legacy of the immediate post-war era, which would less likely to happen in the 
future; and (2) the media featured serious murder crimes sensationally. In 
addition, the 1980s was a period when individual abolitionist activities only 
gradually started to turn into collective actions, and lacked social impact across 
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the nation.118 In addition, NGOs which began to act on behalf of the victims of 
false charge cases had been seen by the public as mixing the two ideas of 
fighting for innocent convicts and abolishing the capital punishment system 
(Yasuda et al. 1996:116). Furthermore, Nagayama’s success as a novelist did 
not necessarily contribute to helping the public to discuss whether depriving a 
man of life is merely judicial killing, or to examine alternative punishment. As the 
Hidaka case illustrates, whilst anti-death-penalty activists criticised the Ministry 
of Justice for the ill-defined criteria regarding reprieve for death row inmates, it 
did not become a central concern amongst the general public (Yasuda 1998:98).  
 
The next section will focus on the governmental discourse on capital punishment, 
and examine how strategically the government had been using the climate of 
public opinion in order to add legitimacy to the retention of the system.   
 
3.3. GOVERNMENTAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
 
The successive disclosure of false charge cases could have caused a setback to 
Japan’s justification of capital punishment policy. Even if capital punishment may 
appear to function as social justice for victims’ bereaved families, executing 
innocent people is nothing but injustice (Dando 1996). However, in order to keep 
gaining public support for the system and using it as a primary source of 
justification, the Ministry of Justice endeavoured to stress that a serious of 
miscarriages of justice stemmed from a pre-war criminal justice system, and only 
                                                  
118 Postal correspondence with a former death row inmate, Menda Sakae, 8 March 2011; 
and interviews with two NGO staff, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
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amended the compensation system instead of halting executions in order to 
avoid further false charge cases. For examination of the exact measures that the 
government took, this part will divide this time period into the three phases: (1) 
1980 to 1984, when the first three false charge cases were disclosed; (2) 1984 to 
1987, when the issue of a decades-long-serving death row inmate was raised; 
and (3) 1987 to 1989, when the Criminal Compensation Act was amended and 
the fourth false charge case was disclosed.  
 
3.3.1. Governmental Response to False Charge Cases (1980 to 1984) 
  
First of all, the Minister of Justice Okuno Seisuke’s (17 July 1980 to 30 
November 1981) pro-death-penalty approach was first observed in the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 27 August 1980, when he proposed amendment of the 
Penal Code following the Shinjuku bus arson attack case. According to Okuno, 
harsher punishment must be imposed on mentally disabled people since it was 
not fair to the public that they tended to be exempted from death sentences and 
be left free to become repeat offenders (Okuno 1980a:5). He then proclaimed 
the deterrent effect of capital punishment when he was questioned on the 
retention of the death penalty in the Legal Affairs Committee on 16 October and 
18 December 1980. He stressed that the Japanese public believed that criminals 
of serious murder cases should atone for the crimes with death, and that the 
capital punishment system had been working as a deterrent in Japan (Okuno 
1980c:8).  
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With regard to the miscarriages of justice, he emphasised the existence of a fair 
trial system in Japan. When the Menda Sakae case started to be examined as a 
possible miscarriage of justice by attorneys and anti-death-penalty advocates, 
Okuno was asked his opinion in the Legal Affairs Committee on 18 December 
1980. However, he only commented that false charge cases can usually be 
avoided since Japan is equipped with a fair three-tier judicial system (Okuno 
1980c:3, 19). Thus, Okuno: (1) proposed an amendment to the legal provisions 
so that death sentences would also be imposed on mentally disabled people; (2) 
proclaimed the retention of capital punishment referring to a cultural value, 
shinde wabiru, and the deterrent effect; and (3) denied the possibility that 
convicts could be falsely condemned in the Japanese criminal justice system. 
 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that Okuno (1980b:24) commented in the 
Legal Affairs Committee on 16 October 1980 that he was unwilling to be given 
such a difficult decision – authorising execution orders – during his term. That is, 
he showed some reluctance to get involved in state killing with his authorisation. 
However, given that Okuno authorised an execution during his term, he appears 
to have chosen to separate his personal feelings from his official duty as a 
Minister of Justice. A similar attitude was observed in the subsequent Minister of 
Justice, Sakata Michita (30 November 1981 to 27 November 1982). Sakata 
(1982a:29) indicated that his official responsibility as the Minister of Justice 
overrode his personal convictions, and also tried to justify capital punishment on 
cultural grounds. In the Legal Affairs Committee on 23 March 1982, he claimed 
that the Japanese had nurtured their own culture living in the islands for 
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approximately 2,000 years: abolishing capital punishment could go against it 
(Sakata 1982b:20).  
 
It was then during the term of Hatano Akira (27 November 1982 to 27 December 
1983) that Menda Sakae was found not guilty on 15 July 1983 after being 
detained on death row for 34 years and seven months. Therefore, it was 
expected by anti-death-penalty Diet members that the Ministry of Justice would 
engage in a constructive discussion and take appropriate measures to prevent 
miscarriages of justice. However, Hatano tried to legitimise the retention of 
capital punishment, denying the necessity of reforming the Japanese criminal 
justice system. Firstly, in the Legal Affairs Committee on 10 August 1983, the 
international anti-death-penalty trend was discussed through the example of the 
UK.119 However, Hatano argued that the issue of whether or not states should 
abolish capital punishment depended on the quality of the national criminal 
justice system, the climate of public opinion, and cultural practices (Hatano 
1983:23). Regarding the first factor in particular, Hatano (1983:23) argued that 
Japanese criminal justice was ‘superior’ to those of the US or the UK, referring to 
the findings by B.J. George, Jr..  
 
According to George (1984:72), Japan is both ‘number one and unique’ since 
‘public prosecutors in Japan are committed to a standard of objectively fair 
administration of justice to a far greater extent than all but a handful of federal 
                                                  
119 In the UK, a motion to reintroduce capital punishment was rejected in the House of 
Commons on 13 July 1983 in the face of a strong public support corresponding to an 
increase in serious crimes. 
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and state prosecutors in the United States’. Given that George is an expert in 
comparative criminal law, Hatano may have cited his work in order to back up his 
claim. However, it cannot be ignored that the majority of the scholars agree that 
public prosecutors pursue ‘exceptional efficiency’ in solving the cases,120 and 
their activities are not directed by the principle of in dubio pro reo (‘when in doubt, 
favour the accused’) (Van Wolferen 1989:222). As Johnson (2002:39) argues, 
forced confessions lie at the heart of Japanese criminal justice. In fact, in the 
Menda case, it was the Japanese criminal justice system that ‘delayed’ and 
‘denied’ justice for more than three decades (Van Wolferen 1989:190). 
Nevertheless, citing a single source that admires the ‘fair’ work of Japanese 
public prosecutors, Hatano (1983:23) claimed that disclosure of a single false 
charge case cannot necessarily be a significant factor in advancing abolitionism 
in Japan.  
 
To sum up, Hatano insisted that false charge cases rarely occur in Japan and it 
is not necessary to abolish capital punishment since: (1) prosecutors do an 
outstanding job compared with those in other countries; (2) defendants can 
prove innocence through the legal process from first to third trials; and (3) death 
row inmates can submit pleas for retrials if they are falsely convicted. However, 
in reality, human errors are inevitable in trials even with the improved DNA test 
technology compared with a poor blood test in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
and it is not easy for death row inmates to prove their innocence. Prosecutors 
tend to make defendants confess in order to keep their investigative efficiency 
                                                  
120 Consistent writers on this issue include C. Johnson 1972; Clifford 1976; Aoyagi 1986; 
Foote 1992a; 1992b; Haley 1992; Mukherjee 1994; and D. Johnson 2002. 
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high; they get involved in the rulings from the first to third trials; and they possess 
the right to submit immediate appeals against retrials.  
 
In fact, contrary to Hatano’s confidence in the Japanese criminal justice system, 
two more false charge cases were disclosed successively during the term of the 
subsequent Minister of Justice, Sumi Eisaku (27 December 1983 to 1 November 
1984): Taniguchi Shigeyoshi was found not guilty on 12 March 1984 after 33 
years and 11 months, and Saito Yukio on 11 July 1984 after 28 years and seven 
months. The issues of false charges and capital punishment were frequently 
discussed in the Diet meetings, and several proposals were made by 
anti-death-penalty Diet members.  
 
Firstly, Hayashi Hyakuro (1984:38) proclaimed the rights of death row inmates to 
retrial in the Legal Affairs Committee on 2 March 1984. He proposed that once 
retrials are permitted, death row inmates must be treated as ‘defendants’ who 
may be proved innocent, and should be released from death row temporarily. In 
response, the Director-General of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Kakei Ei-ichi 
(1984:38) dismissed the proposal, referring to Article 11 (2) of the Penal Code, 
which provides that ‘A person who has been sentenced to the death penalty 
shall be detained in a jail until its execution’. However, Hayashi’s proposal 
aroused a great amount of sympathy amongst some Diet members, and on 17 
May 1984 Terada Kumao (1984:1) proposed a bill to amend a part of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure with other abolitionist Diet members. According to the 
proposed bill: 
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(1) criteria for opening of retrials must be softened;  
(2) executions must be halted once death row inmates have started to 
appeal for retrials;  
(3) attorneys’ rights must be secured in the process of opening retrials 
(secret communication between death row inmates and attorneys, and 
attorneys’ rights to access to necessary information must be secured);  
(4) public prosecutors’ immediate appeals against retrials must be 
forbidden; and  
(5) the costs of appeals for and opening of retrials must be covered by the 
government (Terada 1984:1). 
 
Since the three false charge cases had already been disclosed by then, this 
proposal was a constructive action towards ensuring more fair trials in Japanese 
criminal justice. However, the bill did not pass in the Diet and no measures of 
that sort have been taken by the Ministry of Justice until today. Given that 
approximately 80 per cent of all legislation passed is drafted by bureaucrats (Van 
Wolferen 1989:33, 145), it was unlikely from the start that measures drafted by 
Diet members who are not in favour of government policy would pass.  
 
Although Sumi did not try to engage with the issue of false charges, he made 
further conservative remarks justifying capital punishment in the Legal Affairs 
Committee on 27 March 1984: (1) views on capital punishment depend on 
individuals; (2) the government must respect the feelings of the Japanese nation, 
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which can be observed in public opinion polls; and (3) it is a legal duty of 
Ministers of Justice to authorise executions (Sumi 1984:8). Even though two 
more false charge cases were disclosed during his term after the Menda case, 
and initiatives to improve the rights of death row inmates and ensure a better 
chance for them to open retrials were taken by Diet members, Sumi authorised 
an execution of a death row inmate during his term. Like Okuno, Sumi (1984:32) 
showed some reluctance to authorise executions, but chose to carry out his 
official duty on the basis of law and public opinion.  
 
3.3.2. Governmental Response on a Long-Serving Death Row Inmate (1984 
to 1987) 
 
Following the disclosure of false charge cases, the main discussion topic during 
the term of Shimasaki Hitoshi (1 November 1984 to 28 December 1985) was 
shifted to an inmate at the time, Hirasawa Sadamichi. Hirasawa had been on 
death row for 30 years since 1950, on a charge of poisoning 12 people and 
committing a bank robbery on 26 January 1948. Hirasawa had submitted 17 
pleas for retrials and five pleas for clemency by that time, none of which had 
been accepted. What deserves a particular attention is that he was the last 
defendant sentenced to death under the old Code of Criminal Procedure used in 
the pre-war period, whereby only a confession was required to charge 
defendants with a capital offence. Therefore, Diet members such as Miura 
Takashi, Akiyama Chozo, and Inokuma Shigeji raised two main concerns on this 
case during this time period: (1) Hirasawa might have been forced to make a 
confession by torture; and (2) years of detention in constant fear of execution is 
189 
 
an inhuman punishment, which cannot be justified by the Penal Code.  
 
In the Legal Affairs Committee on 11 December 1985, Miura (1985:6) questioned 
whether Hirasawa would be granted a reprieve considering his age, 94. However, 
the Director-General of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Kakei Ei-ichi (1985:6), 
explained that no exception can be allowed to the elderly unless they suffer from 
a serious mental disorder as specified in Article 479 (1) and (2) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. With regard to Shimasaki, he did not show particular 
initiatives on this issue, either. He merely mentioned that this case was not an 
easy one given that approximately 30 years had passed since the incident 
occurred, and few public prosecutors knew the details of this case (Shimasaki 
1985:7). Given that Shimasaki believed in Jodo Shinshu Buddhism, which 
teaches that every single person’s life is precious, one may conjecture that he 
was personally sensitive to the issue of depriving death row inmates of life. 
Indeed, it has been disclosed that a later Minister of Justice, Sato Megumu (29 
December 1990 to 5 November 1991), refused to authorise executions out of 
respect for the teaching of the Jodo Shinshu Buddhism, which will be discussed 
more in Chapter 4. However, rather than sticking to his religious belief, 
Shimasaki appears to have chosen to fulfill his official responsibility as the 
Minister of Justice. He authorised executions of two death row inmates during 
his term.   
 
Regarding the term of Suzuki Seigo (28 December 1985 to 22 July 1986), what 
merits some attention is not necessarily his own remarks. Rather, it is a drastic 
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change in the opinion of the former Minister of Justice, Hatano, on the Japanese 
criminal justice system. During his term as Minister of Justice (27 November 
1982 to 27 December 1983), Hatano (1983:23) used to stick to his argument that 
the Japanese criminal justice system is superior to those in Western countries, 
and that there are only handful false charge cases in Japan. However, Hatano 
(1986:11) argued in the Legal Affairs Committee on 25 March 1986 that public 
prosecutors’ role must be altered to achieve more fair trials in Japan. According 
to him, whilst public prosecutors were considered as judicial officers in the 
pre-war period, they became administrative officers after the war (Hatano 
1986:11). The Public Prosecutor’s Office became the administrative authority 
accordingly, and the judges became the only judicial officers. Despite this 
change, prosecutors continued to exert tremendous power in the Japanese 
criminal justice system and get involved in the crucial part of capital punishment 
policy. Furthermore, Hatano (1986:11) claimed that the criminal justice system in 
Japan was originally an import from Germany, and now that it had taken root in 
Japan, it was time to adjust it to the Japanese way so that it could function better. 
 
Whilst Hatano sought to legitimise Japanese criminal justice when he was in the 
post of the Minister of Justice, he thus criticised deficiencies in exactly the same 
system. Given that it was only about three years after Hatano left his post of 
Minister of Justice one may doubt that such concerns occurred to him suddenly 
within such a short time. This can indicate that Ministers of Justice tend to try to 
act on precedents and legitimise the existing legal system as the top authority of 
the Ministry of Justice, even against their personal convictions. In response to 
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Hatano’s suggestion on the role of public prosecutors, Suzuki (1986:12) merely 
stated that he would respect Hatano’s opinion and continue to make an effort for 
the future of the Japanese criminal justice system. Invoking the feelings of 
Japanese citizens on capital punishment in the Legal Affairs Committee on 27 
March 1986, Suzuki authorised executions of two inmates during his term. 
 
In the meantime, the natural death of Hirasawa Sadamichi at the age of 95 was 
confirmed on 10 May 1987, and a subsequent Minister of Justice, Endo Kaname 
(22 July 1986 to 6 November 1987), and bureaucrats were heavily accused of ill 
treatment by the Ministry of Justice in this case. However, they endeavoured to: 
(1) legitimate the non-execution allowing some room to the interpretation of 
Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specifies the responsibility 
of the Minister of Justice regarding the timing of authorising and conducting 
executions; and (2) stress that there was no possibility that Hirasawa was 
innocent (Okuno 1980c:3, 19; Endo 1987a:8; Okamura 1987: 8). Firstly, in the 
Legal Affairs Committee on 14 May 1987, a Diet member, Inokuma Shigeji, 
voiced concerns regarding the non-execution of Hirasawa against the legal 
provisions. According to him, Hirasawa’s 32 years of life in detention until his 
death could imply that Japan used a system of life imprisonment without parole 
with no legal backing, and this could be more inhuman than hanging (Inokuma 
1987:14).  
 
In response, Okamura Yasutaka, the Director-General of the Criminal Affairs 
Bureau, raised three main reasons to explain why the Ministry of Justice failed to 
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take appropriate measures dealing with this case: (1) shortage of competent 
public prosecutors; (2) low efficiency caused by outstanding numbers of pleas 
from Hirasawa; and (3) the advisory nature of Article 475 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. According to Okamura, whilst the number of applicants for public 
prosecutor posts had been decreasing,121 Hirasawa submitted pleas for retrials 
18 times and for reprieves five times in total, which heavily hindered the 
efficiency in dealing with this case (Okamura 1987:5,6,14). What is more, 
Okamura tried to justify Hirasawa’s 32-year detention claiming that it was 
reasonable for Ministers of Justice to have dealt with the case very carefully and 
postponed the execution orders (Okamura 1987:14). More precisely, Okamura 
argued that it was not strictly necessary for Ministers of Justice to be bound by 
Article 475 (2): whilst it requires the Minister to order the execution of the death 
penalty ‘within six months from the date when the judgment becomes final and 
binding’, this excludes the period that applications or requests for a retrial or 
pardon are being made (Okamura 1987:14).  
 
This is strikingly different from what Ministry bureaucrats often claim in justifying 
the capital punishment system. It is usually the Ministry of Justice that contends 
that executions must be authorised on the basis of Article 475 in order to keep 
Japan hochi kokka, whilst constitutional scholars tend to interpret this provision 
in wider terms and claim that it is rather mandatory for Ministers of Justice to be 
extraordinarily careful with decisions that relate to matters of life and death.122 In 
                                                  
121 Okamura explained that whilst there were more than 50 applicants for prosecutor posts in the 
previous year, less than 40 applied in 1987. 
122 Interview with two constitutional scholars, Tokyo, 13 May 2011. 
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order to justify the fact that Hirasawa was not executed despite the legal 
provisions, Okamura thus implied legal ambivalence in Article 475, which was 
not consistent with the Ministry’s usual claim to legitimate capital punishment on 
the basis of law. 
 
Endo (1987a:15) also supported Okamura’s explanation regarding this case and 
claimed that it was not necessarily unusual that more than 30 years should pass 
by without parole or execution while the Ministry of Justice and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office were handling each plea one by one. Furthermore, what 
merits some attention is that both Okamura and Endo stressed that there was no 
possibility whatever that Hirasawa was innocent (Okamura 1987: 8; Endo 
1987a:8); and Endo provided detailed information on how he tried to deal with 
this case. According to Endo, doubting whether the non-execution of Hirasawa 
was a neglect of the duty of the Ministry of Justice, he set up several meetings 
with senior bureaucrats in the Ministry (Endo 1987a: 15). He then claimed that 
the Ministry appeared to have been extraordinarily careful in case the Japanese 
public might wonder whether the government had killed an innocent person 
before Hirasawa’s retrials were permitted (Endo 1987a:8).  
 
Given that Ministers of Justice rarely talk about internal communication within 
the Ministry of Justice, Endo appeared at first sight enthusiastic about engaging 
himself in this issue. However, stressing that there was no possibility whatever 
that Hirasawa was innocent and that the Ministry of Justice cared about the 
public view of the legitimacy of capital punishment policy, Endo appeared to 
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have evaded a fundamental question of whether it is appropriate to retain capital 
punishment at the risk of detaining or executing innocent people.  
 
The Ministry of Justice thus endeavoured to defend the non-execution of 
Hirasawa on grounds of (1) the shortage of competent prosecutors; (2) the 
tremendous amount of pleas from Hirasawa; (3) the ‘rights’ of Ministers of 
Justice to postpone executions when appropriate; and (4) careful investigation 
on this case in order not to raise public doubt as a false charge case. However, 
Endo’s further remark raised controversy in the Diet. In light of the Hirasawa 
case, Endo suggested in the Legal Affairs Committee on 14 May 1987 that it 
would be better to limit the number of retrials for each inmate, since it could give 
the public a wrong understanding that there was a loophole that death row 
inmates could use to postpone executions (Endo 1987a:8). What is more, 
Toyoshima Eijiro, superintendent public prosecutor in the High Public 
Prosecutors' Office in Nagoya, made a similar comment at his inauguration 
speech on 18 May 1987, only four days after Endo’s comment. Since Toyoshima 
stated that ‘it appears that submitting pleas for opening retrials are currently “in 
fashion”’, Negoro Yasuchika (1987:3), the Chief Cabinet Secretary, had to 
comment in the Legal Affairs Committee on 27 August 1987 that Toyoshima’s 
remark referred to those who submit pleas without valid reasons repeatedly, and 
it did not necessarily refer to Hirasawa.  
 
The Hirasawa case thus revealed the ‘institutional ambivalence’ of the capital 
punishment system. The Ministry of Justice treats capital punishment as an 
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issue of law consistently, and justifies executions on the basis of Article 475 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, it tried to legitimate non-execution of 
a death row inmate who had been sentenced to death decades ago, using the 
same legal provision as a valid reason. Stressing in the Legal Affairs Committee 
on 15 May 1987 that the validity of the system’s deterrent effect depends on 
national characteristics (Endo 1987b:6), Endo authorised executions of two 
inmates during his term. 
 
3.3.3. Governmental Response to the Criminal Compensation Act and 
Disclosure of Another False Charge Case (1987 to 1989) 
 
Finally, it was during the term of Hayashida Yukio (6 November 1987 to 27 
December 1988) that an amendment was made to the Criminal Compensation 
Act relating to those detained on death row on false charges. Given that Menda, 
Taniguchi and Saito were found not guilty from 1983 to 1984, and Hirasawa died 
in 1987 leaving the possibility that he was innocent, significant attention was 
paid to the improvement of criminal compensation in the Diet meetings. 
Originally, criminal compensation for those detained on death row on false 
charges was from 1,000 yen (£7.69) up to 7,200 yen (£55.38) per day, while for 
those who were executed on false charges it was up to 20 million yen (£153,846) 
since 1980 (Hayashida 1988a:1). Hayashida (1988b:1) proposed a new bill in 
the Legal Affairs Committee on 25 March 1988 which would increase the 
amounts to 9,400 yen (£72.31) and 25 million yen (£192,308),123 respectively.  
                                                  
123 The amount was originally up to one million yen (£7,692) in 1964; three million 
(£23,077) yen in 1968; five million yen (£38,462) in 1973; 15 million yen (£115,385) in 
1975; and 20 million yen (£153,846) in 1980. It is currently up to 30 million yen 
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In the following Legal Affairs Committee on 29 March 1988, scholars and 
attorneys were called to the Diet to give unsworn testimony. Discussions ranged 
from raising the amount of the compensation money more than the Ministry of 
Justice proposed to a fundamental question of whether or not it was appropriate 
to set a limit to the amount in the first place. For example, Yokoyama Koichiro, 
professor of law at Kyushu University, used the example of the Compensation 
Act in West Germany in 1971. There was no upper limit in West Germany, and 
those who were detained on false charges could claim any amount as long as 
they could prove the loss it may have incurred (Yokoyama 1988:2). Considering 
the psychological damage that inmates had to go through from the first trial to 
the third, and financial loss during their life in detention, Yasuoka Okiharu 
(1988:5), a Diet member and a later Minister of Justice, also disagreed with an 
upper limit to compensation. Despite these criticisms in the Diet discussions, the 
proposed bill, which presumably had already been agreed amongst 
governmental officials, passed in the Legal Affairs Committee on 28 April 1988.  
 
The Diet discussion agenda then moved back to whether or not Japan should 
retain capital punishment. Chiba Keiko (1988:6), later Minister of Justice, argued 
in the Legal Affairs Committee on 26 April 1988 that abolishing capital 
punishment was as important as securing criminal compensation for those 
detained on death row or executed on false charges. This was because 
amendment of the Act appeared to have been made as an alternative to 
                                                                                                                                                  
(£230,769) since the bill was passed in 1992 (Shigitani 2007:72).  
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discussing a temporary halt to executions or the abolition of the capital 
punishment system. In response, Hayashida merely commented that the death 
sentence had only been given to those convicted of significantly serious crimes, 
with very careful consideration (Hayashida 1988b:6). This sounded like a claim 
that capital punishment policy only involves a small fraction of criminals, and 
does not deserve to be discussed fundamentally.  
 
A similar attitude was observed throughout this period. For example, the Ministry 
of Justice tried to deny the possibility of more false charge cases and to justify 
capital punishment, on three grounds: (1) the three-tier judicial system; (2) death 
row inmates’ rights to retrials, and (3) the improved financial compensation 
system (Okuno 1980c:3, 19; Okamura 1987: 8; Endo 1987a:8; Hayashida 
1988b:6). However, the Ministry of Justice did not try to explain why capital 
punishment needed to be retained even at the risk of detaining and executing 
innocent people. It left aside the ethical concerns about depriving a person of life, 
and dealt with the issue of false charge cases by increasing the amount of 
financial compensation. The Ministry of Justice thus tried to retain a historically 
held policy acting on precedents, and Hayashida authorised executions of two 
inmates as an annual practice.  
 
With regard to the subsequent three Ministers of Justice, each resigned within a 
short period, and active discussions did not take place on the issue of capital 
punishment or false charge cases. For example, Hasegawa Takashi (27 to 30 
December 1988) resigned within four days over an insider trading scandal called 
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the Recruit Scandal. A former Supreme Court judge, Takatsuji Masami (30 
December 1988 to 3 June 1989), took over from him, and it was during his term 
that Akahori Masao was found not guilty on 11 February 1989 after 34 years and 
eight months. However, Legal Affairs Committees met only five times during his 
term, and death row inmates’ rights to retrials and the rights and wrongs of 
capital punishment were not discussed. Thirdly, the subsequent Minister of 
Justice, Tanikawa Kazuo (3 June 1989 to 10 August 1989), resigned within 
approximately two months because of the Prime Minister Uno Sosuke’s 
resignation due to his womanizing. Successive replacements of Ministers of 
Justice did not allow active discussions on human rights issues in the Diet, and 
executions did not take place during these periods, either.  
 
Finally, during the term of Goto Masao (10 August 1989 to 28 February 1990), he 
did not show any particular initiatives on the issue of capital punishment. In the 
Legal Affairs Committee on 5 December 1989, Chiba Keiko (1989:3) questioned 
Japan’s position towards the international anti-death-penalty initiatives such as 
the Second Protocol of the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. 
However, Ishigaki Yasuji (1989:3) of the MOFA stressed that: (1) such an 
initiative is a mere recommendation and legally non-binding; and (2) an 
internationally recognised norm on the death penalty does not exist yet.124 
Although Goto was also questioned on his policy on capital punishment, he only 
replied that the decision on whether or not Japan should comply with such 
                                                  
124 In voting on the Second Protocol of the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death 
penalty, 55 voted for, 28 voted against, and 45 abstained on 22 November 1989. Ishigaki 
(1989:3) combined the number of the latter two and denied that the anti-death penalty norm 
was not widely supported in the world yet.  
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initiatives must be made considering various domestic factors such as public 
opinion that those committing serious crimes deserve death (Goto 1989:3). Goto 
authorised an execution of one death row inmate during his term.  
 
3.3.4. Governmental Justification for Capital Punishment (1980 to 1989)   
 
To sum up, Ministers of Justice during this term separated their personal views 
or emotions from the performance of their official duties, and execution orders 
were authorised upon the basis of law, public opinion, and the shinde wabiru 
social norm. Given that there were a maximum of two executions per year during 
this period, which was exceptionally low by comparison with other retentionist 
countries,125 the Ministry’s dutiful way of carrying out its duty on an annual basis 
was observed. Furthermore, what merits particular attention regarding this 
period is that: (1) executions were not hindered even after several controversial 
events such as a disclosure of false charge cases; and (2) the Ministry of Justice 
invoked the ‘advisory’ nature of legal provisions on executions once it was 
accused of the imprisonment of a death row inmate until death. Firstly, the 
Ministry of Justice treated false charge cases as exceptional incidents which 
occurred during the post-war turmoil, and it did not make them look like crucial 
incidents worth reconsidering the possible abolition of capital punishment. A 
politicians-led bill to provide death row inmates with better treatment in the 
process of opening trials did not pass the bureaucratic decision making 
mechanism, and instead, the Compensation Act was amended as a temporary 
                                                  
125 More than 95 per cent of all executions are believed to take place in China; the 
estimates range from 2,000 to 15,000 per year (Johnson and Zimring 2009:21).  
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alternative to such proposal. The amendment of the Act did not mean that the 
Ministry of Justice started to take a firm step on the issue of capital punishment. 
Rather, it appears to have been based on the idea that abolition of capital 
punishment was unnecessary since Japan was equipped with a three-tier 
judicial system and a retrial system.  
 
Secondly, although the death row inmate Hirasawa was not permitted to open 
retrials and was detained for approximately three decades until his death, a 
ministry bureaucrat, Okamura (1987:14), claimed that it was mandatory for 
Ministers of Justice to be extraordinarily careful with decisions. Whilst Ministry 
bureaucrats usually criticise refusals by anti-death-penalty Ministers of Justice to 
authorise executions as a neglect of official duty, Okamura justified the same 
action when the Ministry was accused of practically giving someone life 
imprisonment without parole without legal backing. Consequently, instead of 
clarifying why Japan should retain capital punishment even at the risk of 
detaining and executing innocent people, the Ministry of Justice chose to justify 
the existing criminal justice system by: (1) using legal provisions, public opinion, 
and cultural factors as prime sources; (2) stressing the available measures to 
avoid miscarriages of justice, and increasing the amount of financial 
compensation for those falsely charged or executed; and (3) implying the 
ambiguity of legal provisions regarding executions.  
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3.4. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter investigated how consistently the Ministry of Justice justified capital 
punishment and conducted executions on an annual basis from 1980 to 1989. 
With regard to the social dynamic in the 1980s, there did not appear to exist a 
mood to discuss the issue of capital punishment fundamentally. It was a time 
when individuals gradually started to take collective action, and 
anti-death-penalty NGOs were still in the making.126 Following the successive 
disclosure of false charge cases, newly formed anti-death-penalty NGOs began 
to act on behalf of falsely charged inmates. However, their campaigns invited 
criticisms from the public for mixing two different issues: (1) resolving judicial 
injustice by trying to prove the innocence of particular inmates, and (2) denying 
social justice by calling for the abolition of capital punishment (Yasuda et al. 
1996:116). Such protests appear to have arisen from the public mainly because 
the Japanese government and the media had been hindering the public from 
acknowledging the correlation between the two issues of false charges and 
capital punishment.  
 
Secondly, the media sensationally featured several serious murder cases during 
this period. Although Japan had an exceptionally low crime rate as it still has 
today, the media coverage of these cases may have led the public to believe that 
heavy punishment through death was still required in Japan. Exceptionally, 
Nagayama’s activities as a novelist on death row grabbed public attention to 
                                                  
126 Postal correspondence with a former death row inmate, Menda Sakae, 8 March 2011; 
and interviews with two NGO staff members, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
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some extent; but this did not necessarily introduce the idea of abolitionism 
across the society. For example, whilst the Hidaka case made anti-death-penalty 
activists criticise the Ministry of Justice over the ill-defined criteria for reprieves 
for death row inmates, this did not become a central concern amongst the 
general public. Although false charge cases aroused sympathy amongst the 
public towards falsely charged people to some extent, and Nagayama raised 
public awareness about death row inmates, this did not necessarily lead the 
public to reconsider how death row inmates should and could atone for their 
crimes. 
 
On the government side, the Ministry of Justice consistently endeavoured to 
justify capital punishment on the basis of law and domestic factors such as the 
climate of public opinion. For example, although false charge cases were 
disclosed successively, the Ministry of Justice treated them as exceptional 
incidents which occurred during the post-war turmoil, not as ‘systematic injustice’ 
(Van Wolferen 1989:188) inflicted by police and public prosecutors. It 
endeavoured to proclaim that Japan was equipped with a three-tiered judicial 
system and retrial system (Okuno 1980c:3, 19), and dealt with the criticisms by 
amending the financial compensation policy. In other words, the Ministry did not 
take any particular measures to prevent false charges or to discuss the 
existence of capital punishment fundamentally, but proclaimed the measures 
already in place for the falsely charged.  
 
Moreover, with regard to the Hirasawa case, the Ministry of Justice showed an 
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ambiguous attitude towards the legal provisions. Whilst the Ministry of Justice 
usually claims that Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
specifies the responsibility of Ministers of Justice regarding executions, must be 
respected in order to keep Japan hochi kokka, a Ministry bureaucrat suggested 
that it was not necessarily required for Ministers of Justice to strictly comply with 
the relevant legal provision (Okamura 1987:14). The Ministry of Justice also tried 
to justify the capital punishment system consistently with reference to domestic 
factors such as the presumed deterrent effect, public opinion, and cultural values. 
However, it failed to account or avoided accounting fully for why Japan is 
required to retain this system even at the risk of detaining or executing innocent 
people. The following chapter will move on to examine the de facto moratorium 
period from 1989 to 1993, and investigate how the Ministry of Justice justified 
the capital punishment system even while executions were put on hold for three 
years and four months.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Governmental Justification for Capital Punishment during the de facto 
Moratorium Period (1989 to 1993) 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Through examining the period from 1980 to 1989, Chapter 3 clarified that the 
Ministry of Justice consistently justifies capital punishment on legal, domestic, 
and cultural grounds, and conducts executions annually. However, no 
executions took place for three years and four months from 1989 to 1993, and it 
may appear at first sight that domestic or international events during this period 
made the bureaucrats at that time refrain from applying capital punishment. 
Nonetheless, as earlier chapters discussed, capital punishment policy is 
primarily elite-driven, and it is not appropriate to consider that executions were 
put on hold on political initiative. Instead, this chapter examines how the 
Japanese government continued to present the dominant governmental 
discourse on capital punishment during the de facto moratorium period from 
1989 to 1993.  
 
The first part of this chapter will critically investigate public opinion on capital 
punishment, which the Japanese government frequently cites in order to justify 
the policy. Whilst the governmental opinion polls tend to suggest that the 
majority of the Japanese public supports capital punishment, no significant 
protest from the public was observed during the de facto moratorium period. This 
205 
 
part will investigate whether or not some domestic factors softened the public 
attitude, or there was not particularly persistent public support for capital 
punishment in the first place.  
 
The second part will explore how the Japanese government justified the capital 
punishment system while ‘institutional ambivalence’ was observed and 
executions did not take place for three years and four months. Since it has been 
revealed that the then Minister of Justice, Sato Megumu, refused to authorise 
executions owing to his religious belief, the role that he played to bring about the 
execution-free period tends to be over-represented in the existing literature. 
However, it is wrong to attach much weight to the individual behaviour of a single 
Minister of Justice in examination of this period. Although this chapter will 
investigate the social climate of the time and the personal convictions of 
Ministers of Justice, it does not aim to investigate the extent to which these 
factors contributed to the de facto moratorium period. Rather, it will illuminate the 
fact that: (1) the period of 40 months without executions simply stemmed from a 
frequent change in Ministers of Justice, and not from a changed view amongst 
the bureaucrats on this policy; and (2) the capital punishment system is 
consistently justified by the Ministry of Justice since the current law allows it to 
exist.   
 
4.2. A SOFTENED PRO-DEATH PENALTY MOOD AMONG THE PUBLIC? 
 
Firstly, it should be particularly noted that the general public were not particularly 
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concerned about the fact that executions were put on hold during this time 
period. As Johnson (2006:113) argues, no significant protests by 
pro-death-penalty bodies were observed, whilst the government tends to 
consistently claim that capital punishment has been retained on the basis of 
strong public support. This part will investigate whether the increase and 
decrease in certain media coverage raised the public’s awareness of capital 
punishment and helped soften the pro-death penalty sentiment amongst them or, 
on the other hand,  public opinion on capital punishment was always more 
neutral in the first place, in contrast to the findings of governmental poll results.  
 
4.2.1. Media Influence on the Public View of Capital Punishment 
 
In contrast to the previous period (1980 to 1989), there appears to have been a 
change in the media coverage of issues related to capital punishment: (1) an 
increase in media coverage of the issue of capital punishment; (2) a decrease in 
media coverage of serious murder cases; and (3) well-known novelists’ action 
for the basic rights of death row inmates. Firstly, the media appear to have 
helped spur a domestic debate on the retention of capital punishment following 
the disclosure of false charge cases in the 1980s. Japan’s major newspapers 
such as Asahi (which is committed to opposing the death penalty), -Yomiuri, 
Mainichi, and Nikkei became very active in calling for a national debate (FIDH 
2008:16). 127  Asahi TV also broadcast a debate on the issue of capital 
punishment on 30 March 1989 and 18 June 1992; and Mainichi TV broadcast a 
                                                  
127 Another leading newspaper company, publishers of Sankei, is not included in the data by 
FIDH. Sankei conducted opinion polls on capital punishment in 1972 and 1977, but not in 
the 1980s or 90s.    
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documentary on this system in Osaka on 28 July 1989. Furthermore, the 
Chunichi newspaper, a local newspaper in the Tokai area, and Shukan Josei, a 
weekly magazine, displayed an anti-death-penalty mood.128  
 
Secondly, a lack of sensational media coverage of serious murder cases may 
not have particularly encouraged the public to demand that the government 
resume executions. Of course, it is not that serious incidents did not occur during 
this period. For example, there was the Sakamoto family murder case. On 4 
November 1989 Aum Shinrikyo members murdered Sakamoto Tsutsumi, 33; his 
wife Satoko, 29; and their son Tatsuhiko, one year old at their home in 
Yokohama in Kanagawa prefecture, and this prompted tremendous media 
coverage in Japan. However, as the victims initially just disappeared and were 
not found dead for many years, the case was treated as a missing persons case 
until 1995, when three dead bodies were found buried in mountain areas of 
Toyama in Niigata and Nagano prefectures and when one of the main culprits, 
Okazaki Kazuaki, turned himself in to the police in September 1995 (Asahi, 18 
November 2011). For this reason, this incident did not necessarily arouse the 
pro-death-penalty sentiment during this period.  
 
Thirdly, some famous writers called for equal opportunities for death row inmates 
in 1990. Recommended by novelists such as Akiyama Shun and Kaga Otohiko, 
the then death row inmate, Nagayama, applied to be a member of the Japan 
Writers’ Association (Nihon Bungeika Kyokai). However, his application was 
                                                  
128 Interview with two NGO workers, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
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rejected on 5 March 1989 ‘given his status as a convicted killer’ (Métraux 
2009:285). To protest against that decision, some novelists such as Nakagami 
Kenji, Tsutsui Yasutaka, Karatani Kojin, and Iguchi Tokio withdrew from the 
association (Mori 2008:88). They greatly esteemed Nagayama’s talent as a 
writer and proclaimed the need to ‘accommodate’ death row inmates as a part of 
civil society as normal citizens like everyone else.  
 
Thus, the absence of a particularly strong pro-capital-punishment protest from 
the public during this period may appear to have stemmed from the 
aforementioned three factors: media coverage on the rights and wrongs of 
capital punishment, lack of sensational media reports on murder cases; and 
some novelists’ action to call for the basic rights to death row inmates. However, 
this does not automatically mean that an anti-death-penalty mood surged 
amongst the public during this period. Whilst media agencies, regardless of size 
or popularity, may have helped raise public awareness of the issue of capital 
punishment and false charge cases, lack of media coverage of serious murder 
cases did not appear to have motivated the public to doubt the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment or call for abolition.  
 
Similarly, it merits some attention that novelists who supported Nagayama’s 
membership in the association were not anti-death-penalty advocates. What 
they called for was an equal opportunity for talented novelists regardless of 
criminal record, since they believed it inappropriate to draw lines between those 
on death row and outside it (Mori 2008:88); they did not necessarily intend to 
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discuss the rights and wrongs of the capital punishment system fundamentally, 
and their protest action did not appear to have generated a drastic conscious 
change in thinking about how those now sentenced to death should atone for 
their crimes. Just as acting on behalf of falsely charged death row inmates and 
advancing abolitionism were treated separately in the 1980s, so the call for 
Nagayama’s rights as a writer appears to have been conceived by the public as 
a distinct issue.   
 
Moreover, it is not impossible to conjecture that public opinion was more neutral 
in the first place than what was suggested in the governmental opinion polls 
Given that there was no particular public protest against the absence of 
executions which lasted for more than three years, a mixture of the 
aforementioned factors may appear at first sight to have ‘softened’ strong public 
support for capital punishment. However, it is unsafe to argue that there was 
originally a ‘strong’ or ‘persistent’ public support for capital punishment, which 
some domestic factors calmed down. As the other opinion poll conducted by 
NHK indicated 40.5 per cent of public support for the introduction of alternative 
punishment in 1994 (Appendix VI), it is important to acknowledge that answers 
can vary depending on how the questions are phrased in the questionnaire. The 
subsequent section will move on to examine the prominence of an 
anti-death-penalty NGO in Japan and its social impact.  
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4.2.2. Emergence of Collective Anti-Death Penalty Activities 
 
Whereas abolitionism was still in the making in civil society in the 1980s, 
anti-death-penalty activities started to be recognised from 1990 with the 
foundation of Forum 90, one of the largest anti-death-penalty NGOs in Japan. 
According to Yasuda Yoshihiro, criminal attorney and key founder of Forum 90, it 
was the adoption of the UN Resolution Concerning Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in 1989 that motivated the existing anti-death-penalty groups to become 
a stronger force in Japan (Yasuda et al. 1996:123, 125). They believed that 
abolition could be achieved in Japan if they succeeded in mobilising the 
international voice to convey it to the Japanese government through their 
grass-roots campaigns more effectively.129 Forum 90 was thus established in 
1990 but with a unique vision. The founders did not try to make it a formal 
organisation with official members, but an informal gathering for those who 
shared the same vision.130 This is because they wanted to make this group 
open to supporters of any social, political, and academic background, and to 
make their activities long-lasting, avoiding any friction amongst members on the 
direction of anti-death-penalty activities.131 Besides the existing supporters from 
the 1980s, several associations and individuals joined this new wave of the 
abolition movement: (1) the Japan Federation of Bar Associations; (2) Setouchi 
Jakucho, a nun; (3) Kikuta Koichi, professor of law; and (4) Danto Shigemitsu, 
professor of law and former Supreme Court Judge.  
 
                                                  
129 Interview with two NGO members, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
130 Ibid.  
131 Ibid.  
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Firstly, they started to hold meetings periodically in Hibiya in Tokyo in order to 
raise public awareness, and a meeting on 1 December 1990 attracted 1,400 
people. The numbers of those who showed sympathy for their activities also 
rose to 5,500 shortly after the foundation, and they included particularly Diet 
members, attorneys, academics, and local assembly members.132 Regional 
branches also started to be established in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, Shikoku, 
and Sendai in the following years. Secondly, besides holding meetings, 
members approached Ministers of Justice in person and tried to convince them 
not to authorise executions. They attended the inauguration party of each 
Minister of Justice with bouquets, visited the home towns of Ministers to hold 
meetings and protests, and even placed opinion advertisements in the local 
newspapers there in order to raise public awareness.133  
 
Whilst anti-death-penalty NGO activities appeared active at the beginning of the 
1990s, which covers the de facto moratorium from 1989 to 1993, most of the 
NGO members whom I interviewed were reluctant to claim that they had an 
impact on the de facto moratorium period. This is because they are fully aware 
that human rights NGOs have not been integrated in the governmental 
decision-making process in Japan, and it is inappropriate to claim that they had 
any impact on governmental policy. Indeed, when I asked interviewees how they 
assessed the ‘influence’ that the then existing anti-death-penalty NGOs had 
possibly exerted during the de facto moratorium, some of them replied by asking 
                                                  
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid.; Forum 90 placed an opinion advertisement in the Oita Godo newspaper in the 
home town of the former Minister of Justice Tahara, for example. 
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me how I defined the term in the first place.134 This is because they felt that it 
was an inappropriate term to describe the effect they could have on the 
Japanese government. Other interviewees such as attorneys and academics 
also agreed with a majority of NGO workers on the limited contribution to the de 
facto moratorium. In particular, denials by governmental officials were strikingly 
strong. They tend not to admit that any policy changes are due to NGO 
pressures in the first place, and such a tendency was also observed in the postal 
correspondence with a former Minister of Justice, Sato Megumu. Regarding the 
question of whether or not there was any interaction with anti-death-penalty 
NGOs during his term, Sato responded that: (1) there was no such thing, except 
that he received letters petitioning him not to authorise executions;135 and (2) 
‘anti-death penalty NGOs were not so active during his term’.136  
 
Thus, this part has clarified that no significant public protest was observed over 
the absence of executions for three year and four months. The following factors 
may appear at first sight to have contributed to ‘softening’ of the public 
pro-death-penalty sentiment: (1) increased media coverage of the issue of 
capital punishment; (2) decreased media coverage of serious murder cases; and 
(3) novelists’ protest against the literary world regarding the discrimination 
against death row inmates. However, it is also possible that public opinion on 
capital punishment was more neutral than appeared from the results of the 
                                                  
134 Postal correspondence with an NGO worker, 28 February 2011, and interview with an 
NGO worker, Tokyo, 12 April 2011. 
135 The anti-death-penalty Jodo Shinshu Sect and Forum 90 sent him a letter on 17 April 
1991 urging him not to authorise executions.  
136 Postal correspondence with a former Minister of Justice, Sato Megumu, 8 February 
2011. 
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governmental opinion polls. Having briefly examined the social climate during 
the de facto moratorium period, the subsequent part will investigate how the 
Japanese government sought to justify capital punishment. 
 
4.3. GOVERNMENTAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CAPITAL PUNSIHMENT (1989 
TO 1993) 
 
The central reason for executions being put on hold during this period is that 
Ministers of Justice did not authorise executions. Having said that, it is not 
necessarily right to attach much weight to the individual behaviour of a single 
Minister of Justice, for two main reasons: (1) this issue has been handled within 
the tightly-knit institutional dynamics where selected elites in the Ministry of 
Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office have a near monopoly; and (2) not all 
the Ministers of Justice refused to authorise executions because of their 
personal convictions. For example, Hasegawa Shin (28 February to 13 
September 1990), the first Minister of Justice during this term, stayed in office for 
less than one year because of his health condition, and did not have 
opportunities to authorise executions. Similarly, the next Minister of Justice, 
Kajiyama Seiroku (13 September to 29 December 1990), served for an even 
shorter period and was not given opportunities to authorise executions, either. 
By contrast, Sato Megumu (29 December 1990 to 5 November 1991), who took 
over Kajiyama, is currently known as the Minister of Justice who did not 
authorise executions because of his religious belief. However, it should be noted 
that Sato did not clearly express his personal opinion on the issue of capital 
punishment during his term: it was after he resigned that he disclosed the fact he 
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had refused to authorise executions.  
 
In fact, Sato’s remarks on various human rights issues in the Diet meetings 
indicate that he did not seek to actively engage in the discussion. Rather, he 
stressed that it was important to prioritise law and order over human rights. For 
example, the continuation of the daiyo kangoku (police detention) system was 
questioned in the Legal Affairs Committee on 20 February and 25 April 1991. 
Since confession is often extracted by torture in daiyo kangoku, which can lead 
to false charge cases, the abolition of this system had been frequently discussed 
in the Diet meetings. However, Sato rejected the possibility that daiyo kangoku 
would be abolished immediately. Firstly, he showed reluctance to have this issue 
dealt with in the Ministry of Justice. He stressed on 20 February 1991 that it was 
the police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office that were in charge of maintaining 
legal order in Japan (Sato 1991a:16), and avoided accusations that the Ministry 
of Justice was taking no initiatives on abolishing the daiyo kangoku system. 
Secondly, he commented on 25 April 1991 that: ‘Although I am aware of the 
reports by Amnesty International on this system and international movements to 
uplift human rights of prisoners, it is currently challenging to abolish the daiyo 
kangoku system with a limited budget (within the Ministry of Justice)’ (Sato 
1991b:2)137. Sato’s response implied that the daiyo kangoku issue could be dealt 
with in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and that the Ministry’s own concerns 
overrode the issue of preventing false charges. 
 
                                                  
137 Sato did not clarify how abolition of the daiyo kangoku system could cause a financial 
problem.  
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Moreover, what merits some attention is his remark in the Legal Affairs 
Committee on 20 February 1991 on human rights, when he discussed the issue 
of foreigners’ human rights in Japan.138 Sato stressed the superiority of law and 
order to human rights: ‘individual’s human rights must be protected under legal 
order (and not the other way around)’ (Sato 1991a:11). Significantly, Sato 
appears to have applied ‘double standards’ to the human rights policy in Japan. 
He stated that the law is situated above human rights regarding the treatment of 
defendants in daiyo kangoku and of foreigners in Japan. On the other hand, he 
appears to have placed individual human rights above the law on the issue of 
capital punishment. In other words, believing that every single person has the 
right to live, he appears to have chosen not to comply with Article 475 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedures that specify the duty of Ministers of Justice: Sato 
did not authorise executions in a dutiful manner during his term.  
 
Of course, he tried to achieve a balance between his personal conviction and his 
responsibility as the Minister of Justice on the issue of capital punishment. Sato 
asked the Director-General of the Criminal Affairs Bureau to bring him 
documents that he was supposed to sign and authorise executions.139 However, 
after reading the documents for two death row inmates, taking two weeks to read 
them, he refused to authorise the executions in the end.140 His official claim on 
                                                  
138 According to Article 62 (1) of Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, ‘Any 
person may, if he/she has knowledge of a foreign national whom he/she believes to fall 
under any of the items of Article 24, report such information’, and the person who reports the 
illegal immigrant can receive a reward up to 50,000 yen if that report is correct. Regarding 
this provision, a Diet member, Okazaki Hiromi, claimed that this can bias Japanese citizens 
against foreign residents in Japan in general. 
139 Postal correspondence with Sato Megumu, 8 February 2011. 
140 Ibid. 
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the legal provisions and human rights issues thus strikingly differed from what he 
disclosed after he resigned as Minister of Justice. This may reflect the policy of 
the Ministry of Justice, which endeavours to act on precedents on the basis of 
law.  
 
Currently, anti-death-penalty advocates treat Sato as a heroic figure who directly 
contributed to maintaining the de facto moratorium. However, it is not well known 
to them that Sato did not show any assertive attitude towards human rights 
concerns, which can either directly or indirectly relate to the capital punishment 
system. The reason why he did not take initiatives in the improvement of 
domestic human rights issues during his term appears to be that he chose to act 
on precedents as a government member. Of course, he may not have been 
aware that neglecting these issues – abolishing the daiyo kangoku system and 
tackling foreigners’ human rights issues – could be linked to an increase in death 
sentences contrary to his personal conviction. For example, confession can be 
extracted in daiyo kangoku through torture, and foreign residents in Japan 
subjected to poor treatment can also be victims of the capital punishment system. 
Given that the issue of capital punishment has been treated by the Japanese 
government as a criminal justice matter, and a distinct one that does not deserve 
attention from the perspective of human rights, Sato may not have been aware 
of that dynamic. However, Sato may have tried to stress the superiority of the 
law and order over human rights as a Minister of Justice only in the official 
setting. In reality, he appears to have chosen not to authorise executions dutifully 
in line with the relevant legal provisions.  
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Finally, after Tawara Takashi (5 November 1991 to 12 December 1992) 
succeeded Sato, he did not have opportunities to authorise executions. Since 
Sato stated after resignation that he did not authorise executions owing to his 
personal conviction during his term,141 Tawara was constantly questioned in the 
Diet meetings about his position on capital punishment and whether or not he 
would authorise executions during his term. However, he confined himself to 
giving general comments. For example, when he was questioned in the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 12 March 1992 on the French experience of the abolition of 
capital punishment and Sato’s non-authorisation of executions, Tawara 
(1992:11) responded in only one sentence that the Ministry of Justice respected 
the current law and it had not been taking any particular measures towards 
change in the current criminal justice system in Japan. 
  
Furthermore, the submissive attitude of the Ministry of Justice to the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office on the issue of Japanese criminal justice – the issue of false 
charge cases specifically – was highlighted in the Legal Affairs Committee on 4 
and 17 December 1991. Article 14 of the Public Prosecutor's Office Act specifies 
the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office as follows: ‘The Minister of Justice may control and supervise public 
prosecutors generally in regard to their functions. However, in regard to the 
investigation and disposition of individual cases, he/she may control only the 
Prosecutor-General’. Although this indicates that Ministers of Justice are not 
                                                  
141 Sato also developed his personal opinion on the issue of capital punishment on an Asahi TV 
programme on 28 January 1992. 
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responsible for supervising an individual public prosecutor, a Diet member, Seya 
Hideyuki (1991:9) claimed that Ministers of Justice should not simply await for 
the outcome of prosecutors’ work, since false charge cases can be avoided if 
Ministers of Justice keep an eye on their investigation activities. However, 
Tawara proclaimed that the Public Prosecutor’s Office was in charge of 
maintaining legal order in Japan, and it was highly important for Ministers of 
Justice to trust them for their rigorous and fair activities (Tawara 1991:8–9).  
 
Tawara thus endeavoured to act on precedents, and did not take any initiatives 
on the issue of capital punishment or false charges. Equally important, the 
anti-death-penalty politicians of the time were not competent in mobilising the 
emerging international and domestic anti-death-penalty trend to the 
governmental level effectively. To judge from the parliamentary proceedings, all 
they did with Tawara was question whether or not he would authorise executions 
during his term. They did not succeed in discussing the issue fundamentally from 
the perspective of: (1) why the state neglects to protect the basic rights of the 
Japanese citizens once they are on death row; (2) by what measures false 
charge cases could be prevented; or (3) what the government could offer for 
victim satisfaction without the use of capital punishment. Simplistic ‘abolition or 
retention’ discussion did not help ministry bureaucrats face the fact that 
Japanese society at that time had been keeping order without the use of capital 
punishment. As a result, Ministry officials appeared to have continued to show 
reserved attitudes towards the existing Japanese criminal justice system.  
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To sum up, four Ministers of Justice stayed in office for a year or less each 
during the de facto moratorium period, and it is difficult to analyse the 
governmental discourse on capital punishment. In particular, the first two of 
those Ministers of Justice, Hasegawa and Kajiyama, did not have opportunities 
to discuss the issue of capital punishment or to authorise executions. Regarding 
Sato, he chose not to authorise executions on account of his religious belief. 
However, since the issue of capital punishment was not brought up during his 
term, Sato neither disclosed his anti-death penalty sentiment nor proclaimed 
retention of the system separating his personal view from his official duty. 
Instead, he appears to have chosen to act on precedents as the Minister of 
Justice, and proclaimed the superiority of law and order to human rights during 
his term (Sato 1991a:11). It was only Tawara during this period who was asked 
his opinion on the capital punishment system, after it was revealed that Sato did 
not authorise executions on the grounds of personal belief. Although it is risky to 
analyse the governmental discourse on the capital punishment system during 
this period simply from several statements by a single Minister of Justice, 
Tawara’s comments suggested that this system existed since the law allowed it 
to function as a criminal justice method.  
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has examined social climate during the de facto moratorium period 
from 1989 to 1993 and how the Japanese government continued to maintain the 
dominant governmental discourse on capital punishment. Firstly, it merits some 
attention that overt protests against the execution-free period were not observed, 
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contrary to the general understanding that the majority of the Japanese public 
supports the system. The central reason may appear to relate to media 
coverage of the issue of capital punishment, limited media coverage of serious 
murder cases, and some novelists’ support for Nagayama regarding his status in 
the literary world. ‘Public opinion’ appears to vary depending on when the 
opinion polls are conducted and how questions are phrased, and ‘strong’ or 
‘persistent’ public support for capital punishment may not have existed in the first 
place. Indeed, the foundation of Forum 90 in 1990 attracted public attention to 
this issue, as shown in the number of participants in one of their meetings.142  
 
However, whilst these events appear to have contributed to increased public 
awareness on the issue of capital punishment to some extent, it does not 
necessarily mean that abolitionism surged rapidly amongst the general public. 
For example, as the case of Nagayama shows, those who called for death row 
inmates’ rights as writers appeared to have been considered as a distinct issue 
from the right and wrong of capital punishment. Moreover, abolitionsts’ voice was 
not counted as a crucial factor in the governmental decision making, they were 
rather seen as a small fraction of public opinion. As Sato Megumu recalls, their 
activities were not treated as a collective voice of Japanese society on the 
governmental side.143  
 
Secondly, whilst the existing literature overestimates the personal convictions of 
the then Ministers of Justice in examination of the de facto moratorium period, 
                                                  
142 Interview with two NGO members, Tokyo, 17 May 2011 
143 Postal correspondence with a former Minister of Justice, 8 February 2011 
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an in-depth analysis of the parliamentary proceedings revealed that not all the 
Ministers during this period endeavoured either to halt executions or to advance 
abolitionism. Rather, most of them stayed in their office for a short period and did 
not have opportunities to authorise executions. Exceptionally, Sato Megumu 
disclosed that he had refused to authorise orders because of his personal belief. 
However, his governmental discourse in the Legal Committee meetings indicate 
that he had not clearly expressed his view on capital punishment or tackled 
relevant human rights issues during his term. Instead, he stuck to presenting of 
official views, such as that the law is situated above human rights. The only 
Minister of Justice who had an opportunity to discuss the issue of capital 
punishment was Tawara, and his statement illuminates the dutiful approach that 
the Ministry of Justice takes. In other words, the Ministry of Justice justifies and 
uses the capital punishment system since the law provides for it. Given that 
abolishing this system requires repealing or amending all of the relevant legal 
provisions, it is less likely for the Ministry of Justice to take an initiative.  
 
Consequently, whilst some people amongst scholars, anti-death penalty NGOs, 
and the media tend to treat this period as worthy of close attention (Chapter 2), it 
appears that what caused the de facto moratorium period was simply a 
high-turnover of Ministers of Justice. Frequent changes of Ministers of Justice 
did not provide them with opportunities to authorise executions, and created a 
‘gap’ in capital punishment policy, which looked like a de facto moratorium period. 
Although Sato’s decision not to authorise executions is not unimportant to study 
this period, as Chapter 1 clarified, important decisions are made within the 
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tightly-knit institutional framework and the role that Ministers of Justice can play 
is limited. Therefore, it is not helpful to try to specify what domestic or 
international factors led decisively to the de facto moratorium periods. Rather, it 
is important to focus on how the Ministry of Justice tries to justify capital 
punishment policy even when executions do not take place. The following 
chapter will move on to examine the governmental narratives on capital 
punishment after the de facto moratorium period.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Governmental Justification for Capital Punishment from 1993 to 2002 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Finally, this chapter investigates how the Ministry of Justice defended the capital 
punishment system from 1993 to 2002, the ten years following the de facto 
moratorium period. The first part will explore the then prevailing social climate on 
capital punishment. According to the governmental opinion polls, 73.8 per cent 
of the Japanese public supported capital punishment in 1994, and 79.3 per cent 
in 1999 (Appendix IV). These results may at first sight indicate increased public 
support for capital punishment. However, this section will clarify that such a 
public mood was very much related to how the media and the government dealt 
with the prevailing crime situations. The second part will investigate how the 
Ministry of Justice put the capital punishment system back in use for the first 
time in three years and four months. Whilst the numbers of annual executions 
were no more than two from 1980 to 1989, and none from 1989 to 1993, they 
ranged from two to seven per calendar year during this period. This part will 
investigate how the government tried to maintain the dominant discourse on 
crime and punishment for the justification of capital punishment during this 
period.   
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5.2. A REAWAKENED PRO-DEATH-PENALTY MOOD AMONG THE PUBLIC? 
 
The governmental opinion polls indicate that 73.8 per cent of the Japanese 
public supported capital punishment in 1994, 79.3 per cent in 1999. However, 
leaving aside the methodological issues regarding the governmental surveys, 
the prime reason why the public may have looked punitive or pro-death-penalty 
during this period appears to relate to: (1) the sensational media coverage of 
indiscriminate murder cases; (2) governmental response to these crimes; and 
(3) media reporting of the results of the governmental opinion polls on the public 
image of Japanese society. The following section will examine how public 
pro-death-penalty sentiment was created by the media agencies, and how 
strategically it was used by the Japanese government as justification for the 
capital punishment system.  
 
5.2.1. Media Coverage of Serious Murder Cases 
 
Whilst media agencies appeared very active in calling for a national debate on 
the issue of capital punishment in the early 1990s (FIDH 2008:16), this 
significantly lost momentum following successive serious crimes. The first case 
was the Aum gas attack, which was committed by the Aum sect in the Tokyo 
underground on 23 March 1995. As already discussed in Chapter 2, it was 
featured by the media as the biggest security threat in Japan in decades.  
 
Secondly, four successive juvenile crimes were also featured by the media 
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sensationally. For example, in the Sakakibara case a 14-year-old high school 
boy committed murders between March and May 1997, finally strangling an 
11-year-old primary school boy in Kobe and cutting off his head, which he left at 
the school gate with a taunting note stuck in the victim’s mouth, found on 27 May 
1997 (Asahi Newspaper Agency 2000:56–7). Names of juvenile offenders are 
usually withheld in media reports for the purpose of protecting their privacy. 
However, as had happened in the Ayase murder case in 1988-9, a weekly 
magazine, Focus, declared that this case should not be handled like other, less 
serious juvenile crimes, and it disclosed the criminal’s full name and picture in 
the issue of 9 July 1997 (Asahi Newspaper Agency 2000:167–9).  
 
Moreover, besides the Hikari case, of a murder committed on 14 April 1999 by 
an 18-year-old boy (Chapter 2), there were the Saga bus hijack case and the 
Aichi murder case, both involving murder committed in 2000 by 17-year-old boys. 
In the former case, on 3 May 2000 a high school boy hijacked a bus in Saga 
prefecture with a knife, and a 68-year-old woman died and three others were 
seriously injured. After investigation, this case was found to have been 
influenced by the latter case, committed by another 17-year-old high school boy, 
who murdered a 64-year-old housewife by stabbing her 40 times and also 
injured her 67-year-old husband seriously (Machizawa 2000:122).  
 
Indiscriminate murders were also committed by adults during this period, and 
they were widely featured by the media. Firstly, there was the Wakayama curry 
poisoning case; four people were killed and 63 others badly affected at a 
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community summer festival in Wakayama prefecture on 25 July 1998. Hayashi 
Masumi, a 42-year-old insurance salesperson, was arrested and sentenced to 
death for both murders and attempted murders in the Wakayama District Court 
on 18 May 2009.144 Secondly, there was the Osaka school massacre case, in 
which a 37-year-old man, Takuma Mamoru, stabbed primary school children at 
Osaka Kyoiku University Ikeda Elementary School on 8 June 2001, killing eight 
children and injuring 13 children and two teachers. The motive was found to be 
retaliation against Japanese society from which Takuma felt left out, and a desire 
to be executed through capital punishment since he could not commit suicide by 
himself (Shinoda 2008:9). Therefore, anti-death-penalty activists proclaimed that 
Takuma would not have committed this indiscriminate crime if the capital 
punishment system did not exist in Japan (Mori 2008:121).  
 
What also merits particular attention in this case is that although Takuma was 
executed within a year after the final sentence was given,145 no major public 
concern was aroused about him being singled out from other death row inmates, 
who had been imprisoned for decades. It may have been a strategic 
bureaucratic decision to execute Takuma within this short period in order to 
justify capital punishment, exploiting public fear aroused by serious murder 
cases. However, since Takuma did not apologise to the bereaved families even 
once, some in the victim lobby doubted whether swift punishment put a closure 
                                                  
144 Regarding this case, there remained a possibility that the crime was set up by someone 
else (Japan Times, 19 June 2004). However, since she had a previous criminal record of 
conspiring with her husband in an insurance-related murder attempt, she was convicted 
without any definite evidence against her or confession from her. 
145 The death sentence on Takuma was finalised on 26 September 2003, and he was 
executed on 14 September 2004. 
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to this incident and eased their feelings (Japan Times, 15 September 2004). 
 
5.2.2. Governmental Response to Serious Murder Cases 
 
In reaction to the successive indiscriminate murder cases, the Japanese 
government handled several cases differently, and tried to maintain its 
pro-death-penalty stance. More precisely, the Ministry of Justice (1) claimed the 
necessity of harsher punishment towards juvenile offenders, (2) amended 
several legal provisions on the initiatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and 
(3) demonstrated through opinion polls that public fear has increased over years. 
Firstly, on 1 July 1997, three days after the offender in the Sakakibara case was 
arrested, Kajiyama Seiroku, then Chief Cabinet Secretary and former Minister of 
Justice, stressed that it was doubtful that social justice could be maintained 
when offenders did not get appropriate punishment because of their ages (Asahi 
Newspaper Agency 2000:205–8).  
 
The Ministry of Justice also made a partial amendment to the prison system for 
juveniles on 9 September 1997. Whilst the maximum imprisonment for juvenile 
offenders used to be set for two years, this change made it possible to extend 
the period for a further two years many times. Secondly, following the Osaka 
school massacre, the Japanese government showed a punitive attitude towards 
criminals who are mentally disturbed. The then Prime Minister, Koizumi 
Jun-ichiro, stated on 9 June 2001 that those people tended to commit crimes 
repetitively and that it was necessary to revise Article 39 of the Penal Code 
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which provides that ‘an act of insanity is not punishable’.146 
 
Thirdly, the results of the opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office 
were used for justification of several amendments of the legal procedures and 
retention of capital punishment. As already discussed in Chapter 1, a change 
was made in the police policy on counting of crimes after the Okegawa case 
(Hamai and Ellis 2008b:26), and this generated a sudden and drastic increase in 
overall recorded crime and decreased clearance rates in recent statistics (Kawai 
2004:39). However, the media only highlighted the statistics, and the public 
anxiety about the current state of society appeared to have surged and may 
have influenced the opinion poll results.  
 
Indeed, the reason for the increased fearfulness amongst the Japanese public 
can be found from the other governmental poll, the Opinion Poll on Public Order 
and Safety (Chian ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa). Although the questions were 
slightly different from 2004 to 2006, both results show that the Japanese public 
tend to take in what the media report uncritically. The question was ‘What made 
you become concerned about the current public order and safety?’ in 2004 and 
‘Where do you acquire information about the current public order and safety?’ in 
2006. 83.9 per cent of respondents answered in 2004 that it was newspapers 
and television programmes that made them concerned about the current state of 
public order and safety; and 95.5 per cent answered in 2006 that these were 
what the public receive the latest news on the criminal situation from (Prime 
                                                  
146 ‘The Act on Medical Care and Treatment for Persons Who Have Caused Serious Cases 
Under the Condition of Insanity’ was then adopted in 2003 and came into force in 2005. 
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Minister’s Office 2004b;2006). Whilst the emerging public fearfulness had been 
heavily influenced by the wide coverage of high-profile murder cases, these 
results were cited by the media and governmental officials to ‘prove’ that 
Japanese society was becoming dangerous and that harsher punishment and 
retention of capital punishment were inevitable in Japan.  
 
The following section will investigate exactly how governmental officials justified 
the capital punishment system during this period. 
 
5.3. GOVERNMENTAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
 
Much as happened in the other case study periods, as a result of political 
corruption scandals or cabinet reshuffles 16 Ministers of Justice served within 
ten years from 1993 to 2003. Although not all of the Ministers of Justice, for this 
reason, had opportunities to clearly demonstrate the governmental approach on 
capital punishment the present section will highlight the key discussions in the 
Legal Affairs Committees dividing this period into four phases: (1) 1993 to 1996 
when executions were resumed and justified by Ministers of Justice on the basis 
of law; (2) 1996 to 2000 when the Ministry of Justice justified capital punishment 
with the climate of public opinion as a prime source; and (3) 2000 to 2002 when 
the Ministry of Justice justified executions disregarding the anti-death-penalty 
victim lobby’s protest.  
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5.3.1. Governmental Justification on the Basis of Law (1993 to 1996) 
 
Executions were resumed by the authorisation by the then Minister of Justice, 
Gotoda Masaharu (12 December 1992 to 9 August 1993). Given that Gotoda 
was consistent with his pro-death penalty attitude throughout his term, his 
personal characteristics and leadership may appear as a crucial factor to this 
event. However, a majority of the anti-death penalty advocates whom I 
interviewed mentioned that more attention must be paid to the intentions of 
Ministry bureaucrats who (they claimed) were really behind the nomination of 
Gotoda for this post, expecting him to resume executions and put capital 
punishment policy back in use.147 Through examining Gotoda’s narratives on 
the issue of capital punishment in depth, the following part will examine: (1) how 
the Ministry of Justice tried to maintain the dominant discourse on crime and 
punishment; and (2) how subsequent Ministers of Justice continued to justify 
capital punishment in order to keep Japan hochi kokka.  
 
First of all, what Gotoda stressed in the Legal Affairs Committee on 23 February 
1993 was the responsibility of Ministers of Justice regarding the capital 
punishment system in Japan. He argued that ‘as long as capital punishment 
exists as a legal system and is sentenced to criminals under fair trials, I believe 
that it is homu daijin no shokuseki (a duty of Ministers of Justice) to authorise it. 
Otherwise, it will ruin ho chitsujo (legal order)’ (Gotoda 1993a:17). However, 
                                                  
147 Interview with an NGO worker, Tokyo, 12 April 2011; with a MOFA official, Tokyo, 9 May 
2011; and with two NGO workers, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. Although interviewees hypothesised 
that it was a decision made amongst the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice strategically, 
it is the Prime Minister who nominates the Ministers (Chapter 1). 
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Gotoda also showed an open mind towards discussing the issue of capital 
punishment in the same meeting:  
 
Whilst opinion polls show that the vast majority of the Japanese citizens 
support retaining capital punishment, most of the Western countries 
have abolished the system. Although the US is exceptional in this case, I 
am aware that there exists an international anti-death-penalty trend. Also, 
I have heard that a public survey was conducted on the street in 
Shikoku148 area a year ago or so, and anti-death penalty sentiment 
appeared to be increasing amongst young generation in particular. 
Whilst opinion polls conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office have 
revealed that there are more retentionists in Japan, we need to handle 
this issue very carefully keeping young generation’s trend in mind  
(Gotoda 1993a:17).  
 
Members of Shikoku Forum, a regional NGO of Forum 90, conducted an opinion 
poll on the issue of capital punishment in the Shikoku area in October and 
November 1992. Out of 1,955 people surveyed, 35 per cent (687 people) 
answered that the capital punishment system was necessary in Japan; 39 per 
cent (759 people) answered that it was not necessary; and 26 per cent (509 
people) answered that they did not know (Shimaya 2005:1). It deserves some 
attention that Gotoda had been informed about the NGO-led survey and that he 
referred to the results when answering questions in the Legal Affairs 
                                                  
148 The Shikoku area comprises four prefectures: Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, and Kochi. 
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Committee.149  
 
Whilst Gotoda thus appeared to have shown some understanding towards a 
different opinion poll result from the governmental one, he authorised three 
executions on 26 March 1993 in order to stick to his principles and to keep Japan 
hochi kokka. Although it was the first time in more than three years that 
executions took place in Japan, the Ministry of Justice did not make any official 
statement regarding this decision. For example, in the Legal Affairs Committee 
on 29 March 1993 Hama Kunihisa, head of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, refused 
to discuss the issue. According to him, the Ministry of Justice cannot disclose 
information about the executions since it can hurt the feelings of the bereaved 
families of those executed, and can disturb other inmates from maintaining 
stable feelings (Hama 1993:3). Gotoda also showed a similar attitude and tried 
to legitimise his political decision, criticising the previous Ministers of Justice who 
had been putting executions on hold: 
 
When serious crimes occur, judges sentence capital punishment to 
criminals: executions then require authorisation of Ministers of Justice. 
Despite this, some Ministers do not authorise executions based on 
kojinteki na shiso shinjo (personal convictions) or shukyo kan (religious 
                                                  
149 However, Shikoku Forum members were upset, five years after this Committee meeting, 
because Gotoda misused the information in his memoir, stating that the Shikoku Forum 
survey showed the same result as the one conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Although 74 members of Shikoku Forum who were involved in conducting this survey sued 
Gotoda and a publisher of his book in Matsuyama prefecture on 20 May 1999, they lost in all 
the trials in Matsuyama, Takamatsu, and Tokyo District Court and the Supreme Court 
(Sakuma 2004: 5).  
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views). In my opinion, they should not be appointed in this post if they do 
not agree with such responsibility in the first place. If they were not 
aware of such issue, it is reasonable that they resign the job as soon as 
they realise it. […] Otherwise, I doubt if one nation’s ho chitsujo can be 
maintained (Gotoda 1993b:2).  
 
In response to an accusation against his dutiful attitude by an anti-death-penalty 
Diet member, Takemura Yasuko, Gotoda tried to make his point clear as follows:  
 
What I am trying to say is that once you are assigned to a job, you are 
required to carry it out. Of course, it is possible to leave certain jobs to 
successors if you do not want to complete the duty, since one Minister’s 
job can only last for approximately one year. However, how can you 
maintain chitsujo (order) like that? I believe that you should resign and 
contribute all of your efforts to anti-death penalty activities if you are not 
happy with your responsibility (Gotoda 1993b:3).  
 
In the Legal Affairs Committee on 2 April 1993, another abolitionist Diet member, 
Suzuki Kikuko, criticised Gotoda’s execution orders upon the basis of law: 
‘Although the de facto moratorium period was a kind of “sustainable legal order” 
that former Ministers of Justice and anti-death penalty lobby had built up, Gotoda 
overturned it under the name of maintaining legal order’ (Suzuki 1993:12). In 
response, Gotoda explained that he did not think there had been a certain legal 
order during the de facto moratoriaum period: those who had been sentenced to 
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death must be executed and this was how legal order was maintained (Gotoda 
1993c:12). Admitting that there were various opinions on this issue, Gotoda said 
there existed a sort of retributive sentiment amongst the Japanese public: the 
vast majority supported the idea of retaining capital punishment, putting 
themselves in the victims’ and their families’ shoes (Gotoda 1993c:13). 
Consequently, Gotoda tried to demonstrate the government’s responsibility 
regarding executions to the following Ministers of Justice, and the Japanese 
state’s approach on crime and punishment to the public.   
 
Strategies behind the Appointment of Gotoda? 
 
Since Gotoda thus showed a consistent pro-death penalty attitude, large 
numbers of the anti-death-penalty advocates whom I interviewed argued that the 
bureaucrats of the time in the Ministry of Justice must have chosen him 
strategically in order to resume executions.150 In the meantime, Gotoda states in 
his memoir Jo to Ri (Mercy and Rationality) that it was he himself who chose the 
post for his own reasons. According to him, the then Prime Minister, Miyazawa 
Kiichi, asked Gotoda to join his administration in any post. Gotoda then chose 
the Ministry of Justice since he considered that he could start his job without 
much expertise required (Gotoda 1998:266). The anti-death-penalty lobby’s 
theory appears to stem from Gotoda’s career background. Since Gotoda had 
first-hand experience of dealing with serious murderers in the National Police 
Agency, according to this theory the Ministry of Justice must have known that he 
                                                  
150 Interview with an NGO worker, Tokyo, 12 April 2011; with a MOFA official, Tokyo, 9 May 
2011; and with two NGO workers, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
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would not fail to show a severe attitude towards criminals and would authorise 
executions in a business-like manner.151  
 
Of course, it is not necessarily true that those in the National Police Agency 
always show a severe attitude towards criminals. For example, from the 
experience when he was the Director-General of the National Police Agency and 
played a leading role in the Asama Sanso (Asama Lodge) incident on 19 
February 1972, Gotoda recalls in his memoir a concern for the importance of 
human life:  
 
The primary purpose of the Japanese police is nothing but to secure the 
safety of citizens. In this incident, the first priority was given to save a 
hostage, Muta Yasuko. […Moreover,] no matter who they are – even if 
they are rioters or criminals – they are still Japanese citizens. In order 
not to deprive them of life or human rights, the police owed responsibility 
to assure criminals’ lives as well (Gotoda 1994:26).  
 
However, an alternative view is that priority was not necessarily given to 
respecting the life of criminals but to arresting the criminals ‘alive’ in order to 
punish them with the appropriate penalty. As Johnson (2002:243–4) argues, the 
Japanese police and prosecutors are evaluated for their high efficiency in 
‘solving’ crimes: shooting criminals as self-defence is usually avoided and it is 
important for them to have criminals convicted and sentenced to appropriate 
                                                  
151 Ibid. 
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punishment. Whilst anti-death-penalty activists criticised the political decision to 
nominate Gotoda and his authorisation of executions, it merits some attention 
that two of those whom I interviewed showed some understanding of Gotoda’s 
political actions. According to them, ‘as it is clear from the fact that he 
consistently claimed the importance of maintaining legal order, Gotoda must 
have been the only Minister of Justice who sincerely cared about what the best 
for the Japanese citizens is: “capital punishment should be used for social 
justice”’.152  
 
Secondly, Gotoda’s successor, Mikazuki Akira (9 August 1993 to 28 April 1994), 
an attorney and law professor, showed a great deal of sympathy towards Gotoda, 
and acted on precedents. Regarding the authorisation of executions, Mikazuki 
had already made up his mind before he took his office as the Minister of Justice. 
Firstly, Mikazuki clearly states in his book Hogaku Nyumon (Introduction to 
Studies of Law) (1982) that capital punishment can be used once illegal acts are 
observed and the judge sentences a convicted person to death. Moreover, it has 
been revealed that Mikazuki had told an abolitionist Diet member, Futami 
Nobuaki, about his decision to authorise executions in advance. Futami visited 
Mikazuki on 9 August 1993, when Mikazuki took office, and Mikazuki told Futami 
the following: after debating with himself in a hotel room for a few days, he finally 
decided to accept the job offer, which includes the ‘responsibility’ of authorising 
executions when required (cited in Sakuma 2004:5). Mikazuki did not try to 
engage in the debate on the propriety of Article 475 of the Code of Criminal 
                                                  
152 Interview with two NGO workers, Tokyo, 17 May 2011. 
237 
 
Procedure, which specifies the duty of the Minister of Justice on authorisation of 
executions, and he authorised executions in a bureaucratic manner. 
 
In the meantime, Mikazuki’s successors did not make official statements on the 
justification. This was partly because most of them stayed in office as Ministers 
of Justice for short periods (see Appendix IX) but partly because 
anti-death-penalty Diet members stopped bringing the issue to the Legal Affairs 
Committees shortly after the Aum gas attack on 20 March 1995. Special 
Committees on Religious Groups took place repetitively, even several days in a 
row during the term of Miyazawa Hiroshi (9 Oct 1995 to 11 January 1996). 
Attention had been paid to investigating the possibility that similar type of crimes 
would be committed by similar religious groups, and how to prevent them. Unlike 
Ministry bureaucrats who do not pay an electoral price for being non-responsive, 
Diet members are sensitive to public opinion. Therefore, a lack of discussion on 
the abolition of capital punishment in the Committee meetings may imply that 
anti-death-penalty Diet members found it risky to bring the issue against the 
background of growing public outcry over the Aum attack. This case shows that 
there exists a boundary dividing anti- and pro-death-penalty lobbies in Japan. 
The results of the opinion polls by non-governmental bodies indicate that the 
public show some understandings and interests in holding executions in order to 
discuss the issue of capital punishment fundamentally, or in introducing an 
alternative penalty such as life imprisonment without parole (see Appendix VI 
and VII). However, most anti- and pro-death-penalty groups tend to consider that 
they are at different ends of the spectrum and that it is a challenging task to 
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overturn a trend when either is in fashion in society.   
 
5.3.2. Governmental Justification Using Social Climate (1996 to 2000) 
 
Executions of High-Profile Death Row Inmates 
 
Secondly, regarding the four executions authorised by Matsuura Isao (7 
November 1996 to 11 September 1997) on 1 August 1997, it appears that the 
Ministry of Justice used the growing public fear aroused by serious murder 
cases for justification of capital punishment. As mentioned earlier, in light of the 
Sakakibara murder case in March-May 1997, Kajiyama Seiroku, then Chief 
Cabinet Secretary and former Minister of Justice, stressed on 1 July 1997 that it 
was doubtful that social justice could be maintained when offenders did not get 
appropriate punishment because of their ages (Asahi Newspaper Agency 
2000:205–8). It was on 1 August 1997 that the four death row inmates were 
executed: (1) Nagayama Norio; (2) Hidaka Yasumasa and Hidaka Nobuko, who 
had given up their rights of submitting pleas for retrials, expecting reprieves; and 
(3) Kanda Hideki, who murdered his father, father’s partner, and partner’s 
granddaughter on 8 March 1985.  
 
Since Nagayama and the Hidakas were particularly very well-known to the 
public, questions arose amongst the anti-death-penalty lobby on how these 
inmates were chosen out of dozens of other inmates at this specific time 
(Yasuda 1998:103). What the abolitionist lobby presumed was that singling out 
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Nagayama, who was 19 years old at the time of the crime, in particular must 
have been a temporary measure to relieve the public fear aroused by the serious 
juvenile murder cases (Yasuda 1998:103). In other words, Ministry bureaucrats 
presumably sought to demonstrate to the public that the Japanese government 
would not hesitate to punish offenders through capital punishment regardless of 
an offender’s age (Yasuda 1998:103).  
 
As the executions strategically took place in the middle of the summer holiday, 
the Legal Affairs Committee did not take place before Matsuura resigned. 
Therefore, his successor, Shimoinaba Kokichi (11 September 1997 to 30 July 
1998), and ministry bureaucrats were urged to comment on behalf of Matsuura 
in the Legal Affairs Committee on 13 November 1997. However, Harada Akio, 
head of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, confined himself to mentioning that he could 
not comment on an individual execution since the Ministry of Justice had not 
been disclosing such information officially. He only stressed that Ministry 
bureaucrats selected death row inmates to be executed after careful 
investigations such as whether or not a reprieve could be granted for them 
(Harada 1997:7). Shimoinaba also discussed the retention of capital punishment 
in general terms: 
 
Given that it is less than one per cent of all the criminals that are 
sentenced to death, it is certain that the Supreme Court judges have 
been extremely careful with the decision of sentencing such penalty to 
offenders. Capital punishment has an aspect of bringing justice to the 
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society, and I believe that retention of the current system is inevitable 
(Shimoinaba 1997:9).  
 
Thus, Hamai’s and Shimoinaba’s defence of the use of capital punishment made 
it look like a trivial matter for the public to wonder why particular inmates are 
executed regardless of long periods spent on death row. Their argument also 
sounded like justification of the Ministers’ responsibility to sign the document for 
execution in a dutiful manner: since criminals are sentenced to death in the 
trustworthy judicial system and singled out for executions after careful 
investigations, it was, they suggested, natural that Ministers of Justice sign 
execution orders when their underlings bring them. Having said that, what merits 
some attention about Shimoinaba’s remarks is that he fulfilled his official duty on 
the basis of his personal conviction regarding social justice. As with a former 
Minister of Justice, Gotoda, Shimoinaba had experience as a chief in the 
homicide division in Osaka, and in the National Police Agency. He claimed that 
his professional career led him to realise that the use of capital punishment can 
bring social justice to the public (Shimoinaba 1998:15). Whereas 
anti-death-penalty Ministers are often accused of mixing private and public 
matters, proponents of capital punishment appear to be allowed to follow their 
personal convictions in conducting official duty as long as they are in line with 
their official responsibilities provided in the law.  
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Amendment of the Ministry’s Secretive Policy  
 
Finally, what was significant during the term of Nakamura Shozaburo (30 July 
1998 to 8 March 1999) was that the number and date of executions started to be 
announced officially from 19 November 1998. This may at first sight have 
appeared as a firm step towards making capital punishment policy more open 
and encouraging public debate regarding abolition or retention. However, the 
real intention of the Ministry of Justice appears to have been the opposite. In 
response to questions regarding this sudden change in the policy in the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 3 December 1998, Matsuo Kunihiro, head of the Criminal 
Affairs Bureau, stated that the Ministry of Justice aimed to receive public support 
and understanding through demonstrating that fair punishment was taking place 
under fair judgment (Matsuo 1998:6). Therefore, as a response to the growing 
public fear aroused by the excessive media coverage of serious crimes, the 
policy change appears to have aimed to show the public that capital punishment 
had been in use in order to bring social justice and that the Ministry did not 
intend to alter the system.  
 
 
5.3.3. Governmental Justification in Disregarding the Feelings of Victims’ 
Bereaved Family (2000 to 2002) 
 
Thirdly, although executions did not take place during the period when Komura 
Masahiko was Minister (5 December 2000 to 26 April 2001), it was not because 
he did not have opportunity to authorise executions. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
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since Komura received pleas from the victim’s bereaved family, Harada 
Masaharu, on 18 April 2001, he promised not to authorise the execution of 
Hasegawa Toshihiko, who killed Harada’s brother in an insurance-related 
murder committed in 1983 (Harada 2004:108–9). However, despite the pleas of 
Harada, Hasegawa was executed on 27 December 2001 under the authorisation 
of the subsequent Minister of Justice, Moriyama Mayumi (26 April 2001 to 22 
September 2003). When criticised for her political decision in the Legal Affairs 
Committee on 3 April 2002, Moriyama defended herself stating that it was not 
appropriate for the final decision made by the Supreme Court judge to be 
overturned by the victims’ bereaved families (Moriyama 2002a:8). Although the 
Ministry of Justice often cites the feelings of the victims’ bereaved families as 
justification of capital punishment, her remarks appeared to have implied the 
Ministry’s actual approach to the system: executions are merely conducted as a 
part of judicial procedures stipulated by the law.  
 
In fact, Moriyama had already showed an assertive attitude regarding the issue 
of capital punishment when she took office as the Minister of Justice. Regarding 
the option of ordering an official moratorium period in order to discuss the 
system fundamentally, Moriyama disagreed with the idea in the Legal Affairs 
Committee on 28 June 2001, stating that this could upset the feelings of death 
row inmates if executions were first put on hold and later resumed (Moriyama 
2001a:17). Although introduction of life imprisonment without parole was also 
proposed as an alternative to the death penalty in the Legal Affairs Committee 
on 11 April 2002, Moriyama voiced her concern that imprisoning offenders until 
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their natural death could destroy their personality (Moriyama 2002b:9). Moreover, 
in the Legal Affairs Committee on 19 October 2001, she stressed that the issue 
of retaining or abolishing capital punishment should be solely left to domestic 
decision making based on domestic factors such as criminal situations, public 
opinion, and the criminal justice system (Moriyama 2001b:8).  
 
Finally, what seems to have prompted Moriyama to treat the issue of capital 
punishment merely as an issue of law and order, not as an issue of human rights, 
was her lack of knowledge about false charge cases in the 1980s. For example, 
when the issue of a pension for Menda Sakae, a former death row inmate, was 
briefly discussed in the Legal Affairs Committee on 2 July 2003,153 Moriyama 
(2003:11) commented that ‘his name rings the bell but I do not know much about 
his details’. It is possible to suspect that she tried not to engage herself in the 
discussion, pretending that she was not aware of that case. However, Menda is 
not a kind of figure that only the anti-death-penalty lobby knows about; he is 
widely known for having been detained on death row for 34 years for a false 
charge. Since this event happened under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Justice and the Public Prosecutors’ Office, such a remark by Moriyama was 
particularly inappropriate as she was an outspoken pro-death-penalty Minister of 
Justice.  
 
                                                  
153 Menda could not have a pension right after he was exonerated and freed. This was 
because the Ministry of Justice had not supposed that death row inmates would be freed 
after proof of innocence, and had not informed them about joining the pension system when 
it was introduced in 1961. Therefore, Menda had not paid his insurance premiums while he 
was on death row (Japan Times, 4 June 2009). 
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5.3.4. Governmental Justification for Capital Punishment (1993 to 2002)   
 
This part has investigated how executions were resumed on political initiative 
from 1993 to 2002. Although 16 Ministers of Justice served within ten years, the 
Ministry of Justice made sure that one or more executions took place each 
calendar year flawlessly. Firstly, Gotoda and Mikazuki not only resumed 
executions but also tried to maintain a principle that it was a responsibility of 
Ministers of Justice to authorise executions in order to maintain legal order. 
Although the provisions of Article 475 and 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which specifies the duty of the Minister of Justice on authorisation of executions, 
have been interpreted in various ways by different scholars, Gotoda, in particular, 
denounced non-authorisation as a neglect of duty (Gotoda 1993a:17; 1993b:2-3). 
Following Ministers uncritically authorised executions simply to act on precedent 
and did not seek to encourage domestic debate on the ethical concerns of 
capital punishment.  
 
Secondly, through analysis of the timing of executions, it was evident that the 
Ministry of Justice had been conducting executions to give a political signal in 
order to legitimate state killing (Yasuda 1998:103). For example, annual 
executions took place in order to show that the system continued, or shortly after 
a surge of public outcry against serious murder cases. Moreover, the Ministry 
started to disclose the fact of executions officially in 1998 for the purpose of 
getting more public support for the use of the capital punishment system. 
Furthermore, execution of one inmate was authorised on legal grounds 
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regardless of the protest of the victim’s bereaved family. Although victims’ 
feelings are often primarily cited by the government as the justification of capital 
punishment, this appears to only refer to the pro-death-penalty victim lobby, 
which is in favour of the government’s policy.  
 
5.4. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter investigated how executions were resumed, and how the Ministry 
of Justice as a pro-death penalty norm entrepreneur tried to maintain the 
dominant discourse on crime and punishment for the justification of capital 
punishment. The first part studied the social climate on capital punishment 
through examining the excessive media coverage on domestic terrorism, 
juvenile crimes, and increase in reported crime rate. It argued that these factors 
appeared to have divided the public into two extremes, for and against the death 
penalty, without allowing alternative debates.  
 
The second part examined how the Ministry of Justice tried to justify the capital 
punishment system on the basis of law and by strategic use of the prevailing 
social climate. Firstly, multiple executions started to take place constantly from 
March 1993, and some key Ministers of Justice such as Gotoda and Mikazuki 
may have at first sight appeared to have re-established a principle for the 
succeeding Ministers to follow, referring in the process to Article 475 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure: it is required for Ministers of Justice to authorise 
executions in order to fulfil their duty and to maintain legal order for the public. 
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Similarly, Moriyama proclaimed that Japan retained capital punishment since it 
was deeply embedded in Japanese culture. However, the real key drivers of this 
policy were still bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice. They appear to have 
managed to use Gotoda and Mikazuki’s legal approach, and Moriyama’s cultural 
approach, as useful political signals to legitimise state killing in Japan.  
 
Similarly, a change in the Ministry’s policy may at first be subject to the initiative 
of then Minister of Justice. For example, an amendment was made to the 
Ministry’s secretive policy, and executions started to be announced by the 
Ministry of Justice during Nakamura’s term. Some anti-death-penalty advocates 
perceived that this would be a definite step towards spurring public debate on 
the rights and wrongs of capital punishment. However, the Ministry’s aim was 
apparently to gain further public support by demonstrating that the capital 
punishment system had been in use for social justice.  
 
Moreover, in addition to the ‘institutional ambivalence’ represented by the de 
facto moratorium period from 1989 to 1993, another ambiguity was observed 
during this period. Whilst the Ministry of Justice usually cites public opinion and 
the feelings of the bereaved families as justification for capital punishment, 
Moriyama authorised an execution, primarily on the basis of the law, ignoring the 
plea of the bereaved family. It illuminated the fact that the Ministry of Justice 
tends to change its priority or source for justification of capital punishment 
depending on the situation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusions:  
Governmental Justification for Capital Punishment in Japan Reconsidered 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
  
This thesis has examined how the Ministry of Justice justified capital punishment 
during the de facto moratorium period, through the case study of the years 1989 
to 1993. Its primary goal has been: (1) to fill the gap in the existing literature, 
which tends to overrepresent domestic and international factors during the 
execution-free period; and (2) to investigate the closed institutional dynamic 
where capital punishment is justified on legal and cultural grounds. The aim of 
Chapter 1 was to present an analytical framework to understand capital 
punishment policy in Japan. The first part illuminated the elite-driven nature of 
the policy, and challenged the existing approach that the Japanese government 
retains capital punishment considering historical, external, and internal factors. 
Examining the highly interdependent relationships within the government, it 
explained that public opinion or anti-death-penalty NGOs do not play significant 
roles in this policy. The second part then threw light on the fact that this policy 
has been dealt with by the government as an issue of criminal justice upon the 
basis of law, and not as an issue of human rights.  
 
Chapter 2 critically examined the validity of the governmental justification for 
capital punishment on domestic and cultural grounds. Firstly, comparison of the 
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opinion polls conducted by the government and non-governmental bodies 
indicated that ‘wide public support’ for the capital punishment system stems from 
strategically phrased questions in the governmental opinion polls. Secondly, 
reviewing the Japanese culture or concepts represented by the act of shinde 
wabiru, and human rights and legal consciousness, it stressed that Japanese 
culture appears to have been strategically cited by the government in order to 
legitimise state killing. Thirdly, it clarified that: (1) the Japanese view on the 
capital punishment system appears to have been heavily influenced by the 
media coverage of serious murder cases, and strategically phrased 
governmental opinion polls; and (2) the Japanese public’s resistance to the 
abolition of capital punishment appears to stem from the lack of sympathy for the 
domestic anti-death-penalty campaigns. Finally, it presented the approach that is 
required to examine the de facto moratorium for a better understanding of the 
elite-driven nature of capital punishment policy in Japan.   
 
Chapter 3, 4, and 5 empirically examined how the Ministry of Justice justified the 
capital punishment system from 1980 to 2002. Chapter 3 focused on the period 
from 1980 to 1989, when the government legitimised the system despite the 
emergence of criminal justice issues including the disclosure of successive 
miscarriages of justice. Chapter 4 examined the de facto moratorium period from 
1989 to 1993. It investigated how consistently the Ministry of Justice justified the 
system even during the execution-free period. Chapter 5 focused on the period 
from 1993 to 2002. It investigated how executions were resumed on political 
initiative, and how the government tried to maintain the dominant discourse on 
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crime and punishment for the justification of capital punishment.  
 
Finally, this concluding chapter summarises the main findings of the thesis, and 
reflects on other issues that should be tackled in future research.  
 
6.2. INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMIC: PRO-DEATH-PENALTY NORM 
ENTREPRENEURS IN JAPAN 
 
Firstly, one of the main claims of this thesis is that the issue of capital 
punishment has been the province of a narrow elite in two government agencies, 
irrespective of public opinion or the views of party politicians. The Ministry of 
Justice justifies capital punishment on the basis of the law, and personal 
convictions of Ministers of Justice do not necessarily challenge the retention of 
the system. Whilst non-authorisation of executions by anti-death-penalty 
Ministers of Justice may appear to create a ‘gap’ in capital punishment policy, it 
is wrong to consider that they play crucial roles in this policy. Rather, it is 
employed-for-life bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office who exert tremendous power in justifying and retaining this 
system in the long run. Indeed, the Public Prosecutor’s Office gets involved in 
the crucial parts of capital punishment policy. Public prosecutors generate 
confessions from offenders to produce sentences of capital punishment, and 
possess the right to immediately appeal against a retrial.  
 
Furthermore, it deserves particular attention that the Ministry of Justice tends to 
be submissive to the Public Prosecutor’s Office on the issue of Japanese 
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criminal justice. Article 14 of the Public Prosecutor's Office Act indicates that 
Ministers of Justice are not responsible for supervising an individual public 
prosecutor, and it does not actively take measures to avoid miscarriages of 
justice (Chapter 5).   
   
Secondly, Chapter 1 also clarified that: (1) capital punishment has been dealt 
with as an issue of law and order, not as an issue of human rights in Japan; and 
(2) the Ministry of Justice tries to ensure the annual executions in business-like 
manner. As Kakusho (1991:17) argues, death row inmates have been 
considered by the government as those who are merely waiting for execution. 
Moreover, the recent lawsuit regarding the Hikari murder case demonstrated that 
the fundamental rights of death row inmates tend to be neglected once a death 
sentence is finalised. These facts appear to explain why several rules regarding 
detention and execution either infringe Article 11 of the Constitution of Japan, 
which guarantees the fundamental human rights, and Article 36, which forbids 
cruel punishments by public officers, or else are not specified in the Act on Penal 
Detention Facilities and Treatment of Inmates and Detainees. Although Johnson 
(2011) presents the nine main hypotheses which encompass historical, external, 
and internal factors comprehensively, Chapter 1 discussed that the actual 
reason why the government retains capital punishment stems from the 
institutional framework where this policy is handled as an issue of law and order, 
not an issue of human rights.  
 
Furthermore, Chapter 1 clarified that since the issue of capital punishment is 
251 
 
elite-driven, there is no room for anti-death-penalty NGOs or public opinion to 
play a crucial role. For example, human rights NGOs in Japan do not have 
official consultative status in drafting official reports on human rights record in 
Japan, and the Japanese government does not usually make official comments 
on their recommendations. Therefore, anti-death-penalty NGOs cannot get 
involved in the governmental decision making regarding capital punishment 
policy.  
 
Moreover, although public opinion appears at first sight to be the determining 
factor in Japan’s retention of capital punishment, examination of the opinion polls 
conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office and other non-governmental bodies, 
and an in-depth survey by a research group, provide alternative views (Chapter 
2). Firstly, public opinion on this issue can vary depending on: (1) the media 
coverage of crime; (2) the discussion on introducing life imprisonment without 
parole as an alternative penalty; and (3) the public level of understanding of the 
capital punishment system. More important, the issue of capital punishment 
primarily revolves around institutional decision making, and public opinion plays 
a relatively passive role in Japan. It is bureaucrats in selected governmental 
agencies who produce the pro-death-penalty norm, and the Japanese public’s 
pro-death penalty sentiment appears to have been strategically built up in the 
media and governmental opinion polls.  
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6.3. CULTURAL DYNAMIC: STRATEGIC USE OF CULTURE IN THE 
GOVERNMENTAL DISCOURSE 
 
The second main claim in this thesis is that Japanese culture has been 
over-represented by governmental officials and the existing literature as a 
determining factor for the retention of capital punishment (Chapter 2). In fact, a 
strategic use of culture in the language used by the government appears to be 
making pro-death-penalty advocates, in particular, believe that Japan’s retention 
of capital punishment has been culturally determined. Firstly, a former Minister of 
Justice, Moriyama, put tremendous emphasis on the concept of shinde wabiru, 
and claimed that capital punishment in Japan was deeply embedded in 
Japanese culture (Moriyama quoted in Japan Times, 4 October 2002). However, 
in-depth investigation of this concept revealed that: (1) it is not necessarily a 
sentiment that contemporary Japanese appreciate; (2) this act is not essentially 
meaningful when spontaneity is lacking; and (3) a contrasting proverb has been 
ignored. 
 
Despite the methodological issues regarding the governmental opinion polls, 
those conducted by non-governmental bodies also indicate public support for 
capital punishment to some extent (Chapter 2). This may appear at first sight to 
relate to the Japanese view on criminals. Self-discipline is admired amongst the 
Japanese public, and those who do not comply with this principle tend to be 
excluded from society. As Komiya (1999:387) contends, the reintegrative 
function is limited in Japan, and once people become criminals, it is less likely for 
them and their families to be accommodated in society again. Even so, it is 
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hazardous to conclude that the Japanese public are ‘punitive’ towards offenders 
for cultural reasons. For example, with the emergence of a vocal victim lobby 
such as that surrounding Motomura on the Hikari case in 1999, the idea of 
capital punishment as social justice started to be reconsidered. What is more, an 
amendment was made to the Juvenile Law in 2000 in order to impose harsher 
punishment on youth offenders. In the meantime, the media showed a reserved 
attitude when the death sentence was finally upheld on the Hikari case offender 
in 2012. An Asahi newspaper editorial on 21 February 2012 generated a 
discussion of the right and wrong of punishing a young man who had committed 
the crime at the age of 18, without giving him a chance of correction or 
rehabilitation. Thus, whether or not the public show a ‘punitive’ attitude towards 
offenders or pro-death-penalty sentiment appears to depend on the climate of 
media coverage and legal measures taken by the government.  
 
Secondly, Japan’s retention of capital punishment appears at first sight to stem 
from a lack of human rights consciousness among the Japanese public. 
However, this too relates to the way the Japanese government treats the legal 
status and rights of death row inmates. For example, Opinion Polls on Defense 
of Human Rights, conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office, do not include 
human rights of death row inmates in the list (see Appendix VIII). Therefore, 
there is little chance for the public to perceive the capital punishment system as 
a domestic human rights concern. The general public’s ‘indifferent’ attitude 
appears to stem from a low level of understanding on the capital punishment 
system and on the treatment of death row inmates (Sato 2009:1–2), and this 
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closely relates to the secretive policy of the Ministry of Justice and biased 
opinion polls. 
 
Thirdly, Japanese legal consciousness can at first glance seem another 
important factor to evaluate the public awareness regarding the capital 
punishment system. Kawashima (1967) discusses that the Japanese public tend 
to prefer legal incidents being dealt with by legal professionals, since they 
appear to ‘regard law like an heirloom samurai sword, something to be treasured 
but not used’ (Dean 2002:4). Therefore, they tend not to show much sympathy 
or give legitimacy to vocal anti-death-penalty campaigns, which aim to challenge 
the existing Japanese legal system. However, besides that, attention must be 
paid not only to public resistance to the NGO activities that go against the 
governmental policy, but also to the characteristics of the domestic 
anti-death-penalty NGOs. For example, activities of a core member of the largest 
anti-death penalty NGO in Japan, or Forum 90, have been playing a crucial key 
in mobilising public opinion. Yasuda Yoshihiro, founding member of Forum 90, is 
a defence attorney for the defendants in high-profile cases. Since he proclaims 
the rights of criminals or death row inmates from his professional responsibility, it 
appears difficult for him, Forum 90, and other domestic anti-death-penalty NGOs 
to enjoy sympathy from the public, whose discussion tends to revolve around 
victim satisfaction.  
 
Consequently, there are problems in considering that the issue of capital 
punishment is culturally determined in Japan. Rather, a strategic use of 
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language by governmental officials appears to be making the public and 
pro-death-penalty advocates believe that capital punishment is deeply 
embedded in Japanese culture. As long as the Japanese government creates 
the pro-death penalty norm and exports it to civil society using Japanese culture 
as its justification, the public are less likely to recognise that the existing capital 
punishment system sacrifices human rights of death row inmates.  
 
6.4. GOVERNMENTAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
DURING THE DE FACTO MORATORIUM PERIOD (1989 TO 1993) 
 
The final argument in my thesis was highlighted from the case study of the de 
facto moratorium period: it is not necessarily critical to investigate how 
executions were put on hold in Japan; rather, it is more important to investigate 
how consistently the Japanese government has been trying to justify capital 
punishment on the basis of the law. For example, although personal convictions 
of Ministers of Justice appeared at first sight to have contributed to the 
execution-free period from 1989 to 1993, in-depth investigation of this factor 
revealed alternative views.  
 
Although the Minister Sato refrained from authorising executions on account of 
his personal beliefs, not all the Ministers were opposed to the death penalty: 
rather, they did not stay in office long enough to authorise executions. Moreover, 
Sato was not necessarily keen on taking initiatives on the issue of human rights 
during his term. Instead, he proclaimed that the law is above human rights (Sato 
1991a:11), and sought to act in line with the law-based policy of the Ministry of 
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Justice. It was only Tawara who represented the Ministry’s official approach on 
capital punishment during this period, and his statement helped illuminate the 
dutiful approach of the Ministry of Justice to this system. According to him: (1) 
the Ministry of Justice retains capital punishment since the current law provides 
for it; and (2) it continues to refer to the rigorous and fair activities of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (Tawara 1991:8–9; 1992:11). In fact, the capital punishment 
system has been justified as a legal penalty on the basis of various legal 
provisions. 154  Whether the Ministry of Justice holds executions officially, 
abolishes the capital punishment system, or introduces an alternative penalty 
such as life imprisonment without parole, any of these courses would require 
repealing or amending of the existing legal provisions. It is unlikely for the 
Ministry of Justice, which tries to act on precedents on the basis of law, to agree 
to this. In fact, Tawara’s statement illuminated the Ministry’s view that the capital 
punishment system has been retained because the current law provides for it.  
  
Besides the ‘institutional ambivalence’ represented by non-executions from 1989 
to 1993, the Ministry of Justice also showed some contradictory or inconsistent 
attitudes in order to justify capital punishment policy throughout 1980 to 2002: 
(1) altering the criminal justice policy; (2) interpreting legal provisions in the 
                                                  
154 They include: (1) Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan, which allows a legal punishment 
to deprive a person of life or liberty exceptionally; (2) the Penal Code and the Nagayama 
Criteria, which specify crimes that are applicable to capital punishment under nine main 
criteria; (3) Articles 475 and 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stipulate the 
responsibility of Ministers of Justice regarding the timing of authorising and conducting 
executions; (4) Article 11 of the Penal Code, which specifies the execution method as 
hanging; (5) Article 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that execution is 
carried out on the initiative of the head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office; and (6) Article 98 
(1) of the National Civil Service Law, which specifies that civil servants have to carry out 
duties set by senior staff.  
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favour of governmental decisions; and (3) changing the prime source of 
justification of the policy. Firstly, the Ministry of Justice ‘dealt with’ the false 
charge cases in the 1980s by increasing the amount of financial compensation in 
cases where innocent people are detained or executed. Recalling the available 
measures such as the three-tier judicial system and retrial system, it did not try 
to review the criminal justice system, where the Public Prosecutor’s Office exerts 
tremendous power. Secondly, when the Ministry of Justice was accused of 
detaining a death row inmate, Hirasawa, until his natural death, it claimed that it 
was not necessarily required for Ministers of Justice to strictly comply with Article 
475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thirdly, although the Ministry of Justice 
often claims that capital punishment functions as social justice for the victims’ 
bereaved families, Moriyama authorised executions against the will of an 
anti-death penalty lobby, on the pretext of maintaining legal order. Thus, in order 
to justify capital punishment consistently, the Ministry of Justice tends to alter its 
claim or policy depending on the situation.  
 
6.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
ANTI-DEATH-PENALTY ADVOCATES 
 
Having examined both institutional and cultural dynamics of the capital 
punishment system, this thesis will suggest implications for international and 
domestic anti-death penalty advocates. As my thesis has claimed, capital 
punishment policy is primarily elite-driven in Japan, and anti-death penalty 
activists have no room to get involved in the decision making process. However, 
it is still important for them to recognise why the Japanese government resists 
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their campaigns; and what strategy would raise public awareness of this issue 
under a secretive governmental policy. 
 
Firstly, the primary task for the international anti-death-penalty advocates is to 
acknowledge the tightly-knit institutional framework that surrounds capital 
punishment policy. Those who face these foreign pressures in Japan tend to be 
Prime Ministers or MOFA officials. However, they are not in a position to express 
any independent opinion on capital punishment, and simply reproduce the policy 
of the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, international anti-death-penalty bodies are 
required to recognise that capital punishment has been dealt with as a criminal 
justice issue in Japan, not as an issue of human rights. Indeed, it is not 
necessarily the case that the Japanese government fails to comply with the 
internationally recognised anti-death-penalty norm out of disagreement with the 
human rights norm. Rather, it appears that the Ministry of Justice simply acts on 
precedents on the basis of the law, and tends not to welcome new ideas or 
opinions to deal with capital punishment policy from a human rights perspective 
or to abolish this historically-held governmental policy. For this reason, a blanket 
approach of imposing the international or European anti-death-penalty norm 
from a human rights perspective is inappropriate and likely to be ineffective.  
 
Furthermore, with regard to the cultural restraints in Japan, it is also important for 
them to understand that it is often political culture that has been hindering  
abolitionism from gaining ground. For example, the Ministry of Justice’s idea of 
treating death row inmates as those who can be released only through death 
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does not necessarily stem from the general public’s view on life and death. 
Rather, it appears to result from the lack of legal status and rights of death row 
inmates in Japan. Therefore, it is important to recognise what language the 
Japanese government has been using in order to make the issue look culturally 
dependent.  
 
Secondly, it is crucial for domestic anti-death-penalty NGOs to recognise why 
their campaigns have been ineffective in advancing abolitionism at the civil 
society level. Although the media coverage of serious murder cases can be the 
major factor in making retentionism surge amongst the public, the way in which 
the core NGO members’ activities have been construed by the public also needs 
to be reviewed. Since core members of anti-death-penalty NGOs tend to be 
defence attorneys, they are likely to send the public a message that they 
overemphasise the human rights of criminals and disregard those of victims and 
their bereaved families.  
 
Moreover, what is required for them is not necessarily just spreading the idea of 
abolitionism but also providing accurate information regarding the capital 
punishment system in Japan. Since saiban-in seido was introduced and 
members of the general public without knowledge of the law are in charge of 
determining both guilt (or innocence) and the sentence to be imposed, it is 
crucial for the public to gain sufficient information on the capital punishment 
system. Given that the Ministry of Justice has followed a secretive policy, 
domestic anti-death-penalty NGOs can be a great source of information for the 
260 
 
public. Besides providing accurate information about the capital punishment 
system, it is also required for domestic anti-death-penalty NGOs to try to 
mobilise the public to discuss in what alternative way justice can be brought to 
the victims, their bereaved families, and the general public in Japanese civil 
society. In order to do this, conveying messages of anti-death-penalty victim 
lobbyists would counterbalance the widespread viewpoint of the 
pro-death-penalty victim lobby. 
 
6.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Finally, the present chapter will conclude by presenting ideas for future research 
using the main findings in my thesis. This thesis has focused on the period from 
1980 to 2002 including the de facto moratorium period from 1989 to 1993; and 
investigated how consistently the Ministry of Justice tried to justify the capital 
punishment system. Therefore, my future research would focus on the period 
after 2002 until today, which includes two other de facto moratorium periods: (1) 
from 28 July 2009 to 28 July 2010; and (2) from 28 July 2010 to 29 March 2012. 
The key events surrounding these execution-free periods include: (1) the 
introduction of saiban-in seido since 21 May 2009; (2) the period in power of the 
Democratic Party of Japan and re-emergence of outspoken anti-death-penalty 
Ministers of Justice from 30 August 2009; and (3) ‘re-discovery’ of the issue of 
capital punishment in the Ministry of Justice and subsequent political initiatives 
since August 2010. I believe that the framework this thesis used for the analysis 
of the period from 1989 to 1993 will help investigate these two contemporary 
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execution-free periods. 
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8. APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Numbers of Inmates Executed and Sentenced to Death from 1945 to 2012 
 
*There was no execution conducted in 1964 and 1968. 
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*There was no execution conducted from 1990 to 1992. 
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*There was no execution conducted in 2011.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Numbers Executed 6 6 4 6 5 3 2 2 1 2 1 4 9 15 7 2 0 3
Numbers Sentenced 3 3 4 7 4 6 5 3 2 15 11 20 23 10 18 8 24 3
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Numbers of Inmates Executed and Sentenced to Death from 1995 to 2012
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Appendix II: List of Interviewees155 
 
Japanese Governmental Officials 
 
Ministry of Justice 
 
Postal Correspondence, former Minister of Justice, Sato Megumu, 8 February 
2011 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Interview, Tokyo, 9 May 2011 
Interview, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division, Tokyo, 17 June 
2011 
Interview, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division, Tokyo, 17 June 
2011 
 
NGOs/NPOs 
 
Postal correspondence, 28 February 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 12 April 2011 
Postal correspondence, Tokyo, 31 January and 16 April 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 18 April 2011 
                                                  
155 Unless otherwise indicated, interviewees agreed to be interviewed anonymously.  
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Interview, Tokyo, 17 May 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 17 May 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 27 May 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 27 May 2011 
 
Individuals 
 
Former death row inmate 
 
Postal Correspondence, Menda Sakae via Shimaya Naoko (Forum 90), 8 March 
2011 
 
Attorneys 
 
Interview, Saitama, 13 April 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 13 April 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 19 April 2011 
 
Senior Writers at Newspaper Agencies 
 
Interview, Tokyo, 12 May 2011 
Postal correspondence, 21 May 2011 
 
Delegation of the European Union to Japan  
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Interview, Political Adviser, Tokyo, 27 May 2011 
 
Academics 
 
Interview, Tokyo, 12 April 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 27 April 2011 
Telephone Interview, 7 May 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 13 May 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 13 May 2011 
Interview, Tokyo, 13 May 2011 
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Appendix III: Sample Interview Questions 
 
Interview Questions for a Former Death Row Inmate, Menda Sakae 
 
1. Could you tell me who was in your support group or wrote on your behalf 
before you were freed from death row in 1983?  
2. Was it allowed by the detention centre to meet support group staff in person 
back then? 
3. To what extent do you think support groups’ activities contributed to being 
freed from death row?  
4. To what extent do you think activities by human rights NGOs such as 
distribution of fliers and calling in to Ministers of Justice contributed to the de 
facto moratorium from 1989 to 1993? 
5. From your experience of calling for the abolition of capital punishment in and 
outside Japan, what do you think about the current anti-death-penalty trend 
in Japan? 
6. Did you see any changes in the response of the Ministry of Justice to both 
domestic and international pressures? How about the period before and after 
the de facto moratorium? 
7. Could you tell me about how the Japanese government should perform 
towards the international anti-death-penalty trend in the future? 
 
Interview Questions for Government Officials and Pro-Death-Penalty 
Advocates 
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1. What do you think about the role of human rights NGOs in the Japanese 
decision making process, regarding capital punishment policy in particular?  
2. To what extent do you think protest activities by human rights NGOs can help 
shape Diet members’ and the Japanese public’s views on capital 
punishment? 
3. What do you think about the fact that executions did not take place from 1989 
to 1993? 
4. What do you think about the current anti-death-penalty trend in Japan? 
5. As a pro-death-penalty advocate, do you see any problems or room for 
improvement in the current anti-death-penalty campaigns? 
6. What do you think about the phrase ‘shinde wabiru’ or ‘shi wo motte 
tsugunau’ (atonement for crimes through death)? 
7. What do you think about the Japanese government’s response to 
recommendations by the UN Human Rights Committee or the Council of 
Europe regarding abandonment of capital punishment?  
8. Could you tell me about how the Japanese government should perform 
towards the international anti-death-penalty trend in the future?  
 
Interview Questions for Anti-Death-Penalty Advocates 
 
1. From your experience as an anti-death-penalty activist, do you get any 
protests from pro-death-penalty Diet memebers or NGOs? 
305 
 
2. What do you think about a balance between carrying out duties as a civil 
servant and respecting personal convictions, through the example of the 
Justice Minister’s duty to authorise executions?  
3. Capital punishment appears to be construed as (1) a domestic issue that 
needs to be handled on the basis of public opinion and the seriousness of the 
crimes; or (2) a global issue in which there is a need to correspond with the 
international trend towards abolition. What do you think about these views?   
4. What do you think about the Japanese government’s response to 
recommendations by the UN Human Rights Committee or the Council of 
Europe regarding abandonment of capital punishment?  
5. To what extent do you think protest activities by human rights NGOs can help 
shape Diet members’ and the Japanese public’s views on capital 
punishment? 
6. To what extent do you think protest activities by human rights NGOs and 
anti-death-penalty Diet members helped bring about the de facto 
moratorium?  
7. What do you think about the current anti-death-penalty trend in Japan? 
8. From your experience, do you see any problems or room for improvement in 
the current anti-death-penalty campaigns? 
9. Could you tell me about how the Japanese government should perform 
towards the international anti-death-penalty trend in the future? 
 
Interview Questions for Victims’ Group 
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1. To what extent do you think activities by victims’ groups can help shape Diet 
members’ and the Japanese public’s views on punishment and rehabilitation 
issues? 
2. Regarding your experience of making speeches in the Legal Affairs 
Committee meetings, how did you get such opportunities? Were you asked 
by anti-death-penalty Diet members to voice concerns on capital punishment 
from the perspective of victims’ bereaved families?  
3. What do you think about the current anti-death-penalty trend in Japan? 
Could you tell me about how the Japanese government should perform to 
establish the legal rights of victims and their families? 
 
 
  
307 
 
Appendix IV: Opinion Poll on Basic Legal System by the Prime Minister’s 
Office 
 
Q.1 Out of these opinions on the issue of capital punishment, which one 
do you agree with?:  
1) It is unavoidable in certain circumstances;  
2) It should be abolished in all circumstances;  
and 3) I do not know. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1956 1967 1975 1980 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Retain 65.0 70.5 56.9 62.3 66.5 73.8 79.3 81.4 85.6
Abolish 18.0 16.0 20.7 14.3 15.7 13.6 8.8 6.0 5.7
"I do not know" 17.0 13.5 22.5 23.4 17.8 12.6 11.9 12.5 8.6
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
Table 3: Public Opinion on the Issue of Capital 
Punishment
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Q.2 In case of abolishing capital punishment, which do you think is 
better?: (1) abolish it straight away or (2) decrease the number of the use 
of capital punishment first? 
 
 
 
  
1994 1999 2004 2009
abolish it straight away 43.2 42.1 39.8 35.1
decrease the use of capital
punishment first 51.9 52.2 53.7 63.1
I do not know. 4.9 5.7 6.5 1.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
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Q.3 Do you think Japan should not abolish capital punishment in the 
future; or can abolish the system when the situation changes? 
 
 
 
 
  
1994 1999 2004 2009
Japan should not abolish
the system. 53.2 56.5 61.7 60.8
Japan can abolish the
system in the future. 39.6 37.8 31.8 34.2
I do not know. 7.2 5.7 6.5 5.0
-5.0
5.0
15.0
25.0
35.0
45.0
55.0
65.0
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Q.4 What do you think about the argument that serious crimes would 
increase if capital punishment is abolished, or remain unchanged? 
 
 
 
(The Prime Minister’s Office 1956; 1967; 1975; 1980; 1989; 1994; 1999; 2004b; 
2009a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
crimes would
increase.
crimes would not
increase. That depends. I do not know.
1994 52.3 12.0 30.8 4.5
1999 54.4 8.4 32.4 2.8
2004 60.3 6.0 29.0 5.0
2009 62.3 9.6 28.0 0.1
-5.0
5.0
15.0
25.0
35.0
45.0
55.0
65.0
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Appendix V: Opinion Poll by Yomiuri  
 
Q. Do you think the capital punishment system should be retained, or 
abolished? 
 
 
 
(The House of Representatives 2008:17) 
 
  
It should be
retained.
I would
rather think
that it should
be retained.
I would
rather think
that it should
be abolished.
It should be
abolished.
I would
rather not
answer.
1993 31.5 32.4 20.9 7.4 7.8
1998 49.0 23.5 13.4 10.1 3.9
2006 56.9 23.5 9.3 5.3 5.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
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Appendix VI: Opinion Poll by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) 
 
Q. 1 Do you think the capital punishment system is necessary or should be 
abolished? 
 
 
 
  
It is necessary. It should beabolished.
I cannot
generalise the
answer./That
depends.
I do not know.
1994 62.8 17.2 15.6 4.4
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Q.2 What do you think about the plan for abolishing capital punishment if 
we place an alternative such as a life imprisonment without parole? 
 
 
  
I agree with the
plan.
The capital
punishment is
necessary.
It should be
abolished
unconditionally.
I do not know.
1994 40.5 42.9 6.1 10.5
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Q.3 Do you agree with the idea that we put executions on hold and discuss 
the issue of capital punishment fundamentally?  
 
 
 
(The House of Representatives 2008:18) 
  
I agree with the
plan.
I disagree with
the plan.
I cannot
generalise the
answer./That
depends.
I do not know.
1994 37.6 28.9 22.7 10.9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
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Appendix VII: Opinion Poll by Asahi  
 
Q.1 What do you think about capital punishment? 
 
 
 
1) It should be abolished right now. 
2) It should be abolished with introduction of an alternative punishment such as 
life imprisonment without parole. 
3) Executions should be put on hold and the debate should be spurred 
meanwhile. 
4) It should be as it is right now. 
5) Others/I do not know.  
 
(The House of Representatives 2008:19) 
 
  
1) 2) 3) 4) 5)
1994 8.4 19.6 19.2 40.2 12.6
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Appendix VIII: Opinion Poll on Defence of Human Rights 
by the Prime Minister's Office 'Which of the Following Human Rights 
Issues are  you Concerned with?' (The Prime Minister's Office 2007) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
19 Others
18 Ainu
17 Nothing Special
16 Homosexuals
15 Gender Identity Disorder
Patients
14 Human Trafficking
13 Foreigners
12 Ex-convicts
11 Burakumin
10 The Homeless
9 Leprosy Victims
8 HIV Patients
7 Crime Victims
6 Women
5 Victims Abducted to North Korea
4 Internet Abuse Victims
3 Children
2 Elderly
1 The Handicapped
2007 (%)
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Appendix IX: Ministers of Justice from 1980 to 2013 
 
Name Sex Year Length of 
Appointment 
(Approximate) 
Numbers of 
Executions 
View on 
Capital 
Punishment 
Party Cabinet 
Okuno 
Seisuke 
Male 17 Jul 1980 to 
20 Nov 1981 
1 year and 4 
months 
1 hawk Liberal 
Democratic 
Party (LDP) 
Suzuki Zenko 
Sakata 
Michita 
Male 30 Nov 1981 to 
27 Nov 1982 
1 year 1 hawk LDP Suzuki Zenko 
Hatano Akira Male 27 Nov 1982 to 
27 Dec 1983 
1 year and 1 
month 
1 hawk LDP Nakasone 
Yasuhiro 
Sumi Eisaku Male 27 Dec 1983 to 1 
Nov 1984 
11 months 1 hawk LDP Nakasone 
Yasuhiro 
Shimasaki 
Hitoshi 
Male 1 Nov 1984 to 28 
Dec 1985 
1 year and 1 
month 
3 hawk LDP Nakasone 
Yasuhiro 
Suzuki Seigo Male 28 Dec 1985 to 
22 Jul 1986 
6 months 2 hawk LDP Nakasone 
Yasuhiro 
Endo 
Kaname 
Male 22 Jul 1986 to 6 
Nov 1987 
1 year and 4 
months 
2 hawk LDP Nakasone 
Yasuhiro 
Hayashida Male 6 Nov 1987 to 27 1 year and 1 2 hawk LDP Takeshita 
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Yukio Dec 1988 month Noboru 
Hasegawa 
Takashi 
Male 27 Dec 1988 to 
30 Dec 1988 
4 days 0 Not known LDP Takeshita 
Noboru 
Takatsuji 
Masami 
Male 30 Dec 1988 to 3 
Jun 1989 
6 months 0 Not known Public 
Sector 
Takeshita 
Noboru 
Tanigawa 
Kazuo 
Male 3 Jun 1989 to 10 
Aug 1989 
2 months 0 Not known LDP Uno Sosuke 
Goto Masao Male 10 Aug 1989 to 
28 Feb 1990 
6 months 1 hawk LDP Kaifu Toshiki 
Hasegawa 
Shin 
Male 28 Feb 1990 to 
13 Sep 1990 
7 months 0 Not known LDP Kaifu Toshiki 
Kajiyama 
Seiroku 
Male 13 Sep 1990 to 
29 Dec 1990 
3 months 0 Not known LDP Kaifu Toshiki 
Sato 
Megumu 
Male 29 Dec 1990 to 5 
Nov 1991 
11 months 0 dove LDP Kaifu Toshiki 
Tawara 
Takashi 
Male 5 Nov 1991 to 12 
Dec 1992 
1 year and 1 
month 
0 hawk LDP Miyazawa 
Ki-ichi 
Gotoda 
Masaharu 
Male 12 Dec 1992 to 9 
Aug 1993 
8 months 3 hawk LDP Miyazawa 
Ki-ichi 
Mikazuki 
Akira 
Male 9 Aug 1993 to 28 
Apr 1994 
8 months 4 hawk Public 
Sector 
Hosokawa 
Morihiro 
Nagano 
Shigeto 
Male 28 Apr 1994 to 8 
May 1994 
11 days 0 Not known Japan 
Renewal 
Hata 
Tsutomu 
319 
 
Party 
Nakai 
Hiroshi 
Male 8 May 1994 to 
30 Jun 1994 
2 months 0 Not known Democratic 
Socialist 
Party 
Hata 
Tsutomu 
Maeda Isao Male 30 Jun 1994 to 8 
Aug 1995 
1 year and 2 
months 
5 hawk LDP Murayama 
Tomi-ichi 
Tazawa 
Tomoharu 
Male 8 Aug 1995 to 9 
Oct 1995 
2 months 0 Not known LDP Murayama 
Tomi-ichi 
Miyazawa 
Hiroshi 
Male 9 Oct 1995 to 11 
Jan 1996 
3 months 3 hawk LDP Murayama 
Tomi-ichi 
Nagao 
Ritsuko 
Female 11 Jan 1996 to 7 
Nov 1996 
10 months 3 hawk Public 
Sector 
Hashimoto 
Ryutaro 
Matsu-ura 
Isao 
Male 7 Nov 1996 to 11 
Sep 1997 
10 months 7 hawk LDP Hashimoto 
Ryutaro 
Shimoinaba 
Kokichi 
Male 11 Sep 1997 to 
30 July 1998 
10 months 3 hawk LDP Hashimoto 
Ryutaro 
Nakamura 
Shozaburo 
Male 30 Jul 1998 to 8 
Mar 1999 
8 months 3 hawk LDP Obuchi Keizo 
Jin-nouchi 
Takao 
Male 8 Mar 1999 to 5 
Oct 1999 
7 months 3 hawk LDP Obuchi Keizo 
Usui Hideo Male 5 Oct 1999 to 5 
Apr 2000 
9 months 2 hawk LDP Obuchi Keizo 
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5 Apr 2000 to 4 
Jul 2000 
Mori Yoshiro 
Yasuoka 
Okiharu 
Male 4 Jul 2000 to 5 
Dec 2000 
5 months 3 hawk LDP Mori Yoshiro 
Komura 
Masahiko 
Male 5 Dec 2000 to 26 
Apr 2001 
4 months 0 dove LDP Mori Yoshiro 
Moriyama 
Mayumi 
Female 26 Apr 2001 to 
22 Sep 2003 
2 years and 5 
months 
5 hawk LDP Koizumi 
Jun-ichiro 
Nozawa 
Daizo 
Male 22 Sep 2003 to 
27 Sep 2004 
1 year  2 hawk LDP Koizumi 
Jun-ichiro 
No-ono 
Chieko 
Female 27 Sep 2004 to 
31 Oct 2005 
1 year and 1 
month 
1 hawk LDP Koizumi 
Jun-ichiro 
Sugiura 
Seiken 
Male 31 Oct 2005 to 
26 Sep 2006 
11 months 0 dove LDP Koizumi 
Jun-ichiro 
Nagase 
Jin-en 
Male 26 Sep 2006 to 
27 Aug 2007 
11 months 10 hawk LDP Abe Shinzo 
Hatoyama 
Kunio 
Male 27 Aug 2007 to 
26 Sep 2007 
1 year 13 hawk LDP Abe Shinzo 
 
26 Sep 2007 to 
2 Aug 2008 
Fukuda 
Yasuo 
Yasuoka 
Okiharu 
Male 2 Aug 2008 to 24 
Sep 2008 
1 month 3 hawk LDP Fukuda 
Yasuo 
Mori Eisuke Male 24 Sep 2008 to 1 year 9 hawk LDP Aso Taro 
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16 Sep 2009 
Chiba Keiko Female 16 Sep 2009 to 8 
June 2010 
1 year 2 in-between Democratic 
Party of 
Japan (DPJ) 
Hatoyama 
Yukio 
8 June 2010 to 
17 Sep 2010 
Kan Naoto 
Yanagida 
Minoru 
Male 17 Sep 2010 to 
22 Nov 2010 
2 months 0 hawk DPJ Kan Naoto 
Sengoku 
Yoshito 
Male 22 Nov 2010 to 
14 Jan 2011 
2 months 0 dove DPJ Kan Naoto 
Eda Satsuki Male 14 Jan 2011 to 2 
Sep 2011 
8 months 0 dove DPJ Kan Naoto 
Hiraoka 
Hideo 
Male 2 Sep 2011 to 13 
Jan 2012 
4 months 0 dove DPJ Noda 
Yoshihiko 
Ogawa 
Toshio 
Male 13 Jan 2012 to 4 
Jun 2012 
5 months 3 hawk DPJ Noda 
Yoshihiko 
Taki Minoru Male 4 Jun 2012 to 1 
Oct 2012 
4 months 4 hawk DPJ Noda 
Yoshihiko 
Tanaka 
Keishu 
Male 1 Oct 2012 to 23 
Oct 2012 
23 days 0 dove DPJ Noda 
Yoshihiko 
Taki Minoru Male 24 Oct 2012 to 
26 Dec 2012 
2 months 0 hawk DPJ Noda 
Yoshihiko 
Tanigaki 
Sadakazu 
Male 26 Dec 2012 to 
today 
ongoing 5 hawk LDP Abe Shinzo 
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